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ABSTRACT 
  
In contrast to the truth of religion, the utility of religion has been a historically-underappreciated 
subject of philosophical scholarship and everyday discourse, and this dissertation aims to draw 
more attention to the fruits of religion in everyday life.  The utility of religion is an expansive 
topic and, in the interest of offering a reasonable treatment of it, the dissertation focuses on 
outlining the insights offered by three nineteenth-century philosophers in particular, for whom 
the utility of religion was an important issue: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900), and William James (1842-1910); this is accomplished by devoting a chapter to a 
text authored by each of these thinkers: 1) Utility of Religion (Mill), 2) The Anti-Christ 
(Nietzsche), and 3) The Varieties of Religious Experience (James).  In these works, Mill, 
Nietzsche, and James defend a variety of positions regarding the utility of religion, and they offer 
an illuminating survey of the many relevant issues (e.g. the relationship between religion and 
morality and the relationship between religion and happiness).  The dissertation advances 
conclusions regarding the utility of religion in view of the textual analyses offered, and it 
highlights the significance of—and a vision for—future scholarship devoted to the topic in light 
of these conclusions.  Specifically, it proposes that we have good reasons to question the moral 
advantages frequently ascribed to religion, but that religion is nonetheless vitally useful for 
some—and perhaps many—individuals who would otherwise never be able to find happiness.  
Although it is possible for some to experience lasting happiness without the aid of religion 
(contrary to what James suggests), others require religious salvation in order to find peace of 
mind (contrary to what Mill, to a lesser extent, and Nietzsche, to a greater extent, suggest). 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
  
Writing this dissertation was one of the hardest things I have ever done, and it was a humbling 
learning experience, to say the least.  However, I feel a great sense of satisfaction and 
accomplishment in having completed it.  I owe many people thanks for seeing me through the 
process.  First, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Ben Eggleston, 
Thomas Tuozzo, Dale Dorsey, Sandra Zimdars-Swartz, and, especially, my advisor, James 
Woelfel.  Perhaps more than anyone else, Professor Woelfel’s wisdom, guidance, and scholarly 
example have helped me mature as a scholar.  Moreover, his patience with me and his feedback 
on the various drafts of this dissertation were invaluable.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Gene Fendt and Professor Yōzan Mosig, who were particularly formidable in my early 
intellectual development as an undergraduate student at the University of Nebraska at Kearney; 
both helped kindle my interest in philosophy, and their authentic and passionate personalities 
inspired me to stay true to myself.  I cannot neglect to mention a kind of historical debt of 
gratitude to John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, and William James, whose many insights 
regarding the utility of religion form the foundation of the dissertation that follows.  Finally, I 
would like to thank my family (my wife, Paula; my children, Abigail, Jack, and Sophia; my 
parents, Steve and Jane; my sister, Brittany; my father-in-law, Paul; and my mother-in-law, 
Susan) and my closest friends (Josh Herian, Jamie Kramer, Daniel Davis, and Joseph Braun), 
who kept me grounded throughout the many years it took to complete this dissertation, and who 
have always encouraged me with an optimistic outlook when I needed it most. 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TITLE PAGE           i 
ACCEPTANCE PAGE         ii 
ABSTRACT           iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS         v 
INTRODUCTION           1 
CHAPTER 1: J.S. Mill and Utility of Religion       7 
CHAPTER 2: Friedrich Nietzsche and The Anti-Christ      68 
CHAPTER 3: William James and The Varieties of Religious Experience   134 
CONCLUSION          199 
APPENDIX: Comprehensive Outline of Dissertation     210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I can easily recall the first philosophy book I read—it was a book I stumbled upon early 
on in my high school years and that instantly ignited a passion for the philosophy of religion.  
That book was Bertrand Russell’s Why I am Not a Christian.  The book was provocative for me 
at the time for a number of reasons.  Chief among them was the fact that I had been growing up 
in an ultra-conservative and heavily Christian south-central portion of Nebraska; almost all of 
my peers were religious (in fact, not one comes to mind who was not), and by this I mean that 
they professed allegiance to some (very predominantly Christian) religion and attended regular 
religious events and ceremonies.  To my knowledge, few if any of these acquaintances had ever 
thought of questioning their religion.  Russell, on the other hand, did precisely this, questioning 
the value of something that has been, for the most part, universally embraced throughout the 
history of humankind.  As time has passed, I have become very curious about a number of 
aspects regarding religion.  What, for instance, explains the endurance and nearly-universal 
nature of religious belief?  Why, when so much seems to change over time, does religion 
continue to exert as much influence as it did thousands of years ago?  Does religion help to 
ensure the survival of our species (in which case its influence might be attributed to something 
like natural selection), or is it gradually tearing us apart through doctrinal differences and holy 
conflicts, as some scholars suggest?1  More generally, is it useful—does it make us happy?  What 
                                                             
1 Consider, for example, the arguments advanced by Sam Harris, a contemporary American scholar, in his book, The 
End of Faith. One of Harris’s chief claims therein is that religion, if strictly adhered to, is inherently divisive, and he 
argues that there is a significant positive correlation between religiosity and violence.  I will say much more about 
the relationship between religion and violence throughout the dissertation. 
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follows is the culmination of years of personal reflection on religion, ruminations that began with 
that fateful first book. 
Specifically, I will examine key philosophical texts that address issues regarding the 
utility of religion.  In doing so, I reflect on whether religion is useful for the individuals who 
subscribe to it and for society at large, not on whether there is any truth to the claims advanced in 
various religious doctrines.  Admittedly, the subject matter at hand is highly complex, and I feel 
it is imperative that I be as clear as possible about what exactly it is that I intend to assess.  As I 
have indicated, the concept of “utility” is essential here: there is a significant difference between 
an analysis of religion in terms of truth and an analysis of it in terms of utility.  It is one thing to 
ask about the truth of various claims within the doctrines of a religion (e.g. “Jesus died for our 
sins”), and it is quite another to ask about the usefulness of the religions espousing such claims.  
In the following analysis, I distinguish the truth of religion from the utility of religion and 
examine the latter.  Ultimately, what I desire to know is this: does religion make us happy? 
Naturally, one might wonder why we ought to focus on the utility of religion to begin 
with—that is, why should we concern ourselves with this issue?  The short answer lies in the fact 
that religion is so prevalent.  According to recent estimates, roughly 84% percent of the world’s 
population is religious (in fact, over 50% of all people alive right now subscribe to either 
Christianity or Islam).2  At the time of this writing, the world’s population is estimated to be 
7,170,216,431,3 which means that, conservatively, six billion people across the globe consider 
themselves religious.  The general point is that, while there are certainly a multitude of 
phenomena affecting the wellbeing of humanity, few are as widespread as religion.  As a result, 
                                                             
2 adherents.com, Major Religions of the World Ranked by Number of Adherents, 
http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html (accessed 5 Nov. 2010). 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/popclockworld.html (accessed 3 June 
2014). 
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this makes consideration of the usefulness of religion all the more worthwhile, since it is much 
more likely to affect humanity in significant and palpable ways. 
In my experience, discussions within the philosophy of religion, both in common 
parlance and in academic settings, tend to revolve around the truth of religion, rather than around 
its usefulness.  John Stuart Mill echoes this sentiment, as the first sentence of his essay Utility of 
Religion (which is the subject of Chapter 1) reads: “it has sometimes been remarked how much 
has been written, both by friends and enemies, concerning the truth of religion, and how little, at 
least in the way of discussion or controversy, concerning its usefulness.”4  Mill thinks that this 
can be explained by the fact that questions regarding religion’s utility seldom arise unless 
questions regarding its truth have already been raised, and, thus, because “so long…as men 
[accept] the teachings of their religion as positive facts, no more a matter of doubt than their own 
existence or the existence of the objects around them, to ask the use of believing it could not 
possibly occur to them.”5  Not surprisingly, then, “the utility of religion did not need to be 
asserted until the arguments for its truth had in a great measure ceased to convince.”6  As a 
result, Mill believes that we should not find it surprising that so little attention is paid to the 
question of religion’s usefulness, and I share this conviction. 
It is worth noting that, in drawing attention to the distinction between the truth of religion 
and the utility of religion, and to the common tendency to emphasize the former, Mill has 
skeptics of religion (e.g. Jeremy Bentham and Auguste Comte)7 equally in mind.  According to 
Mill, skeptics often seem to share the same predicament as their religious counterparts in that 
                                                             
4 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. 
John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 403. 
5 Mill, Collected Works, 403. 
6 Mill, Collected Works, 403. 
7 Mill says that these are the only two thinkers he is familiar with who posit doubts regarding religion’s usefulness 
(Mill, Collected Works, 406). 
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they are also preoccupied with the intellectual aspects of religion, specifically with the idea that 
religious doctrines are false, which then prevents them from duly considering the utility of 
religion.  I will say more about this in Chapter 1, and, on this point, Mill’s remarks no doubt 
seem justified.  It is disappointing that notions regarding the truth of religion have the potential 
to prevent us from considering its usefulness.  What’s more, I believe that an investigation into 
the utility of religion is, at least in one important respect, a more promising and fruitful project.  
By its very nature, the question of utility appeals to the tangible effects religion has on our 
everyday lives, which are more or less directly observable to most of us, whereas the question of 
truth tends to waffle in more obscure and theoretical discourse, involving claims that cannot be 
so easily tested.  Ultimately, I think that the utility of religion is a significant and generally 
underappreciated issue, and one thing I hope to accomplish in writing this dissertation is to bring 
more attention to it. 
Fortunately, there are some who have recognized the value of examining the utility of 
religion, and we inherit a rich historical treatment of the issue, thanks to some classics in the 
philosophy of religion as well as to innovative insights provided by contemporary thinkers.  As 
we shall see, some well-known philosophers have explicitly addressed the issue, and, while it 
may be true that few philosophers make the utility of religion their primary concern, many still 
have much to say about it indirectly by way of discussing related issues.  Clearly, a 
comprehensive analysis of all relevant contributions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and 
I must therefore propose a more manageable treatment of the subject.   
Within philosophical circles, interest in the utility of religion increased markedly during 
the nineteenth century, which is highlighted by the contributions of three nineteenth-century 
philosophers in particular.  John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and 
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William James (1842-1910) each offer extensive reflections on the utility of religion.  As it turns 
out, these three thinkers also offer an illuminating spectrum in terms of their positions regarding 
the utility of religion: James argues very much in favor of religion’s overall usefulness and 
Nietzsche very much against it, while Mill offers a sympathetic yet critical view that lies 
somewhere in between.  For these reasons, I feel justified in examining the utility of religion 
through the lens of what they have to say and, while I will allude to a variety of influential 
works, from the distant past to the present, I shall focus on three well-known and pertinent texts 
authored by them, with a chapter devoted to each: 1) Utility of Religion by Mill, 2) The Anti-
Christ by Nietzsche, and 3) The Varieties of Religious Experience by James. 
By working with these texts, I intend to survey the many issues one ought to consider 
when assessing the utility of religion.  For instance, does religion improve the physical and 
mental health of believers, as many suggest?  Moreover, what is the relationship between 
religion and morality?  Is religion necessary for morality as some maintain, or is it morally 
problematic as others claim?  These are just some of the many questions addressed in the 
analysis that follows.  A few more examples of significant themes that emerge are: the 
psychology of religious belief; the relationship between religion and nihilism; the relationship 
between science and religion; the relationship between religion and violence; and the relationship 
between evolution and religion.  As we shall see, all of these themes relate to the utility of 
religion in significant ways.  Besides working with the philosophical texts mentioned, I will 
discuss empirical research pertaining to the various benefits and harms associated with religion.  
For example, I will discuss research relating to a possible link between religiosity and personal 
health, as well as research regarding the relationship between religiosity and moral behavior.  As 
I examine what Mill, Nietzsche, and James suggest regarding the utility of religion and reflect on 
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the many related issues they raise, I naturally formulate my own conclusions regarding the 
usefulness of religion.  I will argue that religion yields little moral utility and that it can even be 
morally problematic.  However, I will contend that religion provides happiness to many 
individuals who seem otherwise incapable of experiencing it.  In view of these considerations, I 
conclude by stressing the complex nature of the issue; I propose that a final judgment regarding 
the utility of religion calls for extended scholarly analysis, and I offer some suggestions for 
proceeding. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
John Stuart Mill and Utility of Religion 
 
I. Introduction 
I begin my analysis of the utility of religion with an examination of John Stuart Mill’s 
Utility of Religion, which is arguably one of the most significant contributions made to the 
subject, despite its short length of less than thirty pages.  Compare this with William James’s 
masterpiece, The Varieties of Religious Experience, a canonical work in the philosophy of 
religion and the subject of Chapter 3, which, in addition to being much more widely known, 
weighs in at over five-hundred pages.  What Mill, a nineteenth-century British philosopher, is 
able to do in this essay is quite extraordinary.  The Utility of Religion and two other essays 
written by Mill, Nature and Theism, were collectively published posthumously in 1874 as Three 
Essays on Religion.  Despite its brevity, Mill advances a surprising number of arguments in 
Utility of Religion.  Before turning to Mill’s analysis, I’d like to make a few brief prefatory 
remarks, to help establish some context for his essay.   
Utility of Religion seems like an excellent place to start because, as the title of the essay 
suggests, it is expressly concerned with considerations of the usefulness of religion.  Consider 
Mill’s stated purpose in writing the essay:   
It is perfectly conceivable that religion may be morally useful without being 
intellectually sustainable; and it would be a proof of great prejudice in any 
unbeliever to deny, that there have been ages, and that there are still both nations 
and individuals, with regard to whom this is actually the case.  Whether it is the 
case generally, and with reference to the future, it is the object of this paper to 
examine.8 
                                                             
8 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. 
John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 405. 
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Here, Mill calls attention to the distinction between the utility and the truth of religion.  Indeed, 
Mill, who is known for championing utilitarianism, makes frequent appeals to the notion of 
utility, and, perhaps more importantly, to its significance, throughout many of his writings, just 
as he does in his essay Nature, where he says, “all human action whatever, consists in altering, 
and all useful action in improving, the spontaneous course of nature.”9  It is not surprising, then, 
that Mill’s focus in Utility of Religion is not on the truth of various religious doctrines, but on 
whether religions ultimately aid us in our pursuit of a good life. 
At the time he penned Utility of Religion, Mill believed it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain religion intellectually.  Although Mill was always committed, first and 
foremost, to a value system governed primarily by considerations of utility and progress, as 
opposed to considerations of truth, he never completely severed the connection between them, 
and he explicitly remarks on the importance of this connection.  For example, he begins Utility of 
Religion by suggesting that “if religion, or any particular form of it, is true, its usefulness follows 
without other proof.”10  For Mill, the relationship between truth and utility is an important one, 
and this relationship is often, as it is here, at the crux of discussions regarding both the truth and 
the usefulness of religion.  I will address this relationship in more detail in Section C of Part III, 
as well as in subsequent chapters, but here I limit my reflections regarding this relationship to 
one more point.  It is worth emphasizing that Mill is leery of those who are quick to dismiss the 
usefulness of religion simply on the grounds that its teachings are not true.  He believes this 
dismissive standpoint is unwarranted, and he does not share the assumption of the “sceptical 
philosophers,” whom he says suggest that “if religion be false, nothing but good can be the 
                                                             
9 Mill, Collected Works, 402.  
10 Mill, Collected Works, 403. 
9 
 
consequence of rejecting it.”11  In fact, he fears that there are some who take their misgivings 
regarding the intellectual sustainability of religion too far and overstate the case against religion, 
as is evident from the declaration of his purpose in writing the essay.  Accordingly, Robert Carr, 
who traces the evolution of Mill’s thoughts on religion throughout Mill’s lifetime in his article 
“The Religious Thought of John Stuart Mill: A Study in Reluctant Scepticism,” is right to 
suggest that “for Mill, the problem of the utility of religion could not be so simply disposed of as 
skeptical philosophers were wont to believe.”12, 13  Not surprisingly, Mill spends considerable 
time at the beginning of the essay trying to show how some have taken these anti-religious 
sentiments too far.  Mill claims, for example, that Jeremy Bentham, a good friend of Mill’s father 
and a significant influence on Mill himself, overstated the skeptical case, and that Bentham’s 
discussion “presses many parts of the argument too hard.”14  Mill also suggests that these 
skeptics need to proceed more cautiously and exhibit more tolerance when considering the 
possibility of moral benefits pertaining to religion.  He suggests that, for the sake of argument, 
we ought to suppose that religion embodies the best moral perspective available, and then to ask 
whether religion is necessary or optimal for it, which the skeptical philosophers whom he 
references are reluctant and/or fail to do.  Finally, although he will ultimately argue against many 
of the arguments in favor of the utility of religion, he insists that most of the ill effects of religion 
                                                             
11 Mill, Collected Works, 405. 
12Robert Carr, “The Religious Thought of John Stuart Mill: A Study in Reluctant Scepticism,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 23, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1962), 488. 
13 Carr provides a fascinating account of the evolution of Mill’s views on religion.  Carr argues that these views 
changed considerably throughout Mill’s life, suggesting, for example, that “the Mill of 1870…was quite far 
removed, intellectually as well as chronologically, from the youthful propagandist who in 1823 had campaigned 
almost flippantly for religious toleration” (Carr, Religious Thought, 494).  Carr, in turn, attributes this significant 
shift in views to three factors: “Mill’s personality itself, his absorbing concern for morality, and the age in which he 
lived” (Carr, Religious Thought, 494).  With respect to this last factor, Carr remarks that “perhaps Mill unknowingly 
described himself as well as his age when in On Liberty he characterized Victorian England as an ‘age devoid of 
faith, yet terrified of scepticism’” (Carr, Religious Thought, 495). 
14 Mill, Collected Works, 406. 
10 
 
ought to be divorced from it, claiming that, as humankind evolves and progresses, “the immoral, 
or otherwise mischievous consequences which have been drawn from religion, are, one by one, 
abandoned, and, after having been long fought for as of its very essence, are discovered to be 
easily separable from it.”15, 16  In sum, while Mill does not ultimately evince a very favorable 
impression of the usefulness of religion, especially, as we shall see, with respect to its social 
utility, he certainly remains on guard against any unwarranted hostility toward such prospects. 
Lastly, I ought to say something about what Mill means by “religion,” a term that has 
been notoriously difficult to define.  I think Daniel Dennett, a contemporary thinker closely 
associated with the New Atheism movement, is right when he says, “we should expect—and 
tolerate—some difficulty in arriving at a counterexample-proof definition of something as 
diverse and complex as religion.”17  In his own utilitarian analysis of religion, Mill suggests that 
“the essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an 
ideal object, recognized as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish 
objects of desire.”18  For Mill, as Lou Matz points out, “what makes these ideals ‘religious’ is 
that they are the ultimate concern of human beings and form the highest ends to which all others 
are secondary.”19  In my view, this kind of definition can be problematic because it defines 
religion in such a broad manner that it includes secular commitments such as patriotism (as we 
shall see in outlining Mill’s analysis) and Marxism, and even Mill’s own commitment to 
utilitarianism, commitments that I believe most people would not readily associate with 
                                                             
15 Mill, Collected Works, 406. 
16 I express my worries about this claim in Section C of Part II. 
17 Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 7-8. 
18 Mill, Collected Works, 422. 
19 Lou Matz, “The Utility of Religious Illusion: A Critique of J.S. Mill’s Religion of Humanity,” Utilitas, vol. 12, 
issue 2 (2000), 143. 
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religion.20  Furthermore, it seems strange, given the undertones of Mill’s own writing, to think of 
him as religious, yet his conception of religion would oblige us to do so.  It seems to me that, 
when thinking of religion, most people have something more specific in mind than what Mill 
offers us here.  In defining religion, most would likely appeal to some notion of God, and, 
perhaps, to other supernatural phenomena.  World religions such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, 
and Hinduism, in addition to various indigenous religions, make this kind of appeal.  
Accordingly, what most people likely have in mind is not just any “ideal object,” as Mill’s 
general characterization suggests, but something more specific and akin to Dennett’s conception 
of religions, which he describes as “social systems whose participants avow belief in a 
supernatural agent or agents whose approval is to be sought."21  Yet (and I cannot emphasize 
the following point enough), while Mill thinks of religion in such a broad manner, most of his 
analysis in Utility of Religion actually focuses on a more particular kind of religion, to wit, what 
he calls “supernatural” religions (by which he means something that closely resembles Dennett’s 
definition of the term after all).22 
In my estimation, Mill concisely, and for the most part judiciously, attempts to analyze 
religion in terms of its effects on society and on individuals.  Mill suggests that “the inquiry 
divides itself into two parts, corresponding to the double aspect of the subject; its social, and its 
individual aspect.  What does religion do for society, and what for the individual?”23  In outlining 
                                                             
20 I do not mean to suggest that Mill is alone in thinking of religion in such a general fashion.  For example, in his 
book, Psychoanalysis and Religion, Erich Fromm offers a similar notion of religious experience, saying, “religious 
experience is the wondering, the marveling, the becoming aware of life and of one’s own existence, and of the 
puzzling problem of one’s relatedness to the world” (Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press , 1950), 9).  Fromm also maintains that a feeling of oneness, akin to the famous “oceanic feeling” 
Freud alludes to in his Civilization and Its Discontents, is an element of the religious experience.  Additionally, 
James employs a very similar conception of religion, as will become clear in Chapter 3. 
21 Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 9. 
22 The difficulties associated with defining religion is a recurring theme throughout the remainder of the dissertation. 
23 Mill, Collected Works, 406. 
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his views regarding the matter, I follow this general structure, beginning with an analysis of what 
he has to say regarding religion as an instrument of social good (Part II), and then moving on to  
a discussion of his thoughts regarding religion as an instrument of individual good (Part III).  I 
will survey the many arguments he presents regarding the relationship between religion and 
morality and discuss his well-known substitute for supernatural religions, the “Religion of 
Humanity.”  I will argue that, with a few exceptions, which I will expand on as they appear, he 
generally offers illuminating observations with respect to both the social and the individual 
utility of religion.  I will also express a few concerns, however, which ultimately make Mill’s 
analysis seem somewhat incomplete.  I will soon turn to an analysis of why it is that Mill thinks 
religion erroneously receives so much credit for society’s moral persuasions (Section B of Part 
II), which will be followed by an analysis of why he thinks religion is in many ways morally 
problematic (Section C of Part II), but first I shall begin by characterizing the thesis that religion 
is morally advantageous. 
 
II. Religion and Morality 
A. The Moral Case for the Social Utility of Religion 
Mill begins his essay by examining religion’s influence on the welfare of society, most 
notably, and, seemingly for Mill, exclusively, by way of the moral benefits it is thought to 
engender.  Hence, Mill focuses on the relationship between religion and morality, which, to be 
sure, is what much of the discussion regarding the usefulness of religion seems centered around.  
If it is true, as is often suggested, that morality depends on—or is aided in some manner by—
religion, and if it is true that a moral society is, in fact, a happier society (which, for the sake of 
argument, I shall grant here), then it seems we would have good reason to look favorably upon 
13 
 
religion, at least in terms of its social utility.  Many well-known and respected historical figures 
have advanced this kind of thesis, crediting religion with yielding moral benefits to society.  
Indeed, Benjamin Franklin once stated that “religion will be a powerful regulator of our actions, 
give us peace and tranquility within our minds, and render us benevolent, useful and beneficial to 
others.”24  Similarly, David Hume, who is well-known for his skeptical arguments regarding 
proofs for the existence of God, makes a case for why religion is necessary for social stability.25  
In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s literary classic, The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov, one of the 
main protagonists, goes so far as to famously suggest that, if God does not exist, then everything 
becomes permissible.  Similarly, when describing Mill’s early views regarding religion (i.e. 
those he voices in writings that predate Three Essays on Religion), Carr suggests that “from all 
indications…Mill was hesitant, if not unwilling, to assume a completely anti-religious position,” 
and notes that “his reason was not…that he had come to dislike religion less, but that he feared 
anarchy more.”26  Elaborating on this point later in his article, Carr claims that Mill’s “desire for 
social renovation was constantly held in check by his fear of social upheaval.”27  These thinkers 
all suggest that there is good reason to think that religion might be morally advantageous.  The 
thesis that religion is morally advantageous can be supported in a variety of ways, some of which 
I will now briefly detail. 
 Some go so far as to suggest that religion is necessary for morality. Many, philosophers 
and non-philosophers alike, believe that it is impossible for human beings to develop a moral 
compass without the guiding influence of religion.  For example, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-
                                                             
24 Walter Isaacson.  Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 87-88. 
25 See Frederick G. Whelan’s Church Establishments, Liberty & Competition in Religion for a detailed analysis of 
Hume’s case for state-sanctioned religion: Frederick G. Whelan, “Church Establishments, Liberty & Competition in 
Religion,” Polity, vol. 23, no. 2 (Winter, 1990), 155-185. 
26 Carr, Religious Thought, 485. 
27 Carr, Religious Thought, 495. 
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1860), who was a precursor of—and a significant influence on—Friedrich Nietzsche (whose 
views regarding the utility of religion will be examined in Chapter 2), offers one formulation of 
this line of thinking, suggesting, by way of Demopheles, a character in his Religion: A Dialogue, 
that, “where you have masses of people of crude susceptibilities and clumsy intelligence, sordid 
in their pursuits and sunk in drudgery, religion provides the only means of proclaiming and 
making them feel the hight  import of life.”28  Here, Schopenhauer paints a rather dismal and 
less-than-flattering portrait of humanity, according to which human beings, sans religion, are 
barbaric and incapable of naturally providing their own moral compass.  Were they not 
acquainted with religion and the moral guidance provided by holy texts, the implication is that 
human beings would remain consumed by their own selfish earthly passions and remain wholly 
ignorant of, or, worse, unconcerned with, the plight and welfare of their fellow human beings.  
Albeit a bit crude, this characterization captures the view of some (and perhaps many) with 
respect to the relationship between religion and moral conduct.  However, those making a case 
for the moral necessity of religion need not voice their case as strongly as Schopenhauer’s 
character does here.  Instead, they might simply argue that, while not categorically necessary for 
all people, such religious sympathies are necessary in order for some individuals to realize their 
moral potential.  As examples, proponents of this position might point to former hardened 
criminals who claim they would never have turned over a new leaf and assumed a straight and 
narrow path had they not “found God.”  Such cases are familiar to many of us.  The implication 
is still that religion elicits moral behavior that would have otherwise never come to fruition, at 
least in terms of some segment of the population. 
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 While many proponents of the thesis under consideration think that the development of 
morality is dependent—whether for some or for all individuals—on religion, others simply 
maintain that religion yields moral benefits to society (i.e. they do not go so far as to claim that 
religion is necessary for morality).  Indeed, religion may still prove useful for society in moral 
terms even if it is not thought to be necessary for the establishment of our basic moral 
sensibilities.  Ultimately, while shying away from the claim that we would have no semblance of 
morality were it not for religion, which is a stronger claim to be sure, one might still argue that 
religion allows us an easy means by which to propagate morality.  Gregory S. Paul, whose 
empirical findings regarding the relationship between religion and morality will be discussed 
later in Section D of Part II, likely has this distinction in mind when he writes: “at one end of the 
spectrum are those who consider creator belief helpful but not necessarily critical to individuals 
and societies. At the other end the most ardent advocates consider persons and people inherently 
unruly and ungovernable unless they are strictly obedient to the creator.”29  I now turn to a brief 
account of two major themes underlying most arguments in favor of the thesis under 
consideration, which Mill himself distinguishes and highlights as he proceeds with his analysis. 
 First, many think of religion as a sort of enforcer of morality, as something that helps to 
inspire moral behavior that might otherwise be lacking.  The idea here is that religion helps 
provide the motive for people to act in a moral manner.  Those who make this kind of case 
typically appeal to the threat of eternal punishment (e.g. hell) for immorality and the promise of 
eternal reward (e.g. heaven) awaiting those who behave morally.  Granting moral behavior on 
the part of religious individuals may be—and no doubt for many is—solely inspired by a desire 
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to emulate a good and loving God, for others it is thought to stem primarily from the thought of 
eternal consequences in an afterlife, which is imbedded in their religious convictions.  
Accordingly, the threat of eternal consequences is said to act as a deterrent for unwanted 
behavior here on Earth. 
In addition to acting as a formidable enforcer of morality, religion is often credited with 
introducing a large number of people to morality.  That is, religion is viewed as a kind of teacher 
of morality.  In contrast to the notion that religion is an enforcer of morality, the point here is 
“that granting the sufficiency of human motives to make the rule obeyed, were it not for the 
religious idea we should not have had the rule itself.”30  Characterizing supporters of this view, 
Mill writes: “they say, that religion alone can teach us what morality is; that all the high morality 
ever recognized by mankind, was learnt from religion.”31  Along these lines, one might also 
suggest that religion offers a powerful voice on behalf of morality, citing, for example, the 
efficient means it provides for delivering moral teachings.  Given the mass followings of the 
various religions in question, religious messages have a very large audience, which, in turn, 
likely makes disseminating moral messages and encouraging ethical strictures much easier when 
they are involved.  Moreover, religion can be said to preserve and pass on moral wisdoms and 
teachings from generation to generation, providing society with a valuable service in doing so.  
In general, advocates of this line of thought assert that religion offers an ideal vehicle to deliver a 
moral message to the bulk of humanity, a message that might never have otherwise been 
received. 
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On a related note, there are those, including, as we shall see, Mill himself,32 who suggest 
that we have religion to credit for our initial discovery of moral conduct, and that, at the very 
least, we owe it a historical debt of gratitude.  The idea here is that, devoid of religious influence, 
we would have never originally uncovered our sense of morality in the first place, and thus 
religion was necessary for the initial emergence of it (although religion may no longer be 
necessary for morality any longer).  This is not so much an argument for why religion is 
presently useful for moral purposes, but, rather, an argument for why it was historically useful 
for such purposes.  Hence, the implication is that morality is the legacy of religion, and that 
without religion the birth of morality would have been aborted. 
It is worth emphasizing that, if true, most of what Mill says gives us good reason to be 
skeptical of the thesis we are considering, with regard to both religion’s ability to act as an 
enforcer and to act as a teacher of morality.  However, Mill takes it one step further than this.  
Not only does he call into question the positive influence of religion on morality, he goes so far 
as to suggest that religion might be antithetical to moral progress.33  It’s no surprise, then, that 
Mill tasked himself with writing Utility of Religion, wherein he expresses his moral misgivings 
regarding religion, given that in his Autobiography he writes: “on religion in particular the time 
appears to me to have come when it is the duty of all who being qualified in point of knowledge 
have on mature considerations satisfied themselves that the current opinions are not only false 
but hurtful, to make their dissent known.”34  I turn now to a discussion of Mill’s analysis of the 
relationship between religion and morality.  
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B. Mill’s Case against the Thesis that Religion Is Morally 
Advantageous 
 While many are sympathetic to the idea that religion is morally advantageous, others are 
wary of its implications.  Philalethes—Demopheles’ foil in Schopenhauer’s dialogue—cautions 
that “you mustn’t ascribe to religion what results from innate goodness of character, by which 
compassion for the man who would suffer by his crime keeps a man from committing it.  This is 
the genuine moral motive, and as such it is independent of all religions.”35  Philalethes suggests 
that we are apt to credit religion for inspiring good acts when it is not in fact the true source of 
them.  In Utility of Religion, Mill argues in a similar vein, suggesting that the moral advantages 
often associated with religion are mistakenly attributed to it, and that the connection between 
religion and morality is generally overstated and tenuous at best.   
 To begin with, Mill argues that, although religion may receive the credit for eliciting the 
moral sentiments present in human beings, in reality the true force behind these sentiments lies 
primarily in three other factors:  1) authority, 2) education, and 3) public opinion.  He believes 
that there is a tendency to credit “religion as such with the whole of the power inherent in any 
system of moral duties inculcated by education and enforced by opinion.”36  In his view, these 
other underlying factors are what really elicit and encourage moral behavior; divorce religion 
from these attendant factors, and it will cease to appear as though it exerts any real influence 
on—or control over—human behavior.  Ultimately, Mill believes that, “since everything of this 
sort [i.e. the enforcement and teaching of morality] which does take place, takes place in the 
name of religion” and “almost all who are taught any morality whatever, have it taught to them 
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as religion,” “religion receives the credit of all the influence in human affairs which belongs to 
any generally accepted system of rules for the guidance and government of human life.”37   
 Thus, Mill claims that religion only appears to produce moral benefits because of its 
associations with these more fundamental and powerful forces, and he begins making this case 
by examining the role that authority plays in the matter.  In doing so, he accentuates “the 
enormous influence of authority on the human mind,” by which he means “an involuntary 
influence” that exerts influence on “men’s conviction, on their persuasion, [and] on their 
involuntary sentiments.”38  In fact, he maintains that “authority is the evidence on which the 
mass of mankind believe everything which they are said to know, except facts of which their 
own senses have taken cognizance.”39  For Mill, these general reflections on the nature of 
authority relate to morality because “when any rule of life and duty, whether grounded or not on 
religion, has conspicuously received the general assent, it obtains a hold on the belief of every 
individual, stronger than it would have even if he had arrived at it by the inherent force of his 
own understanding.”40  The idea here is that much of what we see with respect to the moral 
beliefs and behaviors of individuals is similar to what we see with respect to their scientific 
beliefs: just as most individuals readily endorse scientific principles and theories that they cannot 
actually confirm by their own personal experiences, simply because they are widely accepted and 
backed by experts in the scientific community, so, too, individuals will adopt the same moral 
beliefs as others around them, especially those of authoritative figures.  What Mill suggests, then, 
is that when morality is well-grounded and a permanent fixture in our lives it is simply because it 
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is widely recognized and upheld by so many people to begin with, especially by those held in 
high esteem by society, not because of any religious associations it might have. 
 Mill moves on to discuss the power of education and the role it plays in adherence to a 
system of morality, especially as it concerns the persuasions of highly impressionable youth.  
Mill attaches great significance to education, claiming that “there is not one natural inclination 
which it is not strong enough to coerce, and, if needful, to destroy by disuse.”41  Consider, he 
implores his readers, “how unspeakable is the effect of bringing people up from infancy in a 
belief, and in habits founded on it.”42  Couple this with the fact that “in all countries…all or 
nearly all who have been brought up by parents, or by any one interested in them, have been 
taught from their earliest years some kind of religious belief,”43 and it should come as no surprise 
that religion has proven to be so influential in the course of human affairs.  Mill’s point here is 
that this sort of influence can be garnered by any systemic worldview, religious or otherwise, 
provided it is impressed on people from an early age, which is to say that any moral benefits 
associated with this kind of influence are not the exclusive domain of religion.   As a result, Mill 
concludes that “it is reasonable to think that any system of social duty which mankind might 
adopt, even though divorced from religion, would have the same advantage of being inculcated 
from childhood, and would have it hereafter much more perfectly than any doctrine has it at 
present.”44  It is also worth emphasizing that Mill argues that religious teachings are particularly 
powerful (as are any kinds of teaching for which the following holds true) because children are 
exposed to them at such an early age.  In support of this, he points out that “it is especially 
characteristic of the impressions of early education, that they possess what is so much more 
                                                             
41 Mill, Collected Works, 409. 
42 Mill, Collected Works, 408. 
43 Mill, Collected Works, 408. 
44 Mill, Collected Works, 408. 
21 
 
difficult for later convictions to obtain—command over the feelings.”45  With this, Mill suggests 
that the emotional attachments formed during our youth usually become permanent fixtures 
within us, difficult to set aside later, even when rational thought would seem to jeopardize 
them.46  In the end, Mill insists that, once again, religion only seems so powerful because of a 
greater force—in this case, education—associated with it.  Remove the advantages of education 
from religion, and it ceases to appear so morally effective.  Alternatively, imbue the young with 
a system of morality devoid of religion, and it should prove just as effective.  Mill points out that 
this was attempted by the ancient Greek states, which, according to Mill, relied almost 
exclusively on secular inducements for moral behavior.47  “Among the Greeks generally,” he 
writes, “social morality was extremely independent of religion,” and “such moral teaching as 
existed in Greece had very little to do with religion.”48  Interestingly, he adds that “the case of 
Greece is…the only one in which any teaching, other than religious, has had the unspeakable 
advantage of forming the basis of education.”49  It should be noted that, since Mill’s time, other 
examples of equally secular (albeit less successful) societies have emerged—for example, the 
former Soviet Union.  In any case, Mill believes that the success of these ancient Greek states 
supports the “presumption that in other cases early religious teaching has owed its power over 
mankind rather to its being early than to its being religious.”50 
 Next, Mill expounds the power of public opinion, suggesting that it, too, underlies the 
relationship between religion and morality.  Here again, the idea is that much of the credit 
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religion receives in the moral arena ought to really be attributed to a more fundamental force at 
play: namely, being held in such high regard by the public in the first place.  According to Mill, 
this—public opinion—is really the driving force behind adherence to moral precepts, whether 
such moral precepts are associated with religion or not.  As he puts it, the desire to garner a 
favorable reputation in society “is a source of strength inherent in any system of moral belief 
which is generally adopted, whether connected with religion or not.”51  Mill goes so far as to say 
that “when the motive of public opinion acts in the same direction with conscience…it is then, of 
all motives which operate on the bulk of mankind, the most overpowering.”52  Expanding on 
why public opinion exerts so much power over our beliefs and behavior, Mill points out that, in 
addition to fearing the general contempt of our peers, we also face the threat of penalties that 
such contempt can arouse: “exclusion from social intercourse and from the innumerable good 
offices which human beings require from one another; the forfeiture of all that is called success 
in life; often the great diminution or total loss of means of subsistence; positive ill offices of 
various kinds, sufficient to render life miserable, and reaching in some states of society as far as 
actual persecution to death.”53  Given these threats, Mill suggests that it is no surprise that we 
generally endorse the prevalent moral precepts (and, I would add, the prevalent religious faiths) 
of our time.  Thus, he concludes, “any one who fairly and impartially considers the subject, will 
see reason to believe that those great effects on human conduct, which are commonly ascribed to 
motives derived directly from religion, have mostly for their proximate cause the influence of 
human opinion.  Religion has been powerful not by its intrinsic force, but because it has wielded 
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that additional and more mighty power.”54  In sum, provided we recognize these three more 
fundamental forces, Mill thinks religion ceases to appear so morally advantageous. 
 In view of these considerations, what should we make of the idea that religion helps 
provide the motive to act in moral ways—that is, that it acts as a kind of enforcer of morality?  
Mill specifically addresses the idea that the supernatural consequences associated with many 
religions makes them an effective means for soliciting moral behavior.  He doesn’t think that this 
is true and he argues that there is little reason to believe religion inspires moral behavior by way 
of supernatural threats.  First, he argues that the threat of eternal consequences is not palpable 
enough in our everyday lives to make an appreciable difference in our behavior.  He puts the 
point as follows: “rewards and punishments postponed to that distance of time, and never seen by 
the eye, are not calculated, even when infinite and eternal, to have, on ordinary minds, a very 
powerful effect in opposition to strong temptation.  Their remoteness alone is a prodigious 
deduction from their efficacy, on such minds as those which most require the restraint of 
punishment.”55  One might argue that all Mill demonstrates here is that eternal consequences are 
on the horizon of conscious concern, not that eternal consequences play no role in moral 
motivation whatsoever.  However, Mill offers a fairly convincing response to this objection, 
writing:  
There is one clear proof how little the generality of mankind, either religious or 
worldly, really dread eternal punishments, when we see how, even at the approach 
of death, when the remoteness which took so much from their effect has been 
exchanged for the closest proximity, almost all persons who have not been guilty 
of some enormous crime (and many who have) are quite free from uneasiness as 
to their prospects in another world, and never for a moment seem to think 
themselves in any real danger of eternal punishment.56, 57 
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Thus, Mill argues that the threat of eternal punishment is too extreme to serve as a legitimate 
enforcer of morality, even as death draws nearer.  The implication is that it is much too easy to 
persuade ourselves that we’re not going to hell for any of our earthly sins—after all, how can our 
finite earthly sins justify eternal damnation?  Mill echoes this point, saying, “even the worst 
malefactor is hardly able to think that any crime he has had it in his power to commit, any evil he 
can have inflicted in this short space of existence, can have deserved torture extending through 
an eternity,”58 and so “he easily persuades himself that whatever may have been his peccadilloes, 
there will be a balance in his favour at the least.”59 
Further, Mill thinks that the extreme nature of hell forces religions incorporating it into a 
practical dilemma: “bad religions teach that divine vengeance may be bought off, by offerings, or 
personal abasement; the better religions, not to drive sinners to despair, dwell so much on the 
divine mercy, that hardly any one is compelled to think himself irrevocably condemned.”60  
Neither response is promising for those making a case for the moral utility of religion; the first 
response yields unhealthy and unwanted guilt,61 and the second response diminishes—or entirely 
eliminates—the fear associated with eternal consequences, which those making this case depend 
upon.  These considerations lead Mill to conclude that “the sole quality in these punishments 
which might seem calculated to make them efficacious, their over-powering magnitude, is itself 
a reason why nobody (except a hypochondriac here and there) ever really believes that he is in 
any very serious danger of incurring them.”62  Mill offers us another reason to doubt the 
effectiveness of supernatural consequences when he suggests that “a still greater abatement is 
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their uncertainty.”63  While there may be some religious individuals who remain so firm in their 
convictions that they do not ever entertain doubts regarding their accuracy, there are, no doubt, 
others who are not so steadfast.  In the case of the latter, at least, Mill’s point holds true: the 
deterring effect of the supernatural consequences is minimized to the extent that there is 
uncertainty that such eternal consequences will ever, in fact, come to fruition. 
Having shown why he believes religion does not, in fact, act as an effective enforcer of 
morality, Mill next considers its merits as a teacher of morality.  Again, those advocating this 
kind of argument suggest that religion can be credited for delivering moral truths to us, 
regardless of whether it deserves credit for inspiring us to act on them.  However, even if this 
turns out to be true, Mill’s view suggests that it is possible to teach these moral principles 
without the aid of religion.64  Provided religion helps teach moral principles, if it doesn’t turn out 
to be necessary for this end (in which case there are other suitable teachers of morality 
available), then the question of whether it is optimal becomes relevant.  Mill points to a number 
of reasons to think that religion is actually morally problematic (which I outline in Section C of 
Part II), in which case it is difficult to think of it as an effective teacher of morality.65  While it’s 
hard to imagine that Mill would go as far as Sigmund Freud, who argues that, when it comes to 
modern religious restrictions, “primitive man was better off in knowing no restrictions of 
instinct,”66 he does suggest that, even supposing religion acts as an effective teacher of morality, 
there are non-religious alternatives available for introducing moral tenets to people (which also 
                                                             
63 Mill, Collected Works, 412. 
64 Recall that Mill argues “it is reasonable to think that any system of social duty which mankind might adopt, even 
though divorced from religion, would have the same advantage of being inculcated from childhood, and would have 
it hereafter much more perfectly than any doctrine has it at present” (Mill, Collected Works, 408).   
65 Once again, it bears repeating that Mill’s reflections regarding this point are primarily concerned with 
supernatural religions.   
66 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), 73. 
26 
 
avoid the problems he associates with supernatural religions).  I now turn to a discussion of the 
problems he associates with viewing religion as an effective teacher of morality. 
First, Mill alludes to the inconsistent teachings and moral recommendations offered by 
the multiplicity of religions that exist.  The central concern here is that religions do not offer us 
any sort of consensus when it comes to divine moral instruction, and, what’s worse, they even 
contradict one another at times. Hence, even granting, for the sake of argument, that morality is 
impossible without religious guidance, or that religion is otherwise advantageous when it comes 
to teaching moral principles, we must still determine the religion(s) for which this is true, which 
is a difficult task to be sure.  The problem is exacerbated when religions recommend disparate 
and conflicting recommendations for action.  For example, many Muslims believe that we ought 
to dress very modestly while in public (this belief is not, of course, limited to Muslims).  
Accordingly, many belonging to the Muslim tradition believe that women ought to wear burqas 
when out in public.  However, others belonging to other religious traditions maintain that, far 
from being morally appropriate, this is a cruel and unnecessary infringement on women’s rights 
and that, if anything, wearing them is morally repugnant.  In fact, in 2010, Belgium passed a bill 
banning any clothing that would obscure the identity of someone in places like parks and in the 
street; this, in effect, was a ban on burqas. 
Making matters worse, sometimes different denominations within the same religious 
tradition uphold different moral standards.  After all, not all Muslims advocate women wearing 
burqas.  Also note that, throughout history, Christianity has been used to both support and 
oppose slavery, as well as the death penalty.67  Many, including several notable philosophers, 
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have also suggested that the teachings of Jesus are at odds with what has come to be known as 
“Christianity.”  Mohandas Gandhi purportedly once said, “I like your Christ, I do not like your 
Christians. Your Christians are so unlike your Christ.”  Mill himself speaks of the “beauty and 
benignity and moral greatness which so eminently distinguish the sayings and character of 
Christ,”68 despite his many reservations about Christianity.  He reflects on the inconsistencies 
between Christianity as we have come to know it (owing, in large part, he says, to St. Paul) and 
the teachings of Christ himself.69  Along these lines, Carr maintains that “Mill’s quarrel was not 
with religion per se, but with the social expressions of organized Christianity in XIXth-century 
England.”70  Nietzsche also talks this way in much of his writing, suggesting that the character of 
the historical Christ offers a case of someone befitting the Aristotelian notion of nobility, a 
quality that is requisite for Nietzsche’s own “master morality” (which he views favorably), while 
Christianity, which is supposed to advance the teachings of Christ himself, is thought to do 
nothing of the sort.  Instead, for Nietzsche, modern day Christianity signals “slave morality” and 
is indicative of an ignoble character, a character who is timid and weak, and whose values 
encourage a passive and submissive will, rather than an active and virtuous will (I will say much 
more regarding Nietzsche’s views in Chapter 2). 
In the previous section, I mentioned the argument that religion was historically necessary 
for the initial introduction of morality to humankind.  Regardless of its current moral utility for 
society, the suggestion here is that religion was, in a sense, historically useful for the sake of 
morality.  On this point, Mill concludes that “there is truth in much of this, considered as a 
matter of history,” and “in any other way [ancient peoples] could not easily have been induced to 
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accept them [i.e. moral precepts].” 71  It seems to me that, in granting this historical advantage, 
Mill neglects another point he emphasizes elsewhere, namely his distinction “between the 
intrinsic capacities of human nature and the forms in which those capacities happen to have been 
historically developed.”72  Similarly, in The Subjection of Women he acknowledges that 
“experience cannot possibly have decided between two courses, so long as there has only been 
experience of one.”73  Yet Mill seems to rely solely on the course of history when he endorses 
the idea that religion helped elicit moral sentiments in ancient peoples.  Even if it were conceded 
that history shows us that a significant portion of human beings were aided by religion in the 
realization of their moral capacities, it tells us nothing more than this.  As such, it does not tell us 
that there were no other possible means by which those same people might have been assisted in 
the actualization of their moral capacities and, hence, that religion was necessary for the process.  
Nor does it demonstrate that religion was, in fact, the most optimal means available. 
However, having granted this historical benefit, Mill then wonders, “are not moral truths 
strong enough in their own evidence, at all events to retain the belief of mankind when once they 
have acquired it?”74  He concludes that “this benefit, whatever it amounts to, has been gained.  
Mankind have entered into possession of it.  It has become the property of humanity, and cannot 
now be lost by anything short of a return to primaeval barbarism.”75  Hence, in Mill’s view, once 
morality has been introduced to us, there is essentially no chance that we will dismiss its obvious 
benefits.  While he is sympathetic to the case for religion’s historical usefulness, he makes it 
clear that its usefulness does not extend beyond the historical past.  Regarding its current social 
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utility, Mill ultimately concludes, “belief, then, in the supernatural, great as are the services 
which it rendered in the early stages of human development, cannot be considered to be any 
longer required, either for enabling us to know what is right and wrong [i.e. as a teacher of 
morality], or for supplying us with motives to do right and to abstain from wrong [i.e. as a 
morality enforcer].”76 
 
C. Mill’s Case for Why Religion Is Morally Problematic 
Far from being a catalyst for morality, Mill suggests that religions can actually be 
morally inhibitory.  To begin with, Mill is worried that religion might stagnate moral progress, 
arguing that “there is a very real evil consequent on ascribing a supernatural origin to the 
received maxims of morality:” “wherever morality is supposed to be of supernatural origin, 
morality is stereotyped,” which “prevents them [i.e. moral maxims] from being discussed or 
criticized”77 and thus improved when they should be.  Mill laments that: 
If among the moral doctrines received as a part of religion, there be any which are 
imperfect—which were either erroneous from the first, or not properly limited and 
guarded in the expression, or which, unexceptionable once, are no longer suited to 
the changes that have taken place in human relations (and it is my firm belief that 
in so-called Christian morality, instances of all these kinds are to be found) these 
doctrines are considered equally binding on the conscience with the noblest, most 
permanent and most universal precepts of Christ.78 
 
Mill offers other reasons for thinking that religion can actually be counterproductive in 
terms of teaching morality.  For one, he illuminates the selfish nature of “moral” behavior that is 
motivated by the fear of eternal consequences, referring to the fear of hell as a “coarse and 
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selfish…social instrument.”79  As he points out, insofar as believers are compelled to behave 
morally due to fear of the eternal consequences they personally stand to face in an afterlife, there 
is some question as to whether the behavior thus inspired is truly moral in the first place.  After 
all, such believers are “moral” essentially out of fear of these personal consequences, which, on 
the face of it, certainly doesn’t seem to be a very moral motivation.  In view of this, Mill writes, 
“what now goes by the name of religion operates mainly through the feelings of self-interest.”80  
Hence, in this scenario, those who must be compelled to act appropriately by the threat of eternal 
consequences have a vested personal interest in acting morally, which many moral philosophers 
(e.g. Immanuel Kant) would insist implicitly detracts from the moral worth of what they are 
doing.  Mill himself describes moral sentiments as those within us that prove sympathetic to the 
unity of mankind, and the moral motivation inspired by the threat of supernatural consequences 
is, in this Millian sense, no true moral motivation, but rather a motivation to act on behalf of 
oneself.  In Mill’s view, this proves to be “a radical inferiority of the best supernatural 
religions.”81 
Matz raises an interesting objection pertaining to this point about motivation, suggesting 
that “a utilitarian like Mill must value, above all, the results of one’s action rather than the 
nobility or moral worth of action (which is demonstrated by one’s motive).”82  The idea here is 
that Mill seems inconsistent insofar as he emphasizes motives behind actions in making this 
point despite the fact that the moral theory he identifies with—utilitarianism—stresses the 
consequences that result from actions.  Matz asks his reader to imagine two individuals: one 
whose behavior is motivated by supernatural beliefs and yields good consequences and one 
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whose behavior is not motivated by such beliefs but also yields good consequence.  He points 
out that, to the utilitarian, the difference in motivation would be inconsequential.  Nevertheless, 
while I understand why Matz raises this concern, I don’t believe it undermines Mill’s point, 
especially—and unquestionably—for those who don’t endorse utilitarianism in the first place.  I 
think Mill’s point about motives can still be relevant even for a utilitarian, insofar as certain 
kinds of motives might lead to more desirable consequences.  Hence, a utilitarian could argue 
that those who act from selfless motives generally yield more happiness than do those who act 
from selfish motives, in which case Mill’s point here is very relevant for a utilitarian like 
himself. 
 Another relevant concern here is the notion of “holy wars” and the related hypothesis that 
religion increases violence.  If it is true that religion increases violence, as some argue,83 then it 
can be argued that religion actually inspires immorality.  I will say much more about this 
hypothesis throughout the remainder of the dissertation, and here I limit my comments to the 
implications of what Mill says about it.  Mill asserts that, “in truth, mankind have been so 
unremittingly occupied in doing evil to one another in the name of religion, from the sacrifice of 
Iphigenia to the Dragonnades of Louis XIV.”84  However, he maintains that “these odious 
consequences…do not belong to religion in itself, but to particular forms of it, and afford no 
argument against the usefulness of any religions except those by which such enormities are 
encouraged.”85   It seems to me that Mill’s qualification is a bit suspect.  Granting that particular 
forms of religion refrain from the violence in question, why minimize the existence of those that 
do?  Religion (or anything else that is the subject of a utilitarian analysis) should not be divorced 
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from any of its consequential offspring, whether good or bad.  Religion in itself might not 
necessitate holy wars, but, without religion, holy wars, by definition, would not be possible.  
Mill also alleges that these nefarious forms of religion are declining in number.  In 
characterizing the progress of religion up to his time, as well as his expectations for it thereafter, 
Mill claims that a “process of extirpation continually goes on: the immoral, or otherwise 
mischievous consequences which have been drawn from religion, are, one by one, abandoned, 
and, after having been long fought for as of its very essence, are discovered to be easily 
separable from it.”86  This shouldn’t come as a surprise given Mill’s generally optimistic views 
regarding the evolution of our species as a whole, which are evident in the discussions of his 
“Religion of Humanity.”  Unfortunately, experience does not seem to corroborate Mill’s 
enthusiasm, and, if anything, it seems to have only refuted it thus far.  The conflicts plaguing the 
contemporary world are arguably just as religiously motivated as those in previous eras.  While 
some might find this debatable, few would suggest that we are anywhere near the pinnacle of 
time Mill predicts, a time in which few evil corollaries remain tangible at all.   The events of 
9/11 obviously serve as a grim reminder of this unfortunate fact. 
Mill also suggests that religious teachings provide immoral examples.  For instance, he 
takes exception to the concept of hell, and elaborates on the difficulties associated with the 
recognition of an “object of highest worship, in a being who could make a Hell,” asking, “is it 
possible to adore such a one without a frightful distortion of the standard of right and wrong?”87  
The creator of such a hell seems too concerned with retribution for Mill’s tastes, and, more 
significantly, the punishment this creator metes out seems incommensurate with what even the 
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most heinous of criminals deserve for their earthly sins.  I will expand on the difficulties related 
to hell in Section C of Part III. 
Similarly, religious faith can yield moral difficulties.  In Fear and Trembling, the Danish 
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard develops a conception of faith whereby it comes to reflect 
believing in something by virtue of the absurd.  Believing in something by virtue of the absurd, 
in turn, indicates a lack of rational and moral justification for the substance of the belief (i.e. the 
belief is irrational or transrational).  Hence, faith is not thought to be something that can be 
explained or understood; instead, Kierkegaard refers to it as a passion, as something that is more 
directly and personally felt.  A “knight of faith,” in turn, is someone who has entered into a 
personal relationship with God and who demonstrates his faith by believing that, with God, all 
things are possible, including the absurd.  The quintessential example of a knight of faith is 
Abraham from the Bible, and through the voice of the book’s pseudonymous author, Johannes de 
Silentio, Kierkegaard further develops his notion of faith by analyzing the circumstances 
regarding Abraham’s willingness to comply with God’s demand that he sacrifice his son Isaac.  
As a knight of faith, Abraham does not question or doubt God’s commands, but follows them 
with absolute obedience, placing his duty to God above all else, including his ethical obligations 
to Isaac and the rest of humanity.  In the end, what Abraham believes is beyond comprehension 
and no amount of reflection will yield a rational or moral justification for it.  For instance, there 
is no reason to believe that he will get his son back, and yet he continues to believe that he will 
nonetheless.  What’s more, Abraham does not try to confront God’s demand on a rational level; 
he does not try to understand the demand.  As de Silentio says, “Abraham had faith and did not 
doubt; he believed the preposterous.”88  Similarly, the knight of faith generally “acknowledges 
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the impossibility, and in the very same moment he believes the absurd.”89   In sum, de Silentio 
suggests that knights of faith habitually form such beliefs, saying, “the movement of faith must 
continually be made by virtue of the absurd,”90 which he reinforces with his depiction of an 
imaginary contemporary knight of faith who “does not do even the slightest thing except by 
virtue of the absurd.”91  While Kierkegaard’s conception of faith is certainly more nuanced than 
it is for most people, it still captures the general sense many have about it, insofar as it suggests 
that religious faith is something that need not—and, perhaps, cannot—be rationally or morally 
justified. 
Kierkegaard seeks to protect faith from the shallow treatment he thinks it often receives 
(and, more particularly, the shallow treatment he thinks it receives from G.W.F. Hegel, whom 
much of his book is intended to rebut), thanks to which it is seen as something inferior to rational 
and moral justification.  In fact, he suggests that faith represents a higher form of existence (it 
represents a higher telos) than one steered by the universal standards implicit in reason and 
morality, and that those few individuals who truly demonstrate faith should be praised for their 
greatness and their courage.  It is precisely this point about faith that has always worried me.  
While Kierkegaard suggests that “the story about Abraham is remarkable in that it is always 
glorious no matter how poorly it is understood,”92  I feel that such praise is off the mark, and I 
am not as inclined to endorse the corresponding movement of faith or to praise those, such as 
Abraham, who make the movement—and for many of the reasons alluded to by Kierkegaard (or 
de Silentio) himself.  As de Silentio suggests, “either Abraham was a murderer every minute or 
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we stand before a paradox that is higher than all mediations.”93  Granting that the religious 
sphere and the faith that represents it cannot be comprehended or understood in universal, ethical 
terms, why deem it higher and better on that account?94  It seems to me that equating irrational 
belief with something praiseworthy is itself irrational and, more importantly for our purposes, 
potentially very harmful, in which case it does not seem wise to praise it as the highest passion.  
Besides, if it is, by definition, irrational, how can one ever try to rationally elevate it above other 
passions?  Worse yet, condoning such acts of faith could open up the proverbial can of worms, 
which de Silentio hints at when he asks, “is it possible to speak unreservedly about Abraham 
without running the risk that some individual will become unbalanced and do the same thing?”95  
Surely we do not want everyone acting on orders that they believe they have received from God.  
On May 11, 2003, a Texan woman named Deana Laney killed two of her sons by stoning them 
to death in their backyard, and she said that she did so because God commanded her to.  A jury 
later acquitted her of all charges by reason of insanity.  Is Deanna Laney really worthy of any 
kind of praise?  Are there any observable moral differences between the cases of Abraham and 
Deanna Laney?  In both cases, each believes he or she has been commanded by God to do 
something that seems clearly immoral and irrational.  In the end, all I can say is that I do not 
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understand this kind of higher telos, nor have I felt it.  Like de Silentio himself, “I cannot make 
the movement of faith, I cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd;”96 nor, 
more importantly, do I think that doing so is the right thing to do. 
 
D. Empirical Research 
Since Mill’s time, the relationship between religion and morality has been the subject of 
extensive empirical research, and I want to discuss some of the relevant findings before moving 
on to Mill’s analysis of religion’s individual utility.  On the whole, the empirical research seems 
to corroborate much of what Mill says insofar as it fails to substantiate a positive correlation 
between religion and morality.  In fact, the relevant research fails to yield any sort of a consensus 
regarding the true nature of the relationship between religion and morality.  While some research 
hints at a positive correlation between the two, much of the research suggests that there is no 
positive correlation between them, or that there is even a negative correlation between them (i.e. 
as religiosity increases, moral behavior decreases).  I now turn to a brief discussion of some of 
the research demonstrating the nebulous nature of the relationship between religion and morality.   
Evolutionary biologist Marc Hauser and philosopher Peter Singer suggest the following 
in a short article they coauthored together called “Godless Morality”: “atheists and agnostics do 
not behave less morally than religious believers, even if their virtuous acts are mediated by 
different principles. They often have as strong and sound a sense of right and wrong as anyone, 
including involvement in movements to abolish slavery and contribute to relief efforts associated 
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with human suffering.”97, 98  It is not hard to imagine Mill saying something similar to this.  In 
the same vein as Mill, the authors present difficulties associated with the thesis that religion is 
morally advantageous.  Instead of rooting morality essentially and significantly in religion, 
Hauser and Singer make a case for grounding it in evolution.  One reason they cite in support of 
their evolutionary foundation for moral behavior, which they also believe undermines the 
religious foundation, is the universal nature of certain basic moral principles.  They write: 
“a…difficulty for the view that morality has its origin in religion is that despite the sharp 
doctrinal differences between the world’s major religions, and for that matter cultures like 
ancient China in which religion has been less significant than philosophical outlooks like 
Confucianism, some elements of morality seem to be universal.”99  Hauser and Singer created 
what they call a “web-based moral sense test” in an effort to demonstrate the universal nature of 
our moral sensibilities.  This test presents the following three moral dilemmas and instructs the 
test-taker to fill in the blanks with morally “obligatory,” “permissible,” or “forbidden”: 
1.  A runaway trolley is about to run over five people walking on the tracks.  
A railroad worker is standing next to a switch that can turn the trolley onto 
a side track, killing one person, but allowing the five to survive. Flipping 
the switch is ______. 
 
2. You pass by a small child drowning in a shallow pond and you are the 
only one around. If you pick up the child, she will survive and your pants 
will be ruined.  Picking up the child is _______. 
 
3.  Five people have just been rushed into a hospital in critical care, each 
requiring an organ to survive. There is not enough time to request organs 
from outside the hospital. There is, however, a healthy person in the 
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hospital’s waiting room. If the surgeon takes this person’s organs, he will 
die but the five in critical care will survive. Taking the healthy person’s 
organs is _______.100 
 
They reveal that a significant proportion of the 1,500 subjects who responded from around the 
world responded with “permissible,” “obligatory,” and “forbidden,” in that order.  They point out 
that “there were no statistically significant differences between subjects with or without religious 
backgrounds, with approximately 90% of subjects saying that it is permissible to flip the switch 
on the boxcar, 97% saying that it is obligatory to rescue the baby, and 97% saying that [it] is 
forbidden to remove the healthy man’s organs.”101  Moreover, they add that “when asked to 
justify why some cases are permissible and others forbidden…those with a religious background 
are as clueless or incoherent as atheists.”102  They argue that, “on the view that morality is God’s 
word, atheists should judge these cases differently from people with religious background and 
beliefs, and when asked to justify their responses, should bring forward different explanations. 
For example, since atheists lack a moral compass, they should go with pure self-interest, and 
walk by the drowning baby.”103  Since atheists do not, as it turns out, answer any differently and 
turn out to be just as selfless, the authors infer that morality is more universal in nature than 
those suggesting that religion is morally advantageous would lead us to believe.  Hauser’s and 
Singer’s findings are far from conclusive, especially given the limitations of their study, most 
notably, its non-experimental nature (consider, for example, its self-selected sample) and the 
small number of moral dilemmas they incorporate. 
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However, their findings are supported by other researchers.  For example, Russell 
Middleton and Snell Putney found that, when it comes to religious and skeptical individuals, “the 
two groups do not differ in the degree to which they believe in elements of common social 
morality.”104  In their research, Middleton and Putney emphasize a distinction between two kinds 
of ethical standards, “the ascetic” and “the social,” which they argue underlies their findings (as 
well as most findings pertaining to the relationship under investigation).  The impetus for their 
doing so lies in their observation of something I have already pointed out: empirical 
investigations into the relationship between religion and morality have yielded conflicting 
results, and there is anything but a consensus among experts regarding the issue.  On this point, 
they write, “empirical studies such as the classic by Hartshorne and May or others…have failed 
to find relationships between measures of religiosity and ethical behavior, nondelinquency, 
humanitarianism, and altruism.  In contrast, several studies have found the religious less likely 
than the non-religious to violate certain moral standards.”105  They believe that their distinction 
helps explain the contrast, and suggest that “this particular confusion, and much of the confusion 
surrounding the relation between religion and morality, derive from failure to distinguish two 
different types of ethical standards—the ascetic and the social.”106  Social standards are said to 
prohibit “actions which in general are harmful to the social group,” and they predict that such 
standards are “shared by the religious and the nonreligious alike as a part of a general social 
ideology.”107  By contrast, they characterize ascetic standards as stemming “primarily from an 
ascetic religious tradition,” and suggest that, while “violations of ascetic standards may be held 
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spiritually harmful to the perpetrator…such violations are usually not directly or obviously 
harmful to the social group—at least in moderation.”108  They offer specific examples of both 
kinds of standards, which they then use in their research; examples of anti-ascetic actions 
“included gambling for money on sports events, gambling for money at cards or dice, smoking, 
nonmarital heavy petting, nonmarital sexual intercourse, intentionally looking at pornographic 
pictures, and drinking alcoholic beverages except for religious purposes,” while examples of 
antisocial actions included “stealing towels, spoons, or other articles from hotels, motels, and 
restaurants; striking another person in anger (except in self defense); lying to a teacher 
concerning the reason for missing class or failing to complete an assignment; theft from an 
individual (intentionally taking articles belonging to other individuals); cheating on 
examinations; and deliberately placing unjust blame on another person for something that was 
really one’s own fault.”109  Middleton and Putney think that in instances where researchers 
established no positive correlation between religion and moral behavior social standards were the 
primary criteria used by the researchers, whereas in cases where a positive correlation was 
supported ascetic standards were involved.  As they put it, “we hypothesize that differences in 
behavior between the religious and the nonreligious are confined to specific areas and are a 
product of differences in standards rather than of differential upholding of standards.”110   
As it turns out, this is exactly what they find to be the case in their own study.  They 
make several interesting discoveries, noting, for example, that the non-religious do not engage in 
violations of social standards any more than the religious do.  In fact, they found that the non-
religious violate them less often (although this finding was not statistically significant at the .05 
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level).  Moreover, they found that the religious are less likely to engage in violations of ascetic 
standards, but that they are also more likely to subscribe to them in the first place.  Finally, they 
observed that the behavior of the non-religious matches their beliefs and standards just as much 
as the behavior of the religious matches theirs; that is, they are equally likely to live up to their 
own ethical standards, whatever those standards may be.  Hence, the non-religious “are less 
likely to regard anti-ascetic actions as wrong, but when they do regard them as wrong, they are 
no more likely than believers to engage in them.”111  As for upholding the social standards one 
believes in, they found that “believers violate their social convictions more often than 
skeptics.”112  It is also worth noting that “despite specific differences the same overall picture 
emerges regardless of the measure of religiosity utilized.”113, 114  Supporting the case that Hauser 
and Singer make, as well as Mill’s case, Middleton and Putney found that, “with regard to 
actions which have an obvious harmful impact on society, there is little or no apparent difference 
between the religious and the irreligious in either normative standards or behavior,” and this 
leads them to conclude “that the religious and the nonreligious in our society share the same 
basic social values and are about equally likely to live up to them.”115 
As I have indicated, some research actually indicates that religion is negatively correlated 
with moral behavior.  In his interesting article, “Cross-National Correlations of Quantifiable 
Societal Health with Popular Religiosity and Secularism in the Prosperous Democracies,” 
Gregory S. Paul examines the relationship between religiosity, secularism, and social welfare, 
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and he sets out to provide “a quantitative cross-national analysis” of their interaction, which he 
suggests “is feasible because a large body of survey and census data on rates of religiosity, 
secularization, and societal indicators has become available in the prosperous developed 
democracies including the United States.”116  Paul’s work is concerned first and foremost with 
the thesis that religiosity is socially beneficial.  Expanding on what this thesis entails, he writes, 
“in broad terms the hypothesis that popular religiosity is socially beneficial holds that high rates 
of belief in a creator, as well as worship, prayer and other aspects of religious practice, correlate 
with lowering rates of lethal violence, suicide, non-monogamous sexual activity, and abortion, as 
well as improved physical health.”117  One important limitation regarding this kind of research, 
which he points out, is that religious belief and practice “have been most extensively and reliably 
surveyed in the prosperous developed democracies” and “similar data is often lacking for second 
and third world nations, or is less reliable.”118  Furthermore, I should note, as he does, that the 
data he works with is “from the 1990s, most from the middle and latter half of the decade, or the 
early 2000s,” and it chiefly looks at “Bible literalism and frequency of prayer and service 
attendance, as well as absolute belief in a creator, in order to examine religiosity in terms of 
ardency, conservatism, and activities.”119 
Interestingly, he prefaces his results by noting that the “United States is the only 
prosperous first world nation to retain rates of religiosity otherwise limited to the second and 
third worlds (Bishop; PEW).”120  This is especially worth noting after considering the results of 
Paul’s analysis, since he finds that the U.S. is often unique (among first world nations) in terms 
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of its moral characteristics.  For instance, he discovers that “the U.S. is the only prosperous 
democracy that retains high homicide rates,”121 and that the United States experiences higher 
rates of certain STDs (e.g. it suffers “uniquely high adolescent and adult syphilis infection 
rates”122).  Also, he finds that “early adolescent pregnancy and birth have dropped in the 
developed democracies (Abma et al.; Singh and Darroch), but rates are two to dozens of times 
higher in the U.S. where the decline has been more modest.”123  He finds results that are 
consistent with these global findings when he analyzes religiosity, secularity, and morality within 
the borders of the United States, writing that “there is evidence that within the U.S. strong 
disparities in religious belief versus acceptance of evolution are correlated with similarly varying 
rates of societal dysfunction, the strongly theistic, anti-evolution south and mid-west having 
markedly worse homicide, mortality, STD, youth pregnancy, marital and related problems than 
the northeast where societal conditions, secularization, and acceptance of evolution approach 
European norms (Aral and Holmes; Beeghley, Doyle, 2002).”124  More generally, Paul found 
that “life spans tend to decrease as rates of religiosity rise,”125 and he also notes that “increasing 
adolescent abortion rates show positive correlation with increasing belief and worship of a 
creator, and negative correlation with increasing non-theism and acceptance of evolution; again 
rates are uniquely high in the U.S.,” which leads him to conclude that “claims that secular 
cultures aggravate abortion rates (John Paul II) are therefore contradicted by the quantitative 
data.”126   In sum, “higher rates of belief in and worship of a creator correlate with higher rates of 
homicide, juvenile and early adult mortality, STD infection rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion 
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in the prosperous democracies.”127  Given the high degree of religiosity in the U.S., “if the data 
showed that the U.S. enjoyed higher rates of societal health than the more secular, pro-evolution 
democracies, then the opinion that popular belief in a creator is strongly beneficial to national 
cultures would be supported.”128  However, as I have indicated, Paul’s findings fail to show this, 
and he notes that, to the contrary, “the most theistic prosperous democracy, the U.S., is 
exceptional…the United States is almost always the most dysfunctional of the developed 
democracies, sometimes spectacularly so, and almost always scores poorly.”129  What’s more, 
“the populations of secular democracies are clearly able to govern themselves and maintain 
societal cohesion” and, thus, “the widely held fear that a Godless citizenry must experience 
societal disaster is therefore refuted.”130  Paul’s findings are clearly consistent with what Mill 
says. 
I do not mean to suggest that all of the empirical research fails to support the thesis that 
religion elicits moral benefits—this is by no means the case.  Indeed, some research indicates 
that the religious are more likely to subscribe to moral standards and beliefs.  Consider a study 
conducted by Marijke ter Voert, Albert Felling, and Jan Peters, which suggests that the non-
religious embrace more of a “self-interest morality” and are less inclined to view, for example, 
honesty as a duty.131  Similarly, in a recent article published in Evolution and Human Behavior, 
Quentin D. Atkinson and Pierrick Bourrat discuss the results of their analysis of cross-cultural 
survey data from 87 countries, where, among other things, they find that both (1) belief in God 
and (2) belief in heaven and hell are positively correlated to belief in the unjustifiability of a host 
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of moral transgressions, including cheating on taxes, adultery, speeding, and buying stolen 
goods.132  One limitation with respect to these two studies is that they only pertain to moral 
beliefs, and not to moral action.  It is one thing to say and believe that telling the truth is a moral 
duty, it is quite another to actually tell the truth. 
However, some researchers have found that, as religiosity increases, moral behavior does, 
in fact, increase.  Take, for example, an experiment conducted by James M. Bloodgood, William 
H. Turnley, and Peter Mudrack in which they presented subjects with the opportunity to increase 
their chances of winning money by untruthfully reporting their success on a word search task 
(the more words subjects reported finding, the greater their prospects for financial gain).  What 
they found was that higher religiosity (which they measured by participation in religious 
activities) was a predictor of more honest reporting of the number of words found while 
performing the task.133  Likewise, Kent R. Kerley, Todd L. Matthews, and Troy C. Blanchard did 
an analysis of survey data collected from inmates at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in 
Parchman, Mississippi (which is one of the largest prisons in the United States) and discovered 
that inmates who claimed to be religious were less likely to argue with other inmates and less 
likely to fight with other inmates.134  Only 53.1% of prisoners who believed in a higher power 
reported arguing once or more per month, compared with 73.9% of prisoners who did not; 18.5% 
of prisoners who believed in a higher power reported fighting once or more per month, as 
opposed to 26.5% of those who did not.135  The findings in these last two studies suggest that 
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religious belief makes a positive difference with regard to moral behavior, not just with regard to 
moral beliefs and standards.  Therefore, these findings conflict with the research I referenced 
earlier (e.g. Middleton’s and Putney’s), and, as I’ve said before, an examination of the empirical 
research renders the true nature of the relationship between religion and morality anything but 
clear.  In this section, I have tried to do two things: 1) point out that, since Mill’s own time, we 
have had the opportunity to empirically test the thesis that religion is morally advantageous and 
2) show that research has thus far failed to substantiate this thesis, as indicated by the ample 
studies that call into question the positive influence of religion on morality.  For every study I 
have come across that suggests a positive influence (like those just mentioned), there’s at least 
one that suggests a neutral or negative influence (like those mentioned earlier). 
 
III. Religion and Personal Happiness 
A. The Case for Supernatural Religions As a Source of Personal 
Happiness 
After spending the first part of his essay trying to show that religion has very little social 
utility, Mill moves on to consider whether it nevertheless proves useful for individuals.  He 
begins this portion of his analysis by investigating the psychological nature of religious belief, 
speculating about its origin and evolution in the process.  Subsequently, he demarcates two 
psychological benefits that supernatural religions offer individuals, and then questions whether 
these religions are nonetheless necessary and/or optimal for securing such benefits.  Mill 
ultimately argues that supernatural religions are neither necessary nor optimal for acquiring these 
benefits, and, in doing so, he builds a case for his alternative, the “Religion of Humanity.”  In 
this part of the chapter, I delve into each of these aspects of his analysis, beginning with an 
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account of why Mill believes that supernatural religion can aid individuals in their pursuit of 
happiness (Section A) and concluding with accounts of why he thinks it is nonetheless not 
necessary (Section B) or optimal (Section C) for doing so. 
Mill begins by asking “what it is in human nature which causes it to require a religion; 
what wants of the human mind religion supplies, and what qualities it developes.”136  Mill 
answers that religion originated with belief in God, which, according to him, could be 
universally and “rationally explained from the spontaneous tendency of the mind to attribute life 
and volition, similar to what it feels in itself, to all natural objects and phenomena which appear 
to be self-moving.”137  Then, after increased recognition of universal patterns and the multitude 
of scientific laws underlying the universe, “the transition was made to supposing that the object 
present to the senses was inanimate, but was the creature and instrument of an invisible being 
with a form and organs similar to the human.”138  With this, Mill explains how religion evolved 
to its modern day form; monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam posit this 
kind of anthropomorphic deity. 
Having characterized the origin and evolution of religious belief, Mill proceeds to try to 
explain its longevity.  One reason why Mill thinks religion has been such a mainstay throughout 
human history is because it satiates our existential curiosity.  Accordingly, he alludes to “the 
small limits of man’s certain knowledge, and the boundlessness of his desire to know.”139  Our 
short-lived existence on Earth is a mystery that we all naturally, at one time or another, wish to 
“solve,” and Mill claims that religion, like poetry, helps satisfy this wish insofar as it allows us to 
entertain “ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of 
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human life.”140  As a result, religion is thought to assuage the existential anxiety that we find 
accompanying our finite knowledge and existence.  Like poetry, religion allows us to imagine 
greater possibilities, and to escape the everyday malaise of our earthly life. 
However, religion is distinguished from poetry in that it “is the product of the craving to 
know whether these imaginative conceptions have realities answering to them in some other 
world than ours,” and, as opposed to poetry, religion entails “positive belief and expectation” 
that these ideal ruminations bear some truth.141  Subsequently, in addition to satisfying existential 
curiosity, Mill hints at another reason why supernatural religion has been so prominent 
throughout history: it offers a sense of redemption, of atonement for the hardships we suffer here 
on Earth, by way of its supernatural ideals.  As Mill suggests, “so long as earthly life is full of 
sufferings, so long there will be need of consolations, which the hope of heaven affords to the 
selfish, the love of God to the tender and grateful.”142  In the afterlife promised by many 
religions, “each hopes to find the good which he has failed to find on earth.”143  There is no 
question that Mill thinks these desires (for existential answers and for a sense of atonement) 
inherent in our human nature prove to be powerful psychological forces, which, in turn, inspire 
and explain the religious belief we find to be so widespread.  Religions are thought to be 
beneficial for individuals insofar as they satisfy these psychological desires.144 
After offering this psychological analysis of religious belief, wherein he explicates how 
religion fulfills these two basic desires, Mill then explicitly speaks to its usefulness for 
individuals.  He clearly suggests that religion is beneficial for individuals, writing, “the value, 
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therefore, of religion to the individual, both in the past and present, as a source of personal 
satisfaction and of elevated feelings, is not to be disputed.”145  Hence, by satisfying the 
psychological needs of individuals, religion is thought to make them happier.  However, 
immediately after acknowledging that supernatural religions can provide personal satisfaction by 
way of these exalted feelings, Mill reveals the rub: “it has still to be considered, whether in order 
to obtain this good, it is necessary to travel beyond the boundaries of the world which we 
inhabit.”146  Granting that supernatural religions yield this benefit, Mill questions whether they 
are 1) necessary and 2) optimal for the acquisition of it.  To this end, he establishes the existence 
of other alternatives (most notably, his own Religion of Humanity), and, thus, he argues that 
these supernatural religions are not necessary for the sake of personal happiness—that is, that 
there are other means by which to satisfy our psychological needs and, more generally, to make 
us happy.  Then, he expounds on the detriments of supernatural religions, which suggests that 
they are not optimal for such purposes, either.  I now consider each of these points in more 
detail. 
 
B. Mill’s Case for Why Supernatural Religions Are Not Necessary 
for Securing Personal Happiness 
First, Mill argues that supernatural religion is not necessary for personal happiness or, 
more specifically, the satisfaction of the particular psychological desires it is associated with.  He 
points out that societies have survived and thrived without being significantly influenced by—or, 
in some cases, being entirely devoid of—supernatural beliefs.  “History,” he writes, “so far as we 
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know it, bears out the opinion, that mankind can perfectly well do without the belief in a 
heaven.”147  Consider, once more, the case of the ancient Greeks, who largely functioned without 
any significant consideration of such belief.148  Despite this, “we neither find that the Greeks 
enjoyed life less, nor feared death more, than other people.”149  Similarly, Mill thinks that many 
Buddhist societies provide us with more proof that it is possible for human beings to subsist and 
be happy without supernatural beliefs, insofar as he argues that the ultimate reward Buddhism 
offers is not another life in the hereafter, but, rather, cessation of existence altogether.150 
Moreover, Mill argues that the psychological needs satisfied by supernatural religions can 
be fulfilled by other means.  Specifically, he believes earthly substitutes can accomplish the same 
effects.  In support of this point, he cites two specific examples: patriotism and his own Religion 
of Humanity.  Mill argues that love of one’s country is “sufficient to inspire large masses and 
long successions of mankind with an enthusiasm capable of ruling the conduct, and coulouring 
the whole life.”151  In support of this conclusion, Mill points to the Romans’ historical allegiance 
to Rome, which he characterizes as follows: 
Rome was to the entire Roman people, for many generations as much a religion as 
Jehovah was to the Jews; nay, much more, for they never fell off from their 
worship as the Jews did from theirs.  And the Romans, otherwise a selfish people, 
with no very remarkable faculties of any kind except the purely practical, derived 
nevertheless from this one idea a certain greatness of soul, which manifests itself 
in all their history where that idea is concerned and nowhere else, and has earned 
for them the large share of admiration, in other respects not at all deserved, which 
has been felt for them by most noble-minded persons from that time to this.152 
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Mill himself offers a substitute for supernatural religions in the form of his “Religion of 
Humanity.”  Mill’s own Religion of Humanity is no doubt inspired by Auguste Comte, who was 
the first to construct a “religion of humanity” and a thinker whom Mill greatly admired and 
became close friends with.  Reflecting on their relationship, Carr suggests that “Mill liked 
Comte’s religion not primarily because it glorified the human race, but because it was a religion 
without a god”153 and he points out that Mill, in return, “outlined to Comte a complete strategy 
for the introduction of atheism into England.”154  Mill’s Religion of Humanity redirects the 
exalted feelings that would otherwise be directed towards an afterlife (as they are in the case of 
supernatural religions) onto the entire duration of human existence and the prospects of our 
human species.  Like patriotism, Mill’s Religion of Humanity draws attention to elements of our 
earthly life, and not to a future existence.  As Carr suggests, “what he wanted still was a religion 
which instead of carrying one beyond the physical world, derived its psychological power from 
an idealization of earthly life.”155  In juxtaposition with patriotism, however, his Religion of 
Humanity enlarges the scope of our earthly concern, encouraging not love of one’s country but 
love of one’s species.  At first, this might sound like a tall order, considering the incessant 
worldly conflicts that have marred humankind throughout history.  However, Mill counters by 
pointing out that “if…persons could be trained, as we see they were, not only to believe in theory 
that the good of their country was an object to which all others ought to yield, but to feel this 
practically as the grand duty of life, so also may they be made to feel the same absolute 
obligation towards the universal good.”156  Thus, Mill argues that we can infer that his Religion 
of Humanity is possible from the fact that patriotism has proven to be effective.  What’s more, 
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the psychological desires satisfied by supernatural religions are satisfied by the Religion of 
Humanity “in as eminent a degree, and in as high a sense, as by the supernatural religions even in 
their best manifestations, and far more so than in any of their others.”157  Ultimately, Mill 
remains convinced that all are capable of “identifying their feelings with the entire life of the 
human race,”158 and that the Religion of Humanity is “capable of fulfilling every important 
function of religion.”159 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud makes similar remarks in his discussions 
regarding the import of science, implying that it, too, might help serve our purposes here.  
According to Freud, when confronted with inevitable restrictions on his or her pleasure, the 
civilized individual must succumb to what Freud identifies as the “reality principle,” and he or 
she is forced to modify his or her claim to happiness as a result.160  In Freud’s estimation, our 
most profitable response to this reality principle is to become “a member of the human 
community” and, “with the help of a technique guided by science,”161 collectively attempt to 
subjugate nature for the benefit of each individual,162 thereby aspiring to attain the optimal 
amount of pleasure possible given the reality of the situation.  In fact, through this process of 
subjugation (of nature), the individual will “almost become a God himself.”163  Anticipating the 
objection that, despite the advances of science, many of us are still not happy, Freud cites 
specific scientific accomplishments—railway, telephone, longer life, etc.164—and urges his 
reader to reflect on the enhancements and joys these accomplishments have nevertheless made 
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possible.  Scientific and technological advancements, Freud writes, “are an actual fulfillment of 
every—or almost every—fairy-tale wish.”165  I will say much more about the relationship 
between religion and science, and how this relationship affects considerations of the utility of 
religion, in Chapter 2, where I outline Nietzsche’s thoughts on these issues. 
 
C. Mill’s Case for Why Supernatural Religions Are Not Optimal for 
Securing Personal Happiness 
For the foregoing reasons, Mill believes we ought to consider the Religion of Humanity a 
viable—and, perhaps, preferable—alternative to supernatural religions.  And, in fact, Mill does 
think that his Religion of Humanity is preferable, claiming that it “is not only capable of 
fulfilling these functions, but would fulfil them better than any form whatever of 
supernaturalism.”166  Thus, Mill is convinced that his Religion of Humanity, along with its 
corresponding ideal of humanity, can not only elicit the same benefits garnered by supernatural 
religions, but can do so more optimally.  He cites several reasons for believing this to be the 
case, which I will explicate in the following section. 
To begin with, recall the moral difficulties associated with supernatural religions, which I 
elaborated on in Section C of Part II.  Consider, for example, the self-interested nature of the 
behavior motivated by fear of hell and hope for heaven.  By contrast, Mill points out that his 
Religion of Humanity is disinterested insofar as its ascendancy does not depend on the fear of 
eternal damnation or the hope for eternal reward.167  As Lou Matz suggests, “morally, it [the 
Religion of Humanity] is disinterested, unlike vulgar Christianity which easily tempts Christians 
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to regard moral action as a means to personal salvation.”168  What’s more, while Mill’s ideal of 
humanity does not depend on any hope of a reward, it still offers a reward nonetheless: namely, 
“the approbation, in this [world], of those whom we respect, and ideally of all those, dead or 
living, whom we admire or venerate.”169  Insofar as some subscribing to supernatural religions 
profess to “worship without any perversion of the moral sentiments,” Mill maintains that they do 
so “by fixing the attention exclusively on what is beautiful and beneficent” and ignore the base 
and vile aspects of these religions, which reflects “a torpid and inactive state of the speculative 
faculties.”170  Indeed, Mill concludes that “it is an immense abatement from the worth of the old 
religions as means of elevating and improving human character, that it is nearly, if not quite 
impossible for them to produce their best moral effects, unless we suppose a certain torpidity, if 
not positive twist in the intellectual faculties.”171 
Speaking of these intellectual faculties, Mill thinks that his Religion of Humanity avoids 
a number of intellectual difficulties associated with supernatural religions.  One gets the sense 
that, for Mill, supernatural religions are frequently at odds with objective considerations of 
truth.172  In this vein, Carr suggests that, “assuming that free discussion was the most excellent 
means of getting at the truth on any public issue, Mill was puzzled about the denial of this 
method of inquiry to religion.”173  Mill, however, does hint at an explanation for this kind of 
denial in the Utility of Religion, suggesting that “many, again, having observed in others or 
experienced in themselves elevated feelings which they imagine incapable of emanating from 
any other sources than religion, have an honest aversion to anything tending, as they think, to dry 
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up the fountain of such feelings.”174  Similarly, this is why they also “either dislike and disparage 
all philosophy, or addict themselves with intolerant zeal to those forms of it in which intuition 
usurps the place of evidence, and internal feeling is made the test of objective truth.”175  As a 
result of the intellectual difficulties involved, Mill suggests that “it is time to consider, more 
impartially and therefore more deliberately than is usually done, whether all this straining to prop 
up beliefs which require so great an expense of intellectual toll and ingenuity to keep them 
standing, yields any sufficient return in human well being.”176  I briefly mentioned in Section C 
of Part II how the common conception of faith, whereby it comes to mean believing something 
despite a lack of evidence or reason, or even despite contrary evidence or reason, yields moral 
difficulties; it also presents an intellectual difficulty insofar as it is essentially irrational.  I now 
turn to some other specific examples of the intellectual difficulties Mill is referring to. 
Consider, first, the notorious “problem of evil,” which has been widely discussed 
throughout the history of theology and philosophy.  Many, including Mill, suggest that the 
problem of evil poses a problem for those who subscribe to supernatural religions because it 
doesn’t seem logically possible to reconcile the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, and 
benevolent God (which is the kind of God most often, although certainly not always, embraced 
by such religions) with the abundant existence of evil in the world.  Why would an all-loving 
God permit unspeakable evils to transpire at all, not to mention at the rate in which we actually 
find them happening, provided such a God has the power to prevent them?  Thus, on the face of 
it, the existence of evil does not seem consistent with the existence of this kind of God.177  In 
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describing the views Mill articulates in Three Essays on Religion, Carr suggests that “Mill was 
more impressed by nature’s cruelty than by its beneficence,” and that, “as Mill saw it, Nature 
was not simply amoral, but positively immoral.”178, 179  Ultimately, Mill argues, “it is impossible 
that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt his inquiring intellect by 
sophistry, should be able without misgiving to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author 
and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of 
its inhabitants.”180, 181 
Consider, further, the problem of hell.  Remember that the effectiveness of religion as an 
enforcer of morality is often thought to depend on the belief that there will be eternal rewards 
and punishments assigned for our earthly behavior.  Accordingly, either God is thought to have 
created heaven and hell (or to enforce similar consequences in a future life), in which case 
religion can be thought to act as a kind of enforcer of morality, or God is not thought to have 
done so, in which case religion no longer inspires moral behavior by way of such eternal threats.  
In the first scenario, we encounter an intellectual difficulty associated with believing in and 
emulating a God who creates a hell, for reasons I already mentioned in Section C of Part II.  In 
the second scenario, much of the moral incentive—as well as the general social utility—
traditionally associated with religions is lost. 
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One might suggest that the idea of hell is intellectually sustainable by way of the notion 
of divine grace, thanks to which our earthly sins and moral errors are forgiven by God.  
However, here I argue that we are also faced with an intellectual difficulty.  More specifically, 
there are problems associated with revelation and the exclusive nature of divine grace.  Either 
God impartially offers such grace to all of us, or God does so selectively.  In the first scenario, 
hell seems bankrupt insofar as it is, in a sense, an empty threat (since we are all to be saved by 
the grace of God in the end, regardless of whether we behave morally), in which case it loses its 
force as a moral deterrent.  In the second scenario, we must face the intellectual difficulties 
associated with the notion of a God who is no longer impartial, and are left wondering, with Mill, 
why “it is, that so precious a gift, bestowed on a few, should have been withheld from the many” 
when “it would have cost the Divine Giver as little to have vouchsafed to all, as to have 
bestowed by special grace upon a favoured minority.”182  What’s more, he considers this to be 
proof of “one moral contradiction inseparable from every form of Christianity, which no 
ingenuity can resolve, and no sophistry explain away.”183 
Mill does acknowledge one apparent advantage of supernatural religions over his 
Religion of Humanity: the hope produced by the prospects of an afterlife that they promise.  
Along these lines, he writes that the “one advantage, such as it is, the supernatural religions must 
always possess over the Religion of Humanity” is “the prospect they hold out to the individual of 
a life after death.”184  In fact, Carr points out that, in a series of articles Mill published in a paper 
in the 1820s (i.e. much earlier than when Utility of Religion was written), he actually argued that 
the fact that “atheism excludes us from the blessings of a future life should surely be a sufficient 
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reason…to induce every reasonable man to reject it.”185  Furthermore, Carr adds that Mill “was 
convinced that Christianity was a social impediment, but he sensed also that it might be a 
personal necessity,” and so he “could not help suspecting that however wrongheaded its 
doctrines might be, religion was a psychological necessity without which man would lack both a 
sufficient sanction from morality and an ultimate hope to help him meet courageously the 
tribulations here below.”186  Carr expounds on the tension between our intellectual and emotional 
faculties when it comes to religious belief, which, in turn, he suggests underlies much of Mill’s 
discussion and subsequent perspective on the utility of such belief.  Accordingly, the emotional 
satisfaction supernatural religion is thought to offer is squared against the intellectual difficulties 
Mill thinks it spawns, which I have just detailed.  As a result, Carr argues that “the conflict 
between intellect and emotion was never wholly absent from his religious struggles,”187 and this 
tension greatly influenced the development of Mill’s religious views throughout the course of his 
life.  As we will see in Chapter 3, James has much to say regarding this tension as well. 
However, after acknowledging this one advantage supernatural religions appear to have 
over his earthly alternatives in Utility of Religion, Mill immediately proceeds to minimize the 
importance of such an advantage.  First, note, once more, that there are examples of societies that 
have survived—and thrived—without belief in such an afterlife.  Mill also suggests that we will 
care less and less about the prospect of an afterlife as we improve our condition and become 
more satisfied here on Earth.  Accordingly, he “cannot but think that as the condition of mankind 
becomes improved, as they grow happier in their lives, and more capable of deriving happiness 
from unselfish sources, they will care less and less for this flattering expectation,” since “they 
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who have had their happiness can bear to part with existence.”188  Mill goes so far as to suggest 
that it is “not only possible but probable, that in a higher, and, above all, a happier condition of 
human life, not annihilation but immortality may be the burdensome idea,” 189 and that we might 
find relief and not pain in the notion that we are not forever shackled to a conscious existence 
that we have no guarantee we will always want.  In an 1854 journal entry, Mill writes that “the 
belief in a life after death, without any probable surmise as to what it would be, would be no 
consolation, but the very king of terrors.  A journey into the entirely unknown—the thought is 
sufficient to strike with alarm the firmest heart.”190  Interestingly, Matz observes that we can 
interpret “Mill’s view as a kind of Pascalian wager,”191 according to which it would be safer to 
choose non-existence than risk the infinite possibilities of eternal consciousness. 
Furthermore, Mill echoes Socrates, who, in Plato’s Apology, argues that we have no 
reason to think of death as an evil and unwanted thing.  There, Socrates suggests that “the fear of 
death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the 
unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest 
evil, may not be the greatest good.”192  Socrates believes there is great hope that death is a good 
given the two possible implications of death: (a) “a state of nothingness and utter 
unconsciousness” or (b) “a change and migration of the soul from this world to another.”193  As a 
result, he concludes that “those of us who think that death is an evil are in error.”194  In this vein, 
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Mill himself writes that “the mere cessation of existence is no evil to any one: the idea is only 
formidable through the illusion of imagination which makes one conceive oneself as if one were 
alive and feeling oneself dead.”195  In his view, all of this ultimately constitutes “proof that the 
idea [of death] is not really or naturally terrible.”196  For Mill, these reasons show that the one 
advantage that can be associated with supernatural religions—the hope associated with their 
belief in an afterlife—proves to be rather insubstantial, and, all things considered, supernatural 
religions are less optimal than the more earthly alternatives he recommends.  However, not 
everyone finds what Mill says in Utility of Religion convincing, and Mill himself would later 
alter his position on the utility of belief in an afterlife.  In view of this, I want to briefly address 
the evolution of Mill’s own thoughts on the matter, as well as some scholarly criticism of the 
position he espouses in Utility of Religion. 
First, I should point out, as many commentators—including Carr and Matz—have, that 
Mill adopts a more optimistic view regarding the utility of belief in an afterlife in his work, 
Theism, which he wrote much later than Utility of Religion.  Characterizing Mill’s later view, 
Carr writes:  
Though man could base only on hope his convictions about the benevolent 
government of the universe and about life after death, Mill would allow him to 
indulge that hope because of its beneficial effects…that the Religion of Humanity 
would be the religion of the future, Mill entertained little doubt; but he had come 
to believe also that the progress of that religion would be quickened if aided not 
only by intellects outraged by the moral dullness of orthodoxy [e.g. the problem 
of evil], but also by imaginations which roamed freely in the nether regions of 
hope and trust, where a psychologically satisfying vestige of the Christian God 
lived and moved and had his being.197 
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Similarly, Matz, who argues that Mill “pressed his argument against supernatural illusions too 
far” in the Utility of Religion, adds that this is a point that Mill “apparently recognizes at the end 
of his life.”198   
As I’ve just indicated, Matz is one who is critical of the stance Mill takes in Utility of 
Religion regarding the utility of belief in an afterlife.  In his article “The Utility of Religious 
Illusion: A Critique of J.S. Mill’s Religion of Humanity,” Matz acknowledges that he agrees 
with Mill “that…religious belief is not necessary for morality,”199 but he argues “that Mill cannot 
dismiss the utility of hope in an ultimate justice since it need not pervert the intellect or morality” 
and suggests that “there are thus utilitarian grounds to support some supernatural illusions, which 
undermines Mill’s defence of an exclusively naturalistic religion.”200  In support of this 
conclusion, Matz suggests that “Mill cannot show that such a hope, though not based in any 
human experience and perhaps partly inconsistent with it, should be abandoned, since it could, 
and does, inspire the commitment to the moral life without being inimical to intellectual and 
moral progress.”201  He adds that “such a hope could and does, as a matter of fact, support the 
commitment to a moral life and inspires perseverance during troubled times by making some 
sense of the disconcerting fact that the virtuous and vicious often do not get their just due.”202 
However, contrary to what Matz, as well as Mill’s own more considered view, suggests, 
and as I ultimately hope to have demonstrated in this chapter, I believe Mill does give good 
reasons to think that supernatural religious belief is inimical to both intellectual and moral 
progress.  I discussed how this is true regarding the latter in Section C of Part II; in my 
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discussion of the two points mentioned earlier in Part III (i.e. that supernatural religion is neither 
necessary nor optimal for eliciting the individual utility associated with it), I have made a case 
for how this is true of the former as well. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
I would now like to briefly summarize my conclusions regarding the arguments Mill 
advances, and outline a couple of concerns I have regarding his overall analysis.  I find it hard to 
find fault with most of the arguments presented in Utility of Religion, and I’ve alluded to the few 
instances in which I do.  My few worries included: 1) his very general conception of “religion,” 
2) his minimization of the nefarious forms of religion, 3) his notion that instances of these 
nefarious forms are on the decline, and 4) the historical debt of moral gratitude he pays to 
religion.  In general, however, I believe Mill makes a very compelling case against the thesis that 
religion is morally advantageous, and for considering that it may even be disadvantageous.  For 
one thing, he undermines the case for religion as an enforcer of morality.  On the one hand, if 
appeal to supernatural consequences is made, the motivation of believers behaving “morally” 
seems suspect (and possibly even immoral).  On the other hand, even if such an appeal is not 
made, Mill gives us good reason to believe that religion is not necessary, nor preferable, for 
effecting moral behavior.  I concur with Mill, and propose that other worldly deterrents 
imbedded in our society (e.g. prison and social disgrace), some of which Mill alludes to, seem 
just as successful—and arguably more so—at curbing immoral behavior as religious belief does.  
Also, bear in mind Mill’s point about how the remoteness and “the unavoidable uncertainty of 
religious penalties makes them feeble as a deterring motive.”203  Along these lines, worldly 
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consequences are likely more influential on human behavior precisely because they are more 
tangible and certain.  We may have hell to pay should we commit ourselves to a life of crime, but 
we will almost certainly end up paying with years of our lives behind bars.  As Philalethes, from 
Schopenhauer’s dialogue, suggests, “if a man feels tempted to commit a crime, you may rely 
upon it that the first consideration which enters his head is the penalty appointed for it, and the 
chances that it will fall upon him: then comes, as a second consideration, the risk to his 
reputation…he will ruminate by the hour on these two impediments, before he ever takes a 
thought of religious considerations.”204  Furthermore, Mill makes a compelling case against the 
moral merits of religion as a teacher of morality, citing the fact that disparate religions offer 
different—and, at times, conflicting—moral recommendations and that there are examples of 
immorality associated with these religions.  Add to Mill’s arguments the empirical evidence 
calling into question the positive influence of religion on morality, and I can’t help but conclude 
that there’s little reason to think that religion is morally advantageous. 
I also tend to agree with the points Mill makes regarding the individual utility of religion.  
In my mind, there is a much better case to be made for religion’s individual utility than there is 
for its social utility, which is reflected by Mill in his initial concession that religion does, in fact, 
make some people happy.  Reflecting on the “why?” that underlies our existence is something 
we have all experienced, and it is likely something we have all yearned to answer at one point or 
another.  Religion gives some people peace of mind regarding this existential anxiety that is so 
familiar to us all.  However, I believe Mill is correct in suggesting that we nevertheless need to 
ask whether supernatural religious belief is necessary and/or optimal for such satisfaction.  
Moreover, in contrast to what Matz argues and to Mill’s own later views, I agree with the 
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answers Mill provides to these questions in Utility of Religion: supernatural religious belief 
seems neither necessary nor optimal for satisfying our psychological desires and making us 
happy.  Once again, consider the examples of societies that have flourished without a 
preponderance of supernatural belief, and the examples of other alternatives for satisfying the 
existential desires in question (e.g. patriotism and Mill’s Religion of Humanity)—in light of 
these considerations, supernatural religious belief does not seem necessary for the kind of 
personal satisfaction in question.  Moreover, the self-interested nature of moral behavior 
associated with supernatural consequences and the substantial intellectual difficulties cited in 
Section C of Part III give us good reason to believe that other alternatives may be more optimal 
for our individual pursuit of happiness than supernatural religions. 
While I find much of what Mill argues in Utility of Religion convincing, I do have a few 
concerns about his overall analysis.  To begin with, Mill does not consider the benefit of 
religious belief for the physical health of individuals.  In fairness to Mill, this isn’t likely 
something he would have had reason to consider during his lifetime (since he wasn’t familiar 
with the empirical research available today that suggests it), and, thus, it doesn’t suggest any 
fault on his part.  Nonetheless, some research since Mill’s time has indicated that religion is 
beneficial for the physical health of individuals.  Kevin S. Seybold and Peter C. Hill offer a nice 
review of the relevant research in their article “The Role of Religion and Spirituality in Mental 
and Physical Health,”205 wherein they suggest that “studies on the influence of religion on 
physical health suggest that religion usually, but not always, plays a positive role”206 and 
conclude that the influence of religion and spirituality is generally a positive one.207  Similarly, 
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Harold G. Koenig examined the effects of religiosity on patients diagnosed with either 
congestive heart failure or chronic pulmonary disease and most of his findings suggested an 
inverse relationship between religiosity and mental and physical health problems.208  While Mill 
acknowledges the psychological (or mental) benefits associated with religion, he never mentions 
the possibility of physical health benefits for individuals. 
In his work, Richard Dawkins, a well-known atheist and Darwinian scientist, endorses an 
evolutionary explanation of the widespread nature and survival of religious belief, and, in the 
process, he surveys the candidates for such an explanation, one of which is an appeal to the 
benefits religion offers for the physical health of believers.  While he thinks that some of the 
benefits discussed by Mill, such as the notion that religion satisfies our existential curiosity and 
offers a sense of atonement for the suffering we experience on Earth, “miss the point of 
Darwinian explanations altogether,”209, 210 he suggests that a Darwinian can provide the kind of 
explanation in question by appealing to the improved physical health that religion is thought to 
offer individuals.  Accordingly, in discussing the “evidence that religious belief protects people 
from stress-related diseases,” he suggests that it “would not be at all surprising” if this turned out 
to be true, given that “dummy pills, with no pharmacological activity at all, demonstrably 
improve health.”211  He argues that religion offers a kind of placebo effect, whereby believers, 
regardless of whether they’re actually in possession of true beliefs regarding matters of ultimate 
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concern, think they are in possession of such beliefs, and thus experience all the positive benefits 
associated with thinking one is in possession of such truth.212  Hence, even some who are atheists 
and generally skeptical of the utility of religion have conceded that religious belief seems to offer 
physical health benefits to individuals.  To be sure, there are those who remain unconvinced that 
this is in fact true, and Dawkins is right when he suggests that “the theory [i.e. that “religion is a 
medical placebo” that “prolongs life by reducing stress”] is going to have to run the gauntlet of 
skeptics who point out the many circumstances in which religion increases stress rather than 
decreases it.”213  Still, many people would judge their physical health as being of utmost 
importance to them (that is, it is something highly valued by many people), in which case 
omitting it from consideration is no small matter.  All of this goes to show that this is an 
important and significant aspect of individual utility, and it is an aspect that Mill does not seem 
to consider in his own analysis of religion’s individual utility. 
Finally, granting, as Mill suggests, that there other more optimal ways to generate the 
kind of personal satisfaction and happiness religion produces, I am not convinced that these 
alternatives are realistic options for everyone.  While I do believe patriotism and Mill’s own 
Religion of Humanity will work for some people and that Mill may be right to suggest that they 
are optimal, I still wonder whether others might require supernatural views.  In Chapter 3, we 
will see that James makes the case that some individuals are so overburdened by earthly evils 
that supernatural religion becomes necessary for their salvation.  If this is the case, Mill’s 
alternatives will prove to be insufficient for the happiness of some individuals, and religion 
would appear to warrant more credit in terms of individual utility than he gives it.  However, 
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whether religion is indeed essential for the flourishing of some individuals, as James suggests, 
remains to be seen, and there are those who emphasize, instead, religion’s corruptive influence 
on the welfare of individuals.  Nietzsche, to whom we turn in the next chapter, does this, 
asserting that religion spawns self-deception and poor health in individuals.  Nietzsche would 
likely submit that, instead of addressing the source of the problem James alludes to (i.e. our 
suffering here on earth), supernatural religion merely encourages us to turn away from it.  
Alternatively, Nietzsche recommends that we address the problem of earthly suffering head-on 
and seek to understand it better, not that we turn away from it.  For Nietzsche, what’s at the heart 
of this earthly suffering and also underlies supernatural religions is the problem of nihilism, 
which, for him, reflects the devaluation of earthly life that is implicit in these supernatural views.  
In the following chapter, I examine Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ and offer a more detailed 
analysis of how this problem of nihilism affects considerations of the individual utility of 
religion. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Friedrich Nietzsche and The Anti-Christ 
 
I. Introduction 
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger argues that a human being is “distinguished by the 
fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”214  The implication is that it is human 
nature to ponder our own existence and to question why we are here.  At one point or another, 
most of us have wondered why there is something instead of nothing—that is, why does anything 
exist at all?  Life, as they say, is a mystery.  In response, some seek to unravel the mystery— to 
seek “the truth”—via philosophical questions, and some who do this are left feeling unsatisfied, 
and sometimes even hopeless, as a result.  I think Heidegger is right: it seems that, at least to 
some degree, almost all human beings are concerned with these kinds of existential issues and 
feel this kind of existential anxiety at one point or another during their lives.  As self-conscious 
beings, we reflect on our existence and grow anxious in doing so, with thoughts of death and 
suffering and a sense of meaninglessness plaguing us at times; this, in turn, can create 
psychological distress and a need for relief.  As I mentioned in Chapter 1, many have suggested 
that religion is a kind of antidote for these existential ailments, offering a sense of relief through 
the answers it provides for life’s “big questions.”  Like William James, the subject of Chapter 3, 
they believe religion satisfies a basic psychological need of human beings by relieving them of 
the existential anxieties inherent in their earthly existence as self-conscious beings.  Similarly, in 
his well-known work, The Future of an Illusion, Sigmund Freud illustrates the manner in which 
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he thinks religion satisfies our desire to free ourselves from existential helplessness.  Freud 
captures the point as follows: “how does he [man] defend himself against the superior powers of 
nature, of Fate, which threaten him as they threaten all the rest?...Man’s self-regard, seriously 
menaced, calls for consolation; life and the universe must be robbed of their terrors.”215, 216   
Naturally, Freud concludes human beings are compelled to respond to their existential terror in 
one way or another—“a reaction which is precisely the formation of religion.”217  Thus, given 
this ever-present need for a sense of purpose and the perpetual existential dread that can 
otherwise define being human, religion is often advocated on behalf of the existential relief it 
provides to believers.  However, in his book The Anti-Christ, Friedrich Nietzsche staunchly 
rejects this stance, arguing that such religious relief comes at an extreme price, a price that more 
than offsets any of its benefits. 
Much like Plato, Nietzsche is renowned for his artistic style, and, what’s more, each of 
his works seems to have a unique feel.  Some of his books resemble traditional philosophical 
treatises (e.g. The Birth of Tragedy), while others consist entirely of aphorisms (e.g. Beyond 
Good and Evil) or read like an epic (e.g. Thus Spoke Zarathustra).  All in all, he wrote 14 books 
before succumbing to mental illness in January of 1889, after which he spent the last ten years of 
his life in asylums or under the care of his mother and sister.  The Anti-Christ was the second-to-
last of these 14 books, and in the following I examine the arguments that Nietzsche advances in 
this work regarding the utility of religion. 
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Although Nietzsche is well-known for being critical of prior thinkers, there were some 
who significantly influenced him.  It is worth noting here that many of his chief philosophical 
ideas, not to mention his own writing style (as evidenced by his use of aphorisms), were inspired 
by the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), whom I have already referenced in 
Chapter 1 and about whom I will say much more later in this chapter (as well as in Chapter 3).  
Schopenhauer was a German philosopher whose writing Nietzsche discovered by chance in a 
bookstore at the age of 21, and much of Nietzsche’s own philosophy can be seen as an objection 
to Schopenhauer’s pessimism and nihilistic tendencies or an endorsement of Schopenhauer’s use 
of aphorisms and critical philosophy.  As Robert Wicks suggests in his Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy article on Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer's atheistic and turbulent vision of the world, in 
conjunction with his highest praise of music as an art form, captured Nietzsche's imagination, 
and the extent to which the ‘cadaverous perfume’ of Schopenhauer's world-view continued to 
permeate Nietzsche's mature thought remains a matter of scholarly debate.”218  Lest there be any 
doubt that Nietzsche himself felt, at least at some point in his life, a debt of gratitude to 
Schopenhauer, one need only consider that Schopenhauer is the often-praised subject of the third 
essay of his Untimely Meditations (four essays comprise this early work of Nietzsche’s).  
Regarding the third and fourth essays, Wicks writes: 
The third and fourth studies — on Schopenhauer and Wagner, respectively — 
address how these two thinkers, as paradigms of philosophic and artistic genius, 
hold the potential to inspire a stronger, healthier and livelier German culture. 
These celebratory studies on Schopenhauer and Wagner reveal how, as a 
recurring feature of Nietzsche's thought, he presents us with some higher type of 
character — he offers different models of heroic characters as the years go by — 
as an ideal towards which he would have his best readers aspire.219 
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As Wicks suggests, Nietzsche thinks (at least during the early stages of his philosophical career) 
that Schopenhauer demonstrates some of the character traits he associates with “strong” 
characters, whom, in turn, he juxtaposes with “weak” characters, which, as we shall soon 
discover, most religious individuals turn out to be on his account.  Interestingly, we will see that 
Schopenhauer also possesses some “weak” characteristics, too. 
In The Anti-Christ, a book consisting of 62 aphorisms, Nietzsche develops many 
criticisms of one religion in particular: Christianity.  Accordingly, when characterizing 
Nietzsche’s project in the book, Wicks writes:  
Nietzsche expresses his disgust over the way noble values in Roman Society were 
corrupted by the rise of Christianity, and he discusses specific aspects and 
personages in Christian culture — the Gospels, Paul, the martyrs, priests, the 
crusades — with a view towards showing that Christianity is a religion for weak 
and unhealthy people, whose general historical effect has been to undermine the 
healthy qualities of the more noble cultures.220 
   
However, while Nietzsche focuses almost exclusively on Christianity throughout the book, most 
of his criticisms are equally applicable to other religions, and I will note the few instances where 
this does not seem to be the case.221  Moreover, Nietzsche does apply many of these same points 
to other religions more explicitly in his other works, and I will mention some examples as I 
proceed.  Interestingly, Nietzsche originally intended for the book to be the first of a major four-
part project he called the “revaluation of all values” (a project I will say much more about in Part 
V); however, upon completing The Anti-Christ, he decided that he had more or less completed 
his goals with the project’s first installment.222  The Anti-Christ offers a summation of his core 
philosophical beliefs regarding religion (and, to a lesser extent, morality), which, for the most 
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part, he had already expressed, albeit with less vitriol, in previous works.  This sense of 
Nietzsche rehashing what he had said before, coupled with the fact that Nietzsche can easily 
come across as being a bit belligerent in much of the text, leads many—both Nietzsche 
enthusiasts and critics alike—to view the work in a generally unfavorable light.  Thus, in the 
Introduction to Judith Norman’s translation of the text, Aaron Ridley writes, “The Anti-Christ 
strikes one as over-emphatic and rather tiring.”223  Nevertheless, The Anti-Christ offers 
Nietzsche’s most mature views regarding religion, as well as, in my opinion, his most thorough 
and compelling case against it. 
Familiarity with other essential elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy, many of which he 
begins to develop very early on in his writing career, is required if one hopes to understand and 
appreciate his criticisms of religion in The Anti-Christ.  While he doesn’t focus on articulating 
and developing them in The Anti-Christ (although he does still reference them), concepts like 
“nihilism” and “master” and “slave” moralities underlie most of his criticisms of religion therein, 
and understanding these underlying concepts is therefore beneficial in adequately following his 
objections.  Consequently, before analyzing Nietzsche’s criticisms of religion, I will provide 
context by discussing some important elements of his more general philosophy.  I begin by 
detailing Nietzsche’s thoroughly naturalistic philosophy (Part II), highlighting, in particular, his 
famous reflections on master and slave moralities, his amoralism, and his reductionist ontology; I 
suggest that Nietzsche’s thoroughgoing naturalism is the primary precipitator of his criticisms of 
religion.  Next, I outline what I think are the two major problems Nietzsche has with religions: 1) 
they are at odds with an honest concern for truth (Part III) and 2) they are unhealthy (Part IV).  
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Then, I characterize Nietzsche’s “solution” to the problems he associates with religion—his 
project of a revaluation of all values (Part V).  Finally, in Part VI, I conclude by voicing some 
concerns I have regarding what is arguably (granting some of Nietzsche’s own points) the most 
likely outcome of this project, a project that takes a metaphorical hammer to the foundation of all 
traditional values, including those most closely associated with religion.  Specifically, I consider 
the possibility that, in doing away with (what Nietzsche considers to be) the fabrications of 
Christianity and with religious ideals in general, beliefs Nietzsche himself associates with “life 
preserving errors,”224 we might actually be undermining our prospects for living a healthy life.  
Given his own emphasis on facilitating healthy lives and combating nihilism (which is 
unhealthy), there is good reason to think that this would be of utmost concern to Nietzsche 
himself. 
 
II. Nietzsche’s Naturalism 
With respect to most of life’s “big questions,” Nietzsche believes an honest thinker has 
no choice but to suspend judgment.  Thus, in Section 55 of The Anti-Christ he writes, “there are 
some questions that people are not entitled to decide the truth of; all the ultimate questions, all 
the ultimate problems of value are beyond human reason.”225  Subsequently, Nietzsche 
vehemently denies any supernatural interpretation of—or explanation for—any aspect of reality; 
all concepts suggesting anything unnatural—that is, anything unsubstantiated by the physical 
world we come to know during our lives on Earth—are, for Nietzsche, essentially nonsense and 
illusory.  Consider Nietzsche’s temper in the following passage: 
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When the natural consequences of an action are not ‘natural’ any more but instead 
are attributed to spectral, superstitious concepts, to ‘God’, to ‘spirit’, to the ‘soul’, 
as exclusively ‘moral’ consequences, as reward, punishment, warning, as a lesson, 
then the presuppositions of knowledge have been destroyed,--and this is the 
greatest crime against humanity.226 
 
Not only is such anti-naturalism dishonest, but he believes that engaging in such deception is 
ultimately unhealthy, which, for him, constitutes an even more egregious problem.  In a moment 
I will turn to a brief discussion of his famous distinction between master moralities and slave 
moralities, as it reflects his thoroughgoing naturalism and ties in to his views on the utility of 
religion, most notably his scathing attack on Christianity in The Anti-Christ.  First, however, I 
want to make a few remarks about traditional conceptions of morality, since they are at the crux 
of this distinction.  Accordingly, I shall begin this part of the chapter by illustrating his 
skepticism regarding traditional moral views; I do this by way of a discussion of his reductionist 
ontology, showing how it undercuts traditional moral and religious thinking.  Then, I will seek to 
paint a clear picture of the master and slave mentalities that underlie master and slave moralities.  
In doing so, I will explain why Nietzsche associates religion with the slave mentality, and I will 
elaborate on the problematic nature of such an association, noting, for example, the dishonesty 
implicit in this kind of mentality. 
According to traditional conceptions of morality, there are certain values we should all 
embrace, as well as certain ways we should all behave; as a result, traditional moral claims are 
thought to prescribe particular values and actions.  Moral claims are prescriptive, in that they are 
concerned with how the world ought to be, rather than descriptive, in which case they would be 
concerned, instead, with simply how the world actually is.  Hence, “good” values and actions 
signal those that are considered “right” and are consequently prescribed, while “evil” ones 
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denote those that are deemed “wrong” and are, thus, devalued and discouraged.  As a result of 
this prescriptive process, traditional moral theories (e.g. utilitarianism and deontology)—as well 
as, and more importantly for my present purposes, the religions that inculcate such theories—
canonize certain values (e.g. equality and humility).  Along these lines, while a lack of certain 
values, like not preferring vanilla ice cream, is not thought to be grounds for sincere reproach, a 
lack of others, like not valuing equality in society, is.  Subsequently, in societies and cultures 
where these traditional moral views are favored, those who fail to endorse commonly preferred 
values are viewed unfavorably and often ostracized, and, in instances where social institutions 
incorporate such moral theories, delinquents can be penalized in a variety of ways, ranging from 
general social alienation to imprisonment and even, in some cases, death.227 
Ultimately, there can be little doubt that Nietzsche is fundamentally amoral when it 
comes to these traditional conceptions of morality.  After all, when analyzing traditional views of 
morality in Beyond Good and Evil, he famously claims that “there are no moral phenomena at 
all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.”228  Elsewhere, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he 
remarks, “‘this is my way; where is yours?’—thus I answered those who asked me ‘the way.’  
For the way—that does not exist.”229  I also believe that this is why, in The Will to Power,230 
Nietzsche claims it is his purpose to “demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and the 
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application of moral distinctions as conditioned by perspective; to demonstrate how everything 
praised as moral is identical in essence with everything immoral.”231  Indeed, in much of his 
work, Nietzsche denies that certain actions are ever justified—or that certain values are ever 
privileged—in this traditional moral sense; that is, he suggests there are no objectively “right” 
and “good” actions or values.  In essence, it seems that Nietzsche’s own “moral” view is 
characterized by his reluctance to endorse a traditional moral view.  What distinguishes 
Nietzsche is his very opposition to the idea that there are universally-binding or objective 
standards for actions.  Hence, his reflections on morality do not constitute a “moral theory,” per 
se, but rather a kind of critique of all such theories.  In view of this, Nietzsche’s own moral 
theory, like most of his philosophy, is primarily descriptive, not prescriptive.  In his moral and 
religious reflections, he is chiefly concerned with describing the inner workings of various 
psychological mentalities (e.g. master and slave), as well as of life in general, not with 
prescribing particular values and actions. 
In order to gain a better understanding of Nietzsche’s naturalism and amoralism, it is also 
worth discussing his reductionist ontology.  On his account, life consists of (1) incalculable, and 
purely natural, drives (2) incessantly in flux, all (3) perpetually seeking power (i.e. domination of 
other drives).  First, Nietzsche suggests that human beings have a tendency to misconceptualize 
life, and he himself tends to speak of life in a much more reduced sense than one is ordinarily 
accustomed to hearing it talked about.  For instance, in explicating what life is, Nietzsche claims 
that even the word “plant” is painfully misleading, for to even speak of a “plant” is to have 
“invented a false unity which does not exist: the fact of a millionfold growth with individual and 
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semi-individual initiatives is concealed and denied if we begin by positing a crude unity 
‘plant’.”232  As remarks like this suggest, Nietzsche thinks that there are, instead, millions of 
“drives,” or life forces, at work within every living being.  Second, Nietzsche reduces reality to 
that which is immediately present at any given moment, in which case life is constantly 
becoming something completely distinct and entirely new with each and every moment; that is, it 
is constantly changing or, as he is apt to say, “becoming.”  Finally, another of Nietzsche’s central 
philosophical ideas, the “will to power,” suggests that all living beings (or drives) strive to 
exploit their environment for their own benefit, in an effort not simply to survive but to flourish.  
The will to power is a prevalent theme throughout Nietzsche’s writings, including The Anti-
Christ.  Very early on in The Anti-Christ Nietzsche writes: 
What is good?—Everything that enhances people’s feeling of power, will to 
power, power itself.  What is bad?—Everything stemming from weakness.  What 
is happiness?—The feeling that power is growing, that some resistance has been 
overcome.233 
 
In Nietzsche’s view, as evinced by this notion of the will to power, life on Earth is filled with 
conflict and differences, and there is a tendency for the strong to naturally flourish and survive 
while the weak barely scrape by or perish.  Nietzsche thinks the will to power is, in turn, a notion 
that applies universally to the aforementioned manifold drives, and it ultimately constitutes what 
he means by “life.” 
Because it indicates that life is a chaotic struggle for power and that reality is constantly 
in flux, Nietzsche’s reductionist ontology explains why he is so quick to dismiss traditional 
religious and moral views, according to which there is a “right” action that is objectively true and 
proper for everyone everywhere.  It also explains why Nietzsche suggests that nothing is “true” 
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of existence in any objective and universal sense, be it moral or otherwise.  Ultimately, notions 
of objectively “right” and “wrong” actions are entirely misguided for Nietzsche, and, as we shall 
see in greater detail shortly, he reduces them to illusions that bring comfort.  All we do have, in 
reality, are subjective values (i.e. I think this is “good” and this is “bad”), and Nietzsche refers to 
someone who does not deceive him- or herself about this aspect of reality as a “master.”  As 
soon as one attempts to objectify these subjective values and to think of values in terms of 
“right” and “wrong” (i.e. “good” and “evil”), one becomes what Nietzsche calls a “slave.” 
Thus, Nietzsche’s amoralism is a major impetus for his famous distinction between 
“master” (or “noble”) and “slave” (or “Chandala” 234) moralities, and, similarly, the distinction 
between individuals who possess a master mentality (i.e. those Nietzsche refers to throughout his 
writings as “nobles,” “masters,” “free spirits,” and “overmen”) and individuals who exhibit a 
slave mentality (whom Nietzsche often refers to collectively as “the herd”).  In Beyond Good and 
Evil Nietzsche writes, “wandering through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so 
far been prevalent on earth, or still are prevalent, I found that certain features recurred regularly 
together and were closely associated—until I finally discovered two basic types.”235  Although 
this distinction is not a focal point in The Anti-Christ, he does reference it there, too.  For 
instance, when reflecting on the fruits of one of his earlier works, On the Genealogy of Morality, 
Nietzsche writes, “here for the first time, the contrast is made clear between a noble morality and 
a Chandala morality born of ressentiment and impotent revenge.”236  Similarly, when discussing 
the origin of Christianity (which he argues lies in Judaism and resentment) in Section 24, 
Nietzsche again references On the Genealogy of Morality, where he claims that he “introduced a 
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psychology of the opposing concepts of noble morality and ressentiment morality; the latter 
originating out of a no to the former.”237  Generally speaking, slave moralities reflect traditional 
moral theories and their moral prescriptions, while master moralities are thought to transcend the 
need to moralize (in this traditional sense) in the first place.  Master “moralities” refrain from the 
habit of judging actions and values in the traditional moral sense and instead move “beyond good 
and evil.”  The implications of this master-slave distinction are far-reaching, and Nietzsche 
spends a good deal of time providing psychological analyses of the master and slave mentalities 
underlying these master and slave moralities, especially in his works predating The Anti-Christ.  
Moreover, Nietzsche clearly associates religion with slave moralities, as he does in Section 45 of 
The Anti-Christ, where he associates Christianity in particular with slave morality, noting that 
“Paul was the greatest of all apostles of revenge.”238  This association of religion with slave 
moralities should not be surprising, given that most religions clearly endorse a traditional moral 
view of values and actions.  Also, recall from Chapter 1 that religions are often credited with 
propagating traditional moral values.  I believe Nietzsche’s master-slave distinction can help 
shed light on his criticisms of religion, so I now turn to a more detailed analysis. 
Through his works, Nietzsche offers a fairly detailed description of slave moralities and 
of the slave mentality.  The slave mentality is signaled, first and foremost, by an obsession with 
the pain and suffering implicit in life; fear about reality (i.e. that life is rife with conflict, full of 
danger, and entails suffering) plagues the slave mentality.  In this vein, Nietzsche argues that 
many religious individuals cannot handle the truth regarding their earthly reality, especially the 
pain and suffering associated with it, and that they elaborate self-deceptions (which I will discuss 
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in more detail in Part III) as a result.  This is reflected in his discussion of the psychology of 
redemption in Section 30 of The Anti-Christ, where he writes, “the instinct of hatred for reality: 
the consequence of an extreme over-sensitivity and capacity for suffering that does not want to 
be ‘touched’ at all because it feels every contact too acutely.”239  In a similar manner, Nietzsche 
suggests that slave moralities emphasize comfort and the preservation of the herd in an effort to 
mitigate the slave’s acute sense of pain and suffering.  On his account, slave moralities cater to a 
herd mentality, which aims to ensure that everyone survives and lives as comfortably as possible 
in virtue of the considerations of others it expressly requires.  The universalization of values and 
actions through moral maxims ostensibly renders the world a less dangerous place because 
imbedded within the traditional moralizing process is an implicit suspicion of—and contempt 
for—outliers who stray too far from the norm, and, naturally, the more prominent this herd 
mentality becomes, the less likely it is that these anomalies will exist in the first place.  
Preoccupied with the threat posed by others, slaves react by attempting to get everyone to 
subscribe to a particular set of values, which, if adhered to, are thought to produce the most 
comfort and security.  Ultimately, moral ideals help buffer slaves from the distress implicit in 
their lives by imploring all to be “good,” meaning, in essence, to be normal, obedient and, most 
importantly, less dangerous. 
In view of this, Nietzsche distinguishes values from the slave’s perspective by using the 
terms “good” and “evil,” where “good” indicates all that is normal, expected and, therefore, 
comfortable and “evil” signifies all that is unique, unexpected and, therefore, dangerous.  In the 
end, Nietzsche argues that fear is the mother of slave moralities,240 and, not surprisingly, that, 
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from the slave’s perspective, “what is new…is always evil.”241  Consequently, while the values 
of a master are merely thought to be the product of his or her own personal expression, the 
slave’s values are said to be primarily—if not entirely—dictated by others and his or her 
relationship to them.  Accordingly, one of the hallmarks of the slave mentality is sincere concern 
for the welfare of others, and offering pity for the plight of others is viewed favorably—if not 
deemed obligatory—by those who have this mentality.  The upshot is that traditional moral 
views, as well as the religions inculcating them, require us to act like slaves insofar as they 
implore us to set aside, at least to some degree, our own self-interest for the sake of others.  This, 
in Nietzsche’s view, also makes them unnatural, which, not surprisingly, renders them a 
significant object of derision for him.  All of this goes to show why, with respect to Christianity, 
Nietzsche concludes that “the fear of pain, even of infinitesimal amounts of pain—this could end 
up only as a religion of love,”242 given that he thinks “love is the state in which people are most 
prone to see things the way they are not.”243 
By contrast, masters are defined, in part, by their lack of concern regarding the values of 
others or the assimilation of common values, and Nietzsche believes that, by accentuating 
individual well-being and accepting—and even encouraging—individual differences, master 
“moralities” actually minimize the importance of outward concern for others.  Indeed, instead of 
attempting to universalize his or her values, the master seeks to distinguish them, encouraging 
the creation of new and more personal values.  For a master, what matters most is not whether an 
action achieved this or that specific result or whether it was in accord with particular popular and 
privileged values, but whether it was performed boldly and with passion.  What’s more, what 
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distinguishes boldness and passion is, in part, the degree to which one swims against the current.  
The herd mentality may produce a greater sense of security and comfort, but Nietzsche, 
presumably considering himself a master, believes this comes at a significant cost.  While 
quantitatively humanity gains from such efforts (i.e. more human beings may survive), 
qualitatively it loses some degree of distinction, which is to say, on Nietzsche’s account, value 
(and this is one reason why Nietzsche does not value slave moralities).  Normality may yield 
numbers, but only distinction is thought to produce greatness, significance, and beauty.  
According to Nietzsche, one who properly understands his or her values will keep them to him- 
or herself, for this (i.e. their personal and subjective nature) is precisely wherein he thinks their 
true value lies (i.e. in their being different, interesting, and noteworthy).  Along these lines, he 
warns us that “whatever kind of bizarre ideal one may follow…one should not demand that it be 
the ideal: for one therewith takes from it its privileged character.  One should have it in order to 
distinguish oneself, not in order to level oneself.”244  For this same reason, Nietzsche’s 
“philosopher of the future” in Beyond Good and Evil declares: 
My judgment is my judgment…One must shed the bad taste of wanting to agree 
with many.  ‘Good’ is no longer good when one’s neighbor mouths it.  And how 
should there be a ‘common good’!  The term contradicts itself: whatever can be 
common always has little value.245 
 
Unlike masters, slaves create no new values, since they actively pursue the assimilation of 
universal values proffered and preferred by the herd, and this means that they make no 
appreciable difference in the grand scheme of things and are, therefore, of no real significance.  
In sum, Nietzsche believes that slaves seek, above all else, to diminish the pain and suffering 
inherent in life by establishing a communal situation that promotes the least amount of danger 
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for everyone, instead of embracing life in its entirety and seeking beauty, significance, and true 
value like masters.  As we shall see in greater detail later, he views the slave’s obsession with 
pain and suffering and their concomitant attempt to universalize values as a sign of weakness and 
disease. 
Nietzsche ultimately prefers that we foster a society in which the highest human beings 
(i.e. masters) flourish, even if it must be at the expense of those who are diseased and weak, and 
he would gladly trade in any perceived quantitative successes associated with societies and 
cultures that embrace the slave mentality for the more qualitative success he associates with 
those embracing a master mentality.  Indeed, Nietzsche’s endorsement of master morality is clear 
throughout most of his works, including Ecce Homo, where, as Wicks points out, “he claims that 
he is a destiny because he regards his anti-moral truths as having the annihilating power of 
intellectual dynamite; he expects them to topple the morality born of sickness which he perceives 
to have been reigning within Western culture for the last two thousand years.”246  Additionally, 
in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche remarks that “the weak and the failures should perish: first 
principle of our love of humanity.”247  These kinds of remarks suggest that Wicks is right when 
he claims that “Nietzsche alternatively philosophizes from the perspective of life located beyond 
good and evil, and challenges the entrenched moral idea that exploitation, domination, injury to 
the weak, destruction and appropriation are universally objectionable behaviors.”248  For 
Nietzsche, this is just how life works—hence, it’s what he thinks is natural.  Alternatively, those 
endorsing the slave mentality perpetuate what is unnatural, which is why Nietzsche does not 
value the slave mentality.  On this point, Wicks writes: 
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Nietzsche ultimately advocates valuations that issue from a self-confident, self-
reinforcing, self-governing, creative and commanding attitude, as opposed to 
those that issue from reactive attitudes that determine values more mechanically, 
subordinatingly, and opposingly to those who are inherently more powerful.  For 
Nietzsche, those who prefer to think in terms of “good vs. bad” exemplify the 
former, leading and superior mentality, and those who think in terms of “good vs. 
evil,” exemplify the latter, inferior and subservient mentality.249 
 
As Wicks suggests here, Nietzsche represents the value judgments of a master by using the terms 
“good” and “bad,” where “good” just indicates whatever he or she happens to value and “bad” 
whatever he or she happens to despise, with no moral implications or undertones in either case.  
That is, masters do not attempt to objectify values, and, thus, master morality is “beyond good 
and evil.”  In view of the traditional conception of morality discussed earlier, then, there really is 
nothing “moral” about master moralities. 
I believe that Nietzsche’s problems with religion primarily stem from his analysis of the 
slave mentality and his belief in its fundamental incompatibility with his thoroughgoing 
naturalism.  I now turn to more detailed analyses of what I think are his two chief objections to 
religion.  I will begin by discussing why Nietzsche believes religion entails dishonesty (Part III), 
and then move on to discuss why he thinks it is unhealthy (Part IV).  As we shall see, Nietzsche 
thinks that slave deceptions, such as other-worldly notions and moral standards, simply do not 
hold up upon close intellectual scrutiny, and he would certainly echo many of Mill’s criticisms 
regarding the intellectual unsustainability of supernatural religions mentioned in Chapter 1 
(especially in Section C of Part III).  Moreover, from Nietzsche’s perspective, whatever enhances 
earthly life is “good” and whatever saps the instincts for life is “bad” (notice that I use the 
contradistinction “good and bad” here, and not “good and evil”), and he argues that religion 
ultimately does the latter. 
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III. Religion and Truth 
A sincere concern for the truth is something that is of utmost importance to Nietzsche, 
and, aside from health, he seems to value it above all else.  Echoing this sentiment, Walter 
Kaufmann, one of the leading Nietzsche scholars and translators, remarks that “Nietzsche 
himself was a fanatical seeker after truth and recognized no virtue above intellectual 
integrity.”250  Indeed, the impact of Nietzsche’s high regard for honesty regarding the nature of 
reality is far-reaching in the development of his philosophy, and it underlies many of his 
criticisms of religion.  Ultimately, Nietzsche praises masters because they have the “courage” to 
be honest and embrace the truth about reality, which essentially amounts to endorsing his 
thoroughgoing naturalism, and, conversely, he is extremely critical of slaves because they are too 
weak to accept life as it actually is (i.e. as a constant struggle for power amidst an ever-changing 
and chaotic existence) and must indulge in self-deception as a result.  Nietzsche frequently 
juxtaposes the honesty of free spirits and masters with the dishonesty of priests, philosophers, 
and other slaves, and he is not shy about his disdain for the latter, who he thinks deceive 
themselves about the reality of their lives on Earth.  Not surprisingly, then, in Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche laments that “it is precisely the truth that has been absolutely forbidden so far,”251 and, 
in Beyond Good and Evil, he suggests that “perhaps nobody yet has been truthful enough about 
what ‘truthfulness’ is.”252  Similarly, when remarking on the falsifications and self-deceptions 
plaguing the history of Christianity, which will be discussed in more detail shortly, Nietzsche 
writes, “we alone, we spirits who have become free, have the requisite presuppositions for 
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understanding what nineteen centuries have misunderstood,--the honesty that has become 
instinct and passion, that wages war on the ‘holy lie’ above all other lies.”253  As opposed to the 
religious, Nietzsche suggests that free spirits like himself “have become more modest in every 
way.  We have stopped deriving humanity from ‘spirit’, from ‘divinity’, we have stuck human 
beings back among the animals.”254  On Nietzsche’s account, moving beyond a thoroughgoing 
naturalism, as slaves do, entails self-deception. 
This is something most individuals are guilty of doing, as he indicates when reflecting on 
common misconceptions regarding the Gospels and the origin of Christianity in The Anti-Christ: 
“the whole of humanity, even the best minds of the best ages—(with a single exception, someone 
who is perhaps just inhuman--) have allowed themselves to be deceived.”255  In the final section 
of The Anti-Christ, he concludes that “a will to lie at any cost, a disgust, a hatred of all good and 
honest instincts!—Those would be the blessings of Christianity as far as I am concerned.”256  
The self-deception and dishonesty he associates with religion is exacerbated by other 
instantiations of the slave mentality, such as traditional philosophy.  Certainly, Nietzsche is quite 
scathing in his reflections on philosophy.  Consider, for example, his synopsis of the history of 
philosophy: “I will make an exception for a couple of the sceptics, the decent types in the history 
of philosophy; but the rest of them have no conception of the basic demands of intellectual 
integrity.”257  What’s more, Nietzsche suggests that modern German philosophy ultimately 
amounts to “an underhanded theology,”258 and adds that “philosophers supported the church: the 
lie of ‘the moral world order’ runs through the entire development of philosophy, even modern 
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philosophy.”259  Ultimately, religion (along with its more salient extensions, such as morality and 
philosophy) is problematic for Nietzsche insofar as he thinks it fosters self-deception, and in this 
part of the chapter I outline the arguments he offers in support of this thesis. 
As James points out, religion is associated with belief in an “unseen order.”  “Were one 
asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible,” James 
says, “one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our 
supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.”260  This kind of belief in the 
unseen, in the supernatural, is completely at odds with Nietzsche’s naturalism, and he often 
reflects on the extensive self-deception and falsification of reality he associates with it.  Indeed, 
he goes to great lengths in The Anti-Christ to demonstrate the many ways in which he thinks 
religions (and usually Christianity in particular) falsify reality as a result of their supernatural 
emphases.  He chronicles, for example, several intangible fictions he associates with Christianity, 
such as “spirit,” “grace,” “sin,” and “souls,”261 and he goes so far as to say that “this entirely 
fictitious world can be distinguished from the world of dreams (to the detriment of the former) in 
that dreams reflect reality while Christianity falsifies, devalues, and negates reality.”262  James, 
who expresses an appreciation for religion’s ability to assuage our existential anxieties through 
such supernatural beliefs (as I will say much more about in Chapter 3), acknowledges 
Nietzsche’s point about the unrealistic nature of (at least some) religious belief, but he suggests 
that entertaining unrealistic beliefs is something we all do naturally anyway: 
The systematic cultivation of healthy-mindedness as a religious attitude is 
therefore consonant with important currents in human nature, and is anything but 
absurd.  In fact, we all do cultivate it more or less…we divert our attention from 
disease and death as much as we can…so that the world we recognize officially in 
                                                             
259 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 26. 
260 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004), 57. 
261 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 15. 
262 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 15. 
88 
 
literature and in society is a poetic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and better 
than the world that really is.263 
 
This seems reminiscent of Nietzsche’s depiction of the slave mentality, which he says 
emphasizes comfort and introduces illusions in order to minimize feelings of pain and danger.  
What’s more, with respect to those he calls slaves, it seems that Nietzsche would have to agree 
with James’s suggestion that this process of falsifying reality is a natural process, since 
Nietzsche believes that “suffering people need to be sustained by a hope that cannot be refuted 
by any reality.”264  I will say more about the ramifications of this being a natural process for the 
majority of people in parts V and VI. 
Consider, also, one of the central tenets of many religious and traditional moral 
viewpoints: the notion of equality.  Such views suggest that people be treated equally; for 
instance, as Nietzsche is quick to point out, the Gospels suggest that a fundamental belief of 
Jesus was that “everyone is equal to everyone else.”265  In Nietzsche’s view, however, this is an 
unnatural concept (which, for Nietzsche, makes it a deception), insofar as it is starkly at odds 
with his naturalism and reductionist ontology, and his notion that, in reality, life is full of 
inequality.  According to Nietzsche, those who are honest with themselves will admit that 
inequality is an unavoidable fact of life.  He asserts that “caste-order, order of rank, is just a 
formula for the supreme law of life itself…unequal rights are the condition for any rights at 
all.—A right is a privilege.”266  Subsequently, “injustice is never a matter of unequal rights, it is 
a matter of claiming ‘equal’ rights.”267  In his view, moral theorists, Jesus, and other slaves do 
not adequately recognize or appreciate this.  For this reason, when reflecting on those who he 
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thinks unjustifiably think of Jesus as a kind of “genius” and a “hero,” Nietzsche suggests that 
“the rigorous language of physiology would use a different word here: the word ‘idiot’.”268, 269 
According to Nietzsche, appeals to religious faith also entail deception.  In his view, 
“‘faith’ means not wanting to know the truth,”270 and those expressing it are, therefore, thought 
to lack a sincere concern for discovering the true nature of reality.  Further, Nietzsche claims that 
“Christianity knows that it is a matter of complete indifference whether or not something is true, 
but it is of supreme importance that people have faith in its truth.  Truth and the faith that 
something is true: these sets of interests belong to entirely different, almost opposite worlds.”271  
Once again, Nietzsche suggests that religious faith results from the slave’s instinct to minimize 
pain and suffering, not from an honest regard for the truth.  Hence, he suggests that “a faithful 
person is not free to have any sort of conscience for the question of ‘true’ or ‘untrue’: honesty on 
this point would be his immediate downfall.  People with convictions have pathologically 
conditioned optics, which makes them into fanatics."272  For Nietzsche, faith ultimately amounts 
to a disingenuous sense of certainty, and any “justification” for it usually just begs the question, 
as he suggests in one of his characterizations of it: “‘I have faith that faith makes blessed;--
consequently it is true.’”273  As is the case with many of the problems he associates with 
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Christianity in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche believes that the prevalence of faith is largely related 
to the priestly caste’s effort to gain power; he writes:  
I wage war on this theologian instinct…anyone with theologian blood in his veins 
will approach things with a warped and deceitful attitude.  This gives rise to a 
pathos that calls itself faith: turning a blind eye to yourself for once and for all, so 
you do not have to stomach the sight of incurable mendacity.274 
  
Nietzsche concludes that, “if faith is needed above all else, then reason, knowledge, and inquiry 
have to be discredited: the path to truth becomes the forbidden path.”275 
Along these lines, Nietzsche explicitly juxtaposes religion with science throughout The 
Anti-Christ, associating the former with self-deception and the latter with a sincere concern for 
truth.  In Section 52, for instance, he suggests that “the church has to condemn all straight, 
honest, scientific paths to knowledge as forbidden paths.  Doubt is already a sin.”276   Elsewhere, 
when explaining why he thinks religion constitutes a “crime against life,” Nietzsche complains 
that “a religion like Christianity, which is completely out of touch with reality, which 
immediately falls apart if any concession is made to reality, would of course be morally opposed 
to the ‘wisdom of this world’, which is to say science.”277  Once more, Nietzsche argues that the 
impetus for the animosity between religion and science largely lies in the priestly caste’s quest to 
gain power.  He expounds on how science is at odds with their ascent to power as follows: “it is 
all over for priests and gods when people become scientific!—Moral: science is the taboo of all 
taboos,--it is the only thing forbidden.  Science is the first sin, the seed of all sins, the original 
sin.  Only this is morality,--‘Thou shalt not know.’”278  As a result, he thinks the priestly caste 
attempts to destroy knowledge and science by endorsing supernatural concepts like “judgment,” 
                                                             
274 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 9. 
275 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 23. 
276 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 52. 
277 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 47. 
278 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Section 48. 
91 
 
“sin,” “redemption” and “forgiveness,” suggesting that these concepts “are invented to destroy 
people’s sense of causation”279 and that the “priest can only imagine one great danger: and that is 
science—the healthy concepts of cause and effect.”280  Accordingly, he locates the origin of 
“sin” in the priestly caste’s reaction to science, as indicated by the following: 
Science generally only flourishes in favourable conditions,--you need a surplus of 
time and spirit in order to ‘know’…‘Consequently, people need to be made 
unhappy’…You can already guess what would enter the world, given this logic:--
‘sin’…The concepts of guilt and punishment, the whole ‘moral world order’ is 
invented against science,--against priests losing their hold on people.281 
 
In response to the threat of science, Nietzsche argues that “the ‘priest-in-itself’ invents troubles, 
death, the moral dangers of pregnancy, every type of misery, age, hardship, and above all 
illness,”282 because “troubles prevent people from thinking…War—among other things, a huge 
source of disruption for science!”283 
To be sure, Nietzsche believes many of the ills he associates with religion are a result of 
priestly influence.  For instance, when chronicling the history of Christianity, Nietzsche suggests 
that the concept of God “becomes a tool in the hands of priestly agitators who now interpret all 
happiness as a reward, all unhappiness as a punishment for disobeying God, for ‘sins’: that most 
deceitful of all modes of interpretation, the supposed ‘moral world order’, which turns the natural 
concepts of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ on their heads once and for all.”284  This priestly caste needed 
“an anti-natural causality” and, as a result, “all the rest of un-nature now follows.”285  Thus, 
largely as a result of this priestly influence, Christianity becomes entrenched in rampant 
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falsifications and self-deceptions.  In this manner, scripture is said to stem from the priest’s effort 
to maintain power, as indicated in the following: 
Advancing to the next state: the ‘will of God’, which is to say: the conditions for 
maintaining power in the hands of the priests, needs to be divulged,—this calls for 
a ‘revelation’.  In simple terms: an enormous literary falsification is needed, a 
‘holy scripture’ is discovered…From now on, everything in life will be arranged 
so that the priest is everywhere indispensable; the holy parasite will show up at all 
the natural occasions of life, at birth, marriage, illness, death, not to mention 
sacrifice (‘meals’), and denature them all: in his words, ‘sanctify’ them…Viewed 
psychologically, ‘sins’ are indispensable in every society organized by priests.  
They are the real levers of power, the priest lives on sin, he needs ‘sinning’ to 
happen…He coldly and cynically measures peoples, ages, and individuals 
according to whether they promote or oppose the domination of the priests.286 
 
Clearly, Nietzsche thinks that the interests of the priestly caste are at odds with an honest pursuit 
of truth, and he concludes that “as long as the priest is considered a higher type of person—this 
professional negater, slanderer, poisoner of life—there will not be an answer to the question: 
What is truth?  Truth has already been turned on its head when someone who consciously 
champions nothingness and negation passes for the representative of ‘truth’.”287  In sum, 
“anything a theologian thinks is true must be false: this is practically a criterion of truth.  His 
most basic instinct of self-preservation does not allow any scrap of reality to be honoured or even 
expressed.”288 
Many of Nietzsche’s reflections in The Anti-Christ pertain to the history of Christianity in 
particular, and to the problems allegedly plaguing this history, and they may not apply to other 
religions.  Having said that, he writes that “the history of Israel is invaluable because it is typical 
of all histories where natural values are denatured,”289 which, on his account, would include the 
histories of most other religions.  In other words, the history of Christianity illustrates the same 
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kind of self-deception and denaturalization of reality found in many other religions.  The first 
point Nietzsche emphasizes regarding the history of Christianity is that it actually begins with 
Judaism and a corresponding instinct of resentment.  Accordingly, he suggests that Christianity 
“is not a counter-movement to the Jewish instinct,” but rather “it is its natural consequence, a 
further conclusion drawn by its terrifying logic.”290  Nevertheless, the final stage in the history of 
Christianity actually consists of its rejection of Judaism, which he believes involves significant 
misunderstandings on the part of most Christians.  He explains that “as soon as the gap between 
Jew and Judaeo-Christian appeared, the latter had no choice except to use the same methods of 
self-preservation dictated by the Jewish instinct against the Jews themselves, while the Jews had 
only ever used them against non-Jews.  The Christian is just a Jew with less rigorous beliefs.”291  
Thus, Nietzsche concludes that “the small, rebel movement christened with the name of Jesus of 
Nazareth is the Jewish instinct once again.”292  For Nietzsche, this all goes to show that “the 
Jews are the most disastrous people in world history: they have left such a falsified humanity in 
their wake that even today Christians can think of themselves as anti-Jewish without 
understanding that they are the ultimate conclusion of Judaism.”293 
Furthermore, Nietzsche asserts that most religious individuals are not themselves aware 
of any of these self-deceptions—hence, the self-deception.  For instance, since Christians don’t 
realize that they are actually the inevitable spawn of their Jewish ancestry, he declares that 
“‘Christians’, the people who have been called Christian for two thousand years, are just a 
psychological self-misunderstanding.”294  Once again, although he highlights Christianity 
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throughout The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche still applies many of his findings to other religions.  For 
example, he relates Saint Paul295 and Christianity to Mohammed and Islam, suggesting that 
Mohammed later borrowed “Paul’s invention, his method of priestly tyranny, of forming the 
herds, the belief in immortality—which is to say the doctrine of the ‘judgment’.”296  With respect 
to the religious, whom he accuses of denaturing reality, he ultimately suggests that, “examined 
more closely and in spite of all ‘belief’, they have been governed only by instincts.”297  
Similarly, he claims that, while “people have always talked about ‘faith’, they have always acted 
from instinct.”298  The implication is that, despite the pervasive appeals the religious make to 
supernatural phenomena (or, as James would say, to an “unseen order”), they are all the while 
still motivated by purely natural forces. 
Nietzsche’s depiction of the relationship between religion and truth is certainly 
controversial, and there are several issues worth mentioning here.  One reasonable objection is 
that Nietzsche actually says very little that is novel.  One could argue, for example, that 
Nietzsche simply offers a restatement of the secular Enlightenment (e.g. the idea that a “priestly 
caste” is responsible for religion as we know it).  Similarly, the suggested divide between Christ 
and Paul used to be made by Christian scholars in the nineteenth century, and such a divide is 
thought by many to have been subsequently discredited.  Aside from offering little that is new, 
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another problem surfaces with respect to the sheer degree of vitriol present in Nietzsche’s 
analysis—one can’t help but sense a high degree of bias underlying it and wonder whether 
someone like Nietzsche is capable of an objective analysis of the subject matter.  Not 
surprisingly, critics suggest that Nietzsche’s portrayal of religion and of those who are religious 
is unfair and borders on caricature, and they argue that Nietzsche makes extraordinarily 
sweeping judgments and over-simplifications.  As will become clear in Chapter 3, it is not hard 
to imagine someone like James suggesting that Nietzsche’s evidence is not very good and that he 
seems to be imposing a generally-negative attitude toward what is, in actuality, a much more 
complex and varied reality.  What’s more, while Nietzsche claims that Christianity is antithetical 
to any honest pursuit of truth, including the prospects of science, others have suggested that the 
opposite is actually the case.  For instance, there are those who suggest that the Western passion 
for truth is actually rooted in Christianity, and some, like Alfred North Whitehead, have argued 
that Christianity played an important role in the rise of modern science.  Nevertheless, despite 
these concerns, Nietzsche clearly thinks that religion is marred by falsifications and self-
deceptions.  As it turns out, he thinks religion not only fosters self-deception—it is also sickly 
and life-negating, which renders it “nihilistic” and, on his account, a kind of psychological 
disease.  I now turn to a more detailed analysis of this equally controversial contention. 
 
IV. Religion and Health 
In a sense, Nietzsche’s master-slave distinction can be reduced to a difference in one’s 
psychological attitude toward—or outlook on—life.  In his view, the way that individuals deal 
with the reality of their existence and any concomitant existential anxieties reflects a great deal 
about them, and whether they are masters or slaves essentially comes down to whether they can 
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be truthful with themselves about this reality.  The crucial factor is whether, when faced with the 
existential anxieties associated with life as a human being, they (1) accept their natural existence 
for what it is, including all the pain and suffering within it and its lack of an objective standard or 
ultimate purpose, in which case they are considered masters, or (2) resent or bemoan it and 
render it something it is not, thus deceiving themselves with illusions (which he also calls 
“ideals” and “idols”) for the sake of comfort, in which case they are considered slaves.  As 
Nietzsche is fond of putting the point, masters are those who say “Yes” to life, while slaves are 
those who say “No” to it.  For Nietzsche, the slave’s preoccupation with comfort and his or her 
condemnation of the suffering inherent in earthly life amounts to resenting this life.  Indeed, as 
I’ve shown in Part II and Part III, Nietzsche thinks that slaves spend much of their energy 
dwelling on the pain and suffering in their earthly life, often (especially in the case of religious 
individuals) anticipating a better existence in another life hereafter.  According to Nietzsche, 
slaves are troubled by the nature of life itself, and this leads them to live restricted and self-
sacrificing lives in the service of the disillusioned ideals they have invented for the sake of 
coping with the pain and suffering they obsess about. 
All of this goes to show that Nietzsche’s analysis of master and slave mentalities stems 
from what was, for him, a much more critical concern: the problem of nihilism.  Moreover, the 
sickness and mental disease that Nietzsche associates with religion and other instances of the 
slave mentality also reflect this problem.  For Nietzsche, nihilism essentially entails saying no to 
life; it is a kind of negation and depreciation of earthly life.  In turn, much of his philosophy aims 
to combat nihilism, which is why Kaufmann claims that “to escape nihilism—which seems 
involved both in asserting the existence of God and thus robbing this world of ultimate 
significance, and also in denying God and thus robbing everything of meaning and value—that is 
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Nietzsche’s greatest and most persistent problem.”299  As Kaufmann intimates here, Nietzsche 
often talks about nihilism in a manner that suggests it comes in stages and can be classified into 
different types, and we shall see shortly that, while Nietzsche derides religion for being nihilistic, 
he is even more worried about more extreme, non-religious cases of nihilism.  He characterizes 
nihilism and the plight of the religious as if there is a natural progression involved, warning his 
readers that religious individuals typically constitute milder versions of nihilism and that they 
can evolve into much worse kinds. 
Ultimately, what is most troubling and problematic about the slave mentality is the anti-
life sentiment that underlies it, which renders it nihilistic.  He argues that, as a result of the slave 
mentality, morality is “not the expression of the conditions of a people’s life and growth any 
more, not its most basic instinct of life any more, but instead something abstract, an opponent of 
life.”300  In a similar vein, he writes:  
I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the 
accumulation of force, for power: when there is no will to power, there is decline.  
My claim is that none of humanity’s highest values have had this will, --that 
nihilistic values, values of decline, have taken control under the aegis of the 
holiest names.301 
 
Similarly, he claims that church concepts are “the most malicious counterfeits that exist to 
devalue nature and natural values.”302  He maintains that when religions like Christianity take 
hold over the masses, the highest values central to a healthy and flourishing character (i.e. things 
that masters value, like life-affirmation, personal expression, truthfulness, etc.) are flipped on 
their head and, instead, life-negation is praised.  Thus, in the case of Christianity, Nietzsche 
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suggests that “the instinct of ressentiment said no to everything on earth that represented the 
ascending movement of life: success, power, beauty, self-affirmation; but it could do this only by 
becoming ingenious and inventing another world, a world that viewed affirmation of life as evil, 
as intrinsically reprehensible.”303  From the slave’s perspective, life on Earth is best depicted as 
an obstacle to be overcome and it is devoid of any significant value; contrary to Nietzsche and 
those like him who aim to affirm earthly life, the slave fails to view this life as valuable in itself.  
In the worst-case scenarios, an emphasis on pain and suffering causes slaves to renounce their 
earthly lives altogether (much as Schopenhauer does) and sometimes even to commit suicide.  It 
is fair to say that Nietzsche despises this kind of anti-naturalism and its denigration of earthly 
existence more than anything else. 
Nietzsche believes that this nihilistic impulse is a trademark of all instances of the slave 
mentality, including religious and non-religious instances.  I think it is important to note that 
anyone can be a slave (i.e. nihilistic), and, indeed, slaves come from all walks of life.  To be sure, 
homeless individuals can be masters, and CEOs can be slaves.  In the case of slaves, the bottom 
line is that they negate life in some manner regardless of their particular circumstances.  As I 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Nietzsche was heavily influenced by 
Schopenhauer, an atheist who was highly critical of most of the philosophy preceding him, just 
as Nietzsche’s own philosophy would later turn out to be.  Although Nietzsche often gives 
Schopenhauer high praise, his own philosophy in many ways aims to refute the pessimism 
manifest in much of Schopenhauer’s thought, which ultimately renders Schopenhauer a slave.  
Briefly, Schopenhauer suggested that, because our desires can never be completely satisfied and 
we are, therefore, forever destined to a life of discontent, it is essentially futile to seek 
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satisfaction and joy in the first place.  Wicks, who is also the author of the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Schopenhauer, elaborates on the desolate prospects of 
Schopenhauer’s pessimistic worldview, suggesting that, for Schopenhauer, “the world is 
represented as being in a condition of eternal frustration, as it endlessly strives for nothing in 
particular, and as it goes essentially nowhere,”304 and “the world of daily life is essentially 
violent and frustrating.”305  On Schopenhauer’s account, we are better off investing as little 
energy in life as possible, trying to desire as little as possible, in which case the pain and 
suffering that inevitably accompany it will not sting quite as much.  In a sense, the less we get 
our hopes up to begin with and the less we come to expect out of our lives, the less we will feel 
let down in the long run.  Our best course of action is to try and soften the blow, so to speak.  
Consequently, as Wicks suggests, “the result is an attitude of the denial towards our will-to-live, 
which Schopenhauer identifies with an ascetic attitude of renunciation, resignation, and 
willessness.”306  Schopenhauer presents us with a more extreme case of nihilism than does the 
typical religious person, since earthly life seems entirely meaningless for him, whereas earthly 
life retains a kind of integral value for the religious person, insofar as it is thought to determine 
one’s eternal destiny.  Interestingly, it is the non-religious instances of nihilism, such as the case 
of Schopenhauer, that Nietzsche fears the most.  In Part V, I will discuss how Nietzsche’s notion 
that “God is dead!” captures this concern, but first I want to elaborate on the problematic nature 
of nihilism and why Nietzsche deems religion nihilistic. 
While intellectual honesty and the pursuit of truth are among Nietzsche’s highest values 
and religion is, in his view, objectionable insofar as it fails to uphold them, it is health that he 
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values above all else.  Accordingly, Wicks points out that, in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations, 
“Nietzsche claims that the principle of ‘life’ is a more pressing and higher concern than that of 
‘knowledge,’ and that the quest for knowledge should serve the interests of life.”307  Likewise, 
Wicks points out that “this parallels how, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche looked at art 
through the perspective of life.”308  As we’ve seen, honesty in the pursuit of truth certainly 
matters to Nietzsche, but living a healthy life ultimately matters much more.  Not surprisingly, 
then, what makes nihilism (and, therefore, religion) particularly problematic for Nietzsche is that 
it is unhealthy and unnatural.  Indeed, he thinks that nihilism is a sign of a psychologically 
diseased organism that cannot handle the reality of life. 
Nietzsche argues that, instead of helping people survive and flourish, religion and other 
instances of the slave mentality spread decadence.  Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly associates 
religion, especially Christianity, with weakness and mental illness throughout The Anti-Christ.  
In Section 5, for example, he suggests that “Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, 
base, failed, it has made an ideal out of whatever contradicts the preservation instincts of a 
strong life.”309  Later, in Section 22, he writes, “Christianity wants to rule over beasts of prey; its 
method is to make them sick, —weakening is the Christian recipe for domestication, for 
‘civilization’.”310  And, in Section 52: “sickness belongs to the essence of Christianity, the 
typical Christian state of ‘faith’ has to be a form of sickness…‘Whatever makes things sick is 
good; whatever come from fullness, from over-fullness, from power is evil’: this is how the 
faithful see things.”311  Ultimately, Nietzsche believes that “Christianity is based on the rancor of 
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the sick, the instinct against the healthy, against health.”312  In view of these considerations, and 
of the popularity of Christianity and other instantiations of the slave mentality, he ultimately 
laments that “comparatively speaking, humans are the biggest failures, the sickliest animals who 
have strayed the most dangerously far from their instincts.”313  Once again, further complicating 
matters is the fact that slaves do not recognize their own weakness and disease; hence, “they do 
not call themselves weak, they call themselves ‘the good’.”314  Likewise, a priest “will 
instinctively deny that sickness is sickness.”315 
Nietzsche offers several specific examples of how religion is unhealthy.  For instance, in 
his estimation, traditional conceptions of morality, which most religions inculcate in their 
teachings and doctrines, are unhealthy.  This is why, when reflecting on Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morality, Wicks suggests that “Nietzsche offers a competing account of the origin 
of moral values, aiming to reveal their life-negating foundations and functions.”316  Recall that 
traditional conceptions of morality require us to set aside our own interests for the sake of 
attending to the interests of others.  For example, utilitarians present arguments in favor of 
sacrificing oneself if doing so is for the greater good.  This kind of self-sacrifice is, in 
Nietzsche’s view, unnatural and unhealthy, and it is arguably non-existent in the natural order of 
the world outside of humanity.  In this vein, he writes, “I call an animal, a species, an individual 
corrupt when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers things that will harm it.”317  
To be sure, this self-sacrifice afflicts many instantiations of the slave mentality, including the 
religious.  After all, there are ample biblical verses imploring believers to live for the Lord or for 
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others and not for oneself.  For example, Jesus says that “whoever wants to be my disciple must 
deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me,”318 and “greater love has no one 
than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends.”319 
Moreover, while those proclaiming their religious faith are often praised and admired, 
Nietzsche believes that, in reality, they are weak and not worthy of admiration at all.  He puts the 
point as follows: “men of faith, the ‘faithful’ of every type, necessarily dependent people,--the 
sort of people who cannot posit themselves as a goal…The ‘man of faith’ does not belong to 
himself, he can only be a means, he needs to be used up.”320  Likewise, he suggests that “the need 
for faith, for some unconditional yes or no…is a need of the weak.”321  He alleges that the person 
of faith is diseased insofar as faith entails submission to a higher power and, in the process, the 
relinquishing of one’s own natural will to power.  Accordingly, Nietzsche writes:  
Every type of faith is an expression of self-abnegation, of self-alienation…Just 
think how the vast majority of people need some regulative guideline as an 
external principle of bondage or mooring, how compulsion, slavery in a higher 
sense, is the only and ultimate condition for the thriving of the weak-willed 
person.322 
 
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche suggests that he and other free spirits (i.e. masters) are skeptics and 
abhor faith.  Thus, he writes: “make no mistake about it: great spirits are sceptics.  Zarathustra is 
a sceptic.  The vigour, the freedom that comes from the strength and super-strength of spirit 
proves itself through skepticism.”323 
Further, given Nietzsche’s naturalism, it should come as no surprise that he also views 
the supernatural concepts commonly associated with religion (e.g. souls and immortality) as 
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unhealthy, too.  He emphasizes that religion entails an unhealthy negation of natural, earthly life 
by way of such supernatural emphases, suggesting, for instance, that “‘pure spirit’ is a pure 
stupidity: when we discount the nervous system and the senses, the ‘mortal shroud’, we 
miscount—nothing more,”324 and that “the enormous lie of personal immortality destroys all 
reason, everything natural in the instincts,--everything beneficial and life-enhancing in the 
instincts, everything that guarantees the future, now arouses mistrust.”325  For Nietzsche, religion 
(and other instances of the slave mentality) teaches people “to become perfect by acting like 
turtles and pulling their senses inside themselves, cutting off contact with worldly things and 
shedding their mortal shrouds.”326  Hence, a distinction arises between worldly dispositions (i.e. 
those that affirm earthly life) and other-worldly dispositions (i.e. those that negate earthly life by 
emphasizing supernatural phenomena).  Instead of affirming earthly life and accentuating 
worldly concerns, Nietzsche suggests that religions cater to other-worldly emphases.  
Accordingly, for many religious individuals, the value of worldly life is thought to be 
diminished, insofar as earthly life is reduced to being a trial that dictates our fates in a more 
important future existence; for such individuals, earthly life becomes merely a test to see who is 
worthy of a place in heaven, rather than a prize to be enjoyed and naturally valued in itself.  
Thus, Nietzsche stresses that what really matters for many religious individuals is not what 
transpires—what they achieve or become—during their life on Earth, but whether they’re 
granted access into heaven afterward.  Nietzsche, of course, objects to this, lamenting that “when 
the emphasis of life is put on the ‘beyond’ rather than on life itself—when it is put on 
nothingness--, then the emphasis has been completely removed from life.”327  When someone 
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dies, it is not uncommon for religious individuals to comfort the deceased’s loved ones by saying 
things like “they’ve moved on to a better place,” but, for Nietzsche, whose naturalism admits of 
no such place, this kind of suggestion simply amounts to an unhealthy denial of reality.  Due to 
other-worldly dispositions, time, energy, and resources are taken away from life-affirming 
activities, which Nietzsche clearly believes is unnatural and unhealthy.  In sum, religion is 
unhealthy because its other-worldly nature is thought to undermine our prospects for a 
flourishing earthly existence.  Interestingly, in the following, Richard Dawkins, who is 
associated with the New Atheism movement, articulates a position akin to Nietzsche’s: 
As a Darwinian, the aspect of religion that catches my attention is its profligate 
wastefulness, its extravagant display of baroque uselessness. Nature is a miserly 
accountant, grudging the pennies, watching the clock, punishing the smallest 
waste. If a wild animal habitually performs some useless activity, natural 
selection will favor rival individuals who instead devote time to surviving and 
reproducing. Nature cannot afford frivolous jeux d’esprit. Ruthless utilitarianism 
trumps, even if it doesn’t always seem that way….Religious behavior in bipedal 
apes occupies large quantities of time. It devours huge resources. A medieval 
cathedral consumed hundreds of man-centuries in its building. Sacred music and 
devotional paintings largely monopolized medieval and Renaissance talent.328 
 
Similarly, Nietzsche’s problem with Christianity’s God (and comparable gods of other 
religions) is that God becomes “the formula for every slander against ‘the here and now’, for 
every lie about the ‘beyond’!  God as the deification of nothingness, the canonization of the will 
to nothingness.”329  In Nietzsche’s view, this idea of God signals another way in which religion 
denatures reality, and it therefore provides further proof that religion is unhealthy.  God 
ultimately becomes “a contradiction of life, instead of its transfiguration and eternal yes!”330  
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Nietzsche suggests that there is nothing about the Christian God that is worth worshipping, and 
he even goes so far as to deem such a God a “crime against life;” speaking to other free spirits 
(i.e. masters) like himself, he writes, “we are separated by the fact that we view the thing 
worshipped as God as pathetic, absurd, and harmful, not as ‘divine’” and “we do not treat it as a 
simple error but as a crime against life.”331  Ultimately, Nietzsche believes that such a God is 
needed and advocated by weak individuals who cannot handle reality as it actually is.  
Accordingly, in Section 17 of The Anti-Christ, he writes: “whenever the will to power falls off in 
any way, there will also be physiological decline, decadence.  And when the most masculine 
virtues and drives have been chopped off the god of decadence, he will necessarily turn into a 
god of the physiologically retrograde, the weak.”332 
In a similar vein, Nietzsche talks at length about the demerits of pity—a feeling that is 
often encouraged by most slaves, including the religious—in many of his works.  In fact, he 
suggests that “pity is the practice of nihilism,”333 and that, “in the middle of our unhealthy 
modernity, nothing is less healthy than Christian pity.”334  For Nietzsche, the problem with pity 
is that it involves dwelling on pain and suffering.  Instead of accepting pain and suffering as they 
come and then forgetting about them, those expressing pity remain focused on these conditions.  
Thus, Nietzsche writes, “pity has a depressive effect…[it] further intensifies and multiples the 
loss of strength which in itself brings suffering to life.”335  Similarly, he suggests that, “by 
multiplying misery just as much as by conserving everything miserable, pity is one of the main 
tools used to increase decadence—pity wins people over to nothingness!”336  According to 
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Nietzsche, those expressing pity call attention to pain and suffering when they should be moving 
on to life’s next challenge.  Hence, “pity preserves things that are ripe for decline, it defends 
things that have been disowned and condemned by life, and it gives a depressive and 
questionable character to life itself by keeping alive an abundance of failures of every type.”337  
Alternatively, he praises Aristotle for recognizing the dangers associated with pity, saying, 
“Aristotle famously saw pity as a dangerous pathology that should be purged from the system 
every once in a while.”338   
Most would agree that fear and guilt, when not employed as a necessary means for some 
perceived good, are unwanted, as these feelings only engender psychological discomfort for 
those who experience them.  To be sure, there are certainly instances when fear and guilt are 
warranted; for example, we are better off if we learn to fear crocodiles and most would agree that 
we ought to reproach ourselves for physically assaulting someone for no reason.   However, on 
Nietzsche’s account, religions often elicit and propagate unnecessary fear and guilt, which 
ultimately proves to be unhealthy.  Wicks points this out when reflecting on On the Genealogy of 
Morals, writing that “Nietzsche continues with an account of how feelings of guilt, or the ‘bad 
conscience,’ arise merely as a consequence of an unhealthy Christian morality that turns an evil 
eye towards our natural inclinations.”339  The suggestion here is that supernatural religions, like 
Christianity and Islam, exert so much control over some individuals that these individuals are 
riddled with unnecessary guilt regarding some of their most natural feelings and thoughts.340  
Along these lines, Nietzsche claims that contempt of sexuality, or sexual prudishness, is anti-
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natural, and that, as a result, “the preacher of chastity is a public incitement to anti-nature.”341   
Moreover, the emphasis on reward and punishment in a life hereafter, a prominent feature of 
many religions, naturally solicits fear over one’s eternal prospects.  On Nietzsche’s account, this 
fear turns out to be unnecessary, since such supernatural belief is illusory. 
Nietzsche also argues that Christianity is depressive and that it engenders misery.  “It is 
Christian,” he writes, “to hate the senses, to hate enjoyment of the senses, to hate joy in general,” 
and, for the Christian, he thinks “dismal and upsetting thoughts have pride of place.”342  
Interestingly, Nietzsche speaks at great length about Buddhism, another world religion, when 
depicting Christianity in this manner, juxtaposing these two major religions in terms of the 
general dispositions he thinks they facilitate.  In contrast with Christianity, Nietzsche thinks that 
Buddhism exudes cheerfulness and realizes its goal of minimizing conscious suffering.  To be 
clear, Nietzsche still believes that Buddhism is slavish and nihilistic, as it encourages us to 
minimize our natural desires and, thus, does not embrace earthly life to the fullest extent 
possible.  On this point, he says, “I do not want my condemnation of Christianity to lead me to 
be unfair to a related…religion, Buddhism.  The two belong together as nihilistic religions.”343  
Nevertheless, while Buddhism is still slavish to a degree, it avoids the pervasive feelings of 
dread and misery that Nietzsche thinks accompany other supernatural religions, like Christianity, 
and, as a result, Nietzsche is careful to clearly demarcate Buddhism from Christianity, suggesting 
that “there are the most striking differences between them”344 and that “Buddhism is a hundred 
times more realistic than Christianity.”345  In fact, Nietzsche believes that Buddhism is one-of-a-
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kind when it comes to religions, claiming that “Buddhism is the only really positivistic religion 
in history.”346  He reaches this conclusion because he thinks that Buddhism “has stopped saying 
‘war against sin’ and instead, giving reality its due, says ‘war against suffering’,”347 and because, 
“in sharp contrast to Christianity, it has left the self-deception of moral concepts behind,–it 
stands, as I put it, beyond good and evil.”348  Similarly, he suggests that “Buddhism is a hundred 
times colder, truer, more objective.  It no longer needs to make its suffering, its susceptibility to 
pain respectable by interpreting it as a sin.”349  Likewise, when expounding on what he calls the 
three Christian virtues—faith, love, and hope—he says “I call them the three Christian 
shrewdnesses,”350 and he specifically mentions that “Buddhism is too mature, too positivist to be 
shrewd like this.”351  According to Nietzsche, whereas Christianity engenders misery and 
depression, the Buddha “insists on ideas that produce either calm or amusement.”352  This is 
explained, in turn, by the further fact that Buddhism is 
…based on two physiological facts that it always keeps in mind: first, an 
excessively acute sensitivity that is expressed as a refined susceptibility to pain, 
and second, having lived all too long with concepts and logical procedures, an 
over-spiritualization that has had the effect of promoting the ‘impersonal’ 
instincts at the expense of the personal ones…These physiological conditions 
[which Nietzsche believes afflict Christianity and other religions, but not 
Buddhism] give rise to depression.353 
 
In other words, Nietzsche asserts that Buddhism appreciates the problems associated with the 
self-sacrificing nature of other slavish religions.  Thus, he suggests that “the Buddha detects a 
spiritual fatigue that manifests itself in an all-too-great ‘objectivity’ (which is to say an 
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individual’s diminished sense of self-interest, loss of a centre of gravity, loss of ‘egoism’), he 
combats this by leading even the most spiritual interests directly back to the person.”354  In 
contrast to Christianity and other popular religions, “the highest goals [of Buddhism] are 
cheerfulness, quiet, and an absence of desire, and these goals are achieved.”355 
Recall that Nietzsche thinks the priestly caste is much to blame for the falsifications he 
associates with religion, as discussed in Part III.  Nietzsche also believes that priests are largely 
responsible for the unhealthy aspects of religion, including, for example, many of the difficulties 
he associates with common conceptions of God.  Accordingly, he suggests that “the reality 
behind this pitiful lie [i.e. the idea of a moral world order] is: a parasitical type of person who 
thrives at the expense of all healthy developments of life—the priest—, abuses the name of God: 
he gives the name ‘kingdom of God’ to a state of affairs where the priests determine the value of 
things.”356  When this happens, “the parasitism of the priests (or the ‘moral world order’) takes 
every natural custom, every natural institution (state, judicial order, marriage, care for the sick 
and the poor), everything required by the instinct of life, in short everything intrinsically 
valuable, and renders it fundamentally worthless, of negative value.”357  He argues that, from this 
priestly perspective, people “should suffer so that they are always in need of a priest.”358  In a 
similar fashion, he claims that the church “lived on distress, it created distress in order to 
eternalize itself;”359 consequently, he remarks: “parasitism as the church’s only practice; drinking 
all the blood, all the love, all the hope out of life with its ideals of anaemia and ‘sanctity’; the 
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beyond as the will to negate every reality…against life itself.”360  He echoes these sentiments 
throughout The Anti-Christ, writing, for instance, that “for the type of person who wields power 
inside Judaism and Christianity, a priestly type, decadence is only a means: this type of person 
has a life-interest in making humanity sick and twisting the concepts ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘true’ and 
‘false’ to the point where they endanger life and slander the world.”361  Elsewhere, he reflects 
that “wherever the influence of theologians is felt, value judgments are turned on their heads and 
the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ are necessarily inverted: whatever hurts life the most is called 
‘true’, and whatever improves, increases, affirms, justifies life or makes it triumph is called 
‘false’.”362  What’s more, he believes that the problems stemming from priests are exacerbated 
by the fact that priests are usually viewed as praiseworthy and exemplary individuals; this causes 
them to become popular and viewed as necessary figures in society, thanks to which their 
influence becomes even more pronounced.  Conversely, since Nietzsche himself thinks that 
“every type of anti-nature is a vice,”363 he concludes in the final section of The Anti-Christ that 
“the priest is the most vicious type of person: he teaches anti-nature.  Priests are not to be 
reasoned with, they are to be locked up.”364  In sum, priests denature reality by promulgating 
supernatural notions, which are thought to be nihilistic and unhealthy.  Not surprisingly, then, 
Nietzsche thinks that the priest “should be ostracized, starved, driven into every type of 
desert.”365 
I should note that, as was the case regarding his portrayal of the relationship between 
religion and truth, many will find Nietzsche’s depiction of the relationship between religion and 
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health inadequate and unwarranted.  To be sure, some will deny his assertion that Christianity 
engenders misery, and there are, after all, many Christian writers who talk about and emphasize 
joy.  While Nietzsche may be right to suggest that some religious individuals are prone to 
misery, there are certainly religious individuals—including Christians—who are not (as will 
become clear in Chapter 3).  Moreover, while Nietzsche suggests that religion is unhealthy and 
detrimental to earthly life, there are clearly some cases of religious individuals who inspired 
positive effects in this life.  Take, for example, the instances of positive social reform initiated by 
prominent religious thinkers, such as the well-known case of Martin Luther King, Jr., who was a 
Christian minister.  Finally, one could argue that, in his juxtaposition of Christianity with 
Buddhism, Nietzsche compares Christianity at its worst with Buddhism at its best.  Despite such 
concerns, Nietzsche clearly believes religion is antithetical to health and to earthly life, 
constituting a kind of psychological disease.  In view of this, he offers a remedy: what most 
human beings, especially the religious, need, Nietzsche advises, is a “revaluation of all values.” 
 
V. Nietzsche’s Remedy: Revaluation of All Values 
As I’ve intimated throughout this chapter, Nietzsche seems to view himself as being, first 
and foremost, a kind of psychologist, primarily interested in the science of human nature.  
Consider, for instance, some of his topics in The Anti-Christ, where he discusses, among other 
things: the “psychology of the redeemer,”366 the psychology and constitution of Jesus Christ,367 
the psychology of redemption,368 “the psychology of the ‘evangel’,”369 “the psychology of every 
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Chandala morality,”370 the “psychology of the opposing concepts of noble morality and 
ressentiment morality,”371 and the psychology of faith.372  Also consider the title of Kaufmann’s 
celebrated classic on Nietzsche: Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ.  What’s 
more, Wicks, when reflecting on Nietzsche’s final work, Ecce Homo, suggests that, in view of 
his own aptitude for psychological observation, “Nietzsche claims to be wise as a consequence 
of his acute aesthetic sensitivity to nuances of health and sickness in people's attitudes and 
characters.”373  In fact, as Wicks points out, many interpret Nietzsche’s famous notion of “eternal 
recurrence” as both a measure of psychological health and as a means for promoting it.374  In this 
vein, Wicks observes that “the doctrine also functions as a measure for judging someone's 
overall psychological strength and mental health, since Nietzsche believed that the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence was the hardest world-view to affirm,”375 and he points out that some scholars 
believe that the doctrine of eternal recurrence offers “one way to interpret the world among many 
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others, which if adopted therapeutically as a psychologically healthy myth, can help us become 
stronger.”376  In essence, Nietzsche seems to fancy himself a kind of doctor who specializes in 
mental health.  There can be no doubt that Nietzsche believes he has a penchant for health, as he 
routinely says things like, “it is my privilege to have the finest sense for all signs of healthy 
instincts.  I do not have any sickly features.”377  Provided Nietzsche truly is adept at diagnosing 
sickness in people’s attitudes and characters, it remains to be seen whether his potential cure for 
these mental ills—the revaluation of all values—actually proves to be an effective remedy. 
Contrary to the anti-natural and nihilistic values of Christianity and other religions (as 
well as of  atheism as practiced by Schopenhauer and others), Nietzsche himself advocates 
natural values and adamantly preaches the “affirmation of life” throughout his works.  In 
Nietzsche’s view, life is never something to bemoan, and his life-affirming mentality is at odds 
with the pessimistic perspective of the slave.378, 379  This is why, in describing the viewpoint of 
the free and noble kind of individual (i.e. masters like himself), he writes that “nothing can be 
tolerated less in this type than ugly manners or a pessimistic look, an eye that makes things 
ugly,”380 and “the critic of Christianity cannot help but make Christianity look despicable.”381  
From the perspective of Nietzsche and other masters, “‘the world is perfect’—this is how the 
instinct of the most spiritual people speaks, the yes-saying instinct.”382  Not surprisingly, 
Nietzsche concludes The Anti-Christ by officially condemning Christianity, saying, “I condemn 
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Christianity, I indict the Christian church on the most terrible charges an accuser has ever had in 
his mouth.  I consider it the greatest corruption conceivable.”383  What’s more, he adds that “the 
Christian church has not left anything untouched by its corruption,”384 and says “I call 
Christianity the one great curse.”385 
Making matters worse for Nietzsche, slaves disrupt the appearance and flourishing of 
masters, and he routinely points out how the interests of masters and slaves are at odds with each 
other.  Accordingly, in Section 3 of The Anti-Christ, he writes: 
This more valuable type has appeared often enough already: but only as a stroke 
of luck, as an exception, never as willed.  In fact he was precisely what people 
feared most; so far, he has been practically the paradigm of the terrible;--and out 
of terror, the opposite type was willed, bred, achieved: the domestic animal, the 
herd animal, the sick animal: man,—the Christian.386 
 
Also, he suggests that Christian values and noble values provide “the greatest opposition of 
values there is,”387 given that “Christianity is a rebellion of everything that crawls on the ground 
against everything that has height”388 and that the church forms a “deadly hostility to everything 
honest, to every height of the soul, to every discipline of spirit, to everything kind and candid in 
humanity.”389  It should not be surprising that, since “the grand poses struck by these sick spirits, 
these conceptual epileptics, can affect the great masses,”390 “Christianity won, and with this, a 
nobler sensibility was destroyed,”391 which leads Nietzsche to conclude that “Christianity has 
been the worst thing to happen to humanity so far.”392  In fact, he puts Christians on par with 
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anarchists, suggesting that “both are decadents, neither one can do anything except dissolve, 
poison, lay waste, bleed dry, both have instincts of mortal hatred against everything that stands, 
that stands tall, that has endurance, that promises life a future.”393  Nietzsche goes so far as to 
suggest Christians rendered “the entire work of the ancient world in vain;”394 expounding on this 
idea, he writes:  
Greeks!  Romans!  The nobility of the instincts and of taste…defiled by sly, 
secretive, invisible, anaemic vampires!  Not defeated,--just sucked dry!...The 
hidden need for revenge, petty jealousy come to power!  Everything miserable, 
suffering from itself, plagued by bad feelings, the whole ghetto world of the soul 
risen to the top in a single stroke!395 
 
In general, Nietzsche alleges that “the church waged moral combat on everything noble on 
earth.”396 
 Furthermore, Nietzsche expresses contempt for his contemporaries, who he believes have 
become aware of the lies and falsities associated with the church and yet continue to allow 
priests and other forms of religious decadence to persist and dominate society.  In fact, he feels 
so incensed by this religious tolerance that he describes his feelings toward it as “blacker than the 
blackest melancholy.”397  While he suggests that he is “careful not to hold humanity responsible 
for its mental illnesses,”398 he clearly is not so patient when it comes to his contemporaries, 
writing that “our age knows better”399 and that “what used to be just sickness is indecency 
today.”400  He adds that “the concepts ‘beyond’, ‘Last Judgment’, ‘immortality of the soul’, the 
‘soul’ itself; these are instruments of torture, these are systems of cruelty that enable the priests 
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to gain control, maintain control…Everyone knows this: and yet everything goes on as 
before.”401  He is particularly upset with his fellow Germans, suggesting that “if we do not get 
rid of Christianity, it will be the fault of the Germans,”402 and that Germans “have robbed Europe 
of the last great cultural harvest that it still could have brought home,--the Renaissance.”403  
Nietzsche believes that the Renaissance offered an invaluable opportunity for “the revaluation of 
all Christian values, an attempt using all means, all instincts, all genius, to allow the opposite 
values, noble values to triumph,”404 which “would have been the victory that I am the only one 
demanding these days--: with this, Christianity was abolished!”405  According to Nietzsche, this 
opportunity was wasted with the arrival of Martin Luther; as he puts it: “What happened?  A 
German monk, Luther, came to Rome.”406  Nietzsche claims that Luther “had all the vindictive 
instincts of a wounded priest”407 and “flew into a rage in Rome against the Renaissance.”408  
Moreover, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche expresses similar concerns about slave moral 
theories (which, again, most religions incorporate), writing:  
In all “sciences of morals” so far one thing was lacking, strange as it may sound: 
the problem of morality itself; what was lacking was any suspicion that there was 
something problematic here.  What the philosophers called “a rational foundation 
for morality” and tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly 
variation of the common faith in the prevalent morality; a new means of 
expression for this faith…certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, 
questioning, and vivisection of this very faith.409 
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The implication here is that moral philosophers (who are themselves slaves) have done nothing 
but reinforce the slave mentality.  Indeed, the slave mentality seems to be present in all walks of 
life, and this is a point that Nietzsche painfully recognizes. 
 However, in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche does express hope regarding the prospects of 
masters, suggesting, for instance, the following: 
There is a continuous series of individual successes in the most varied places on 
earth and from the most varied cultures; here, a higher type does in fact present 
itself, a type of overman in relation to humanity in general.  Successes like this, 
real strokes of luck, were always possible and perhaps will always be possible.  
And whole generations, families, or peoples can sometimes constitute this sort of 
bull’s eye, right on the mark.410 
 
Also, Nietzsche believes that the illusory nature of supernatural religions is becoming 
increasingly apparent thanks to society’s increased interest in science, suggesting that “there 
might still be no shortage of people who are unaware of the extent to which ‘faith’ is indecent—
or a mark of decadence, of a broken will to life--, but people will certainly be aware of this 
tomorrow.”411  Here, Nietzsche intimates that the fraudulent nature of religion will become more 
readily apparent as interest in science continues to increase (I will elaborate on this shortly).  As 
this occurs, Nietzsche thinks that the continued endorsement of religion turns from somewhat 
innocent self-deception to something more egregious and devious, suggesting that “the 
criminality of being Christian increases with your proximity to science.”412  In the end, 
Nietzsche’s prescription ultimately requires the abandonment of the slave mentality and the 
implementation of the master mentality, and I now turn to an analysis of what this process 
entails. 
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Most instances of nihilism and the slave mentality are essentially rooted in what 
Nietzsche calls “idealism.”  When faced with philosophical quandaries regarding their existence, 
and perhaps feeling helpless and/or hopeless as a result, slaves fabricate ideals (traditional 
conceptions of morality, traditional philosophy, and religions) in order to cope with existence, 
generating the various forms of idealism.  Nietzsche despises idealism, which, for him, denotes 
beliefs in various ideals that are thought to take on some kind of “real” or “objective” 
significance, that signal something “above” or “beyond” the natural world, for the sake of which 
believers often live their lives.  In religious instances, for example, earthly life can be viewed as 
a kind of test to see who is worthy of eternal bliss in a life hereafter.  In The Anti-Christ, 
Nietzsche expounds on what he thinks happens as a result: “the truth of the matter is that the 
highly conscious conceit of being chosen is putting on airs of modesty here: people firmly put 
themselves, the ‘congregation’, the ‘fair and the good’ on one side, the side of ‘truth’—and 
everything else, ‘the world’, on the other.”413  While these ideals are thought to constitute “the 
truth,” they are, in reality, deceptions.  This, in turn, is why Michael Haar suggests that 
“nihilism…is thus for Nietzsche the manifestation of an enormous lie, of delusion, and 
ultimately, of despair.”414  For Nietzsche, idealism reflects, among other things: 1) “the real 
catastrophe” of his life;415 2) “the greatest objection to existence;”416 3) “vice” and “anti-
nature;”417 4) “life preserving errors”418 and “a means for preservation;”419 5) ignorance of 
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oneself;420 6) “the real riddle that the animal ‘man’ poses for the philosopher;”421 7) “a source of 
misfortune and man’s loss of value;”422 8) “lies arising from the bad instincts of sick natures who 
were harmful in the deepest sense;”423 and, in sum, 9) “poisons.”424  Ultimately, Nietzsche 
considers idealism to be not only illusory, but, more importantly, unhealthy. 
Nietzsche considers the revaluation of all values essential on the road to recovery from 
idealism/nihilism.  But what, precisely, is this revaluation of all values and, more importantly, 
how is it thought to cure nihilism?  According to Nietzsche, the revaluation of all values is the 
“formula for an act of humanity’s highest self-examination”425 and indicates “a courageous 
becoming-conscious.”426  Hence, while “not to know oneself” is the “prudence of the idealist,”427 
the revaluation of all values provides Nietzsche’s patient with a strong dose of self-knowledge, or 
self-consciousness.  Nietzsche’s patients must adopt a strict regimen of self-analysis, and 
Nietzsche maintains that his task is to prepare “for humanity’s moment of highest self-
examination, a great noon.”428  What does self-knowledge or self-examination entail?  In one 
word: honesty.  First and foremost, this will require that Nietzsche’s patient not be deceived by 
illusions but, instead, unearth what lies behind them.  Hence, Nietzsche’s patient must evaluate 
these ideals critically and, in a sense, “see through himself and history,”429 as “he who lets 
concepts, opinions, past events, and books, step between himself and things…will never have an 
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immediate perception of things and will never be an immediately perceived thing himself.”430  
On Nietzsche’s view, all “convictions are prisons.”431  In essence, Nietzsche’s patient must 
become a master, and he or she must cease indulging in the illusions of idealism.  I will express 
some doubts regarding the efficacy of Nietzsche’s prescription (i.e. the revaluation of all values), 
but first I want to briefly discuss Nietzsche’s views regarding the evolution of idealism and the 
stages of nihilism that correspond to this evolution, which I first alluded to in Part IV. 
Indeed, Nietzsche speaks as if there is a natural progression pertaining to nihilism, which 
can be likened to a play consisting of three acts: 1) the onset of idealism (what Gilles Deleuze, 
another prominent Nietzsche scholar, refers to as “negative nihilism”); 2) the devaluation of 
idealism (which is brought about, in large part, by increased interest in science, and involves the 
self-destruction of negative nihilism); and 3) the devaluation of all values (what Deleuze calls 
“reactive nihilism”).  All three stages are nihilistic in that they entail depreciation of earthly life, 
but, for Nietzsche, the third stage reflects the decisive danger432—a complete disregard for life 
itself, and the loss of all values.  The first stage of nihilism consists of the onset of idealism.  
Again, Deleuze refers to this stage as “negative nihilism,” which “signifies the value of nil taken 
on by life, the fiction of higher [i.e. other-worldly] values which give it this value and the will to 
nothingness which is expressed in these higher values.”433  The second stage of nihilism consists 
of the devaluation of these (often other-worldly) ideals, such as heaven and hell.  This stage 
marks a transition between negative nihilism and reactive nihilism, the final act in the nihilistic 
drama, and it is similar to Nietzsche’s own revaluation of all values.  In this second stage, the 
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higher ideals posited in the first act are questioned, and, ultimately, negated.  As Deleuze puts it, 
the “supersensible world and higher values are reacted against, their existence…denied.”434  
Heidegger suggests that, at this point, the “decrepitude of the upper-most values edges toward 
consciousness.”435  Finally, instead of negating unearthly ideals and affirming earthly life itself, 
reactive nihilism—Deleuze’s term for the final act of the nihilistic drama—consists of negating 
both (à la Schopenhauer).  Whereas negative nihilism depreciates worldly values while 
esteeming other-worldly values, reactive nihilism deprecates all values, and, consequently, the 
earth is no longer even valuable as a means to some higher end, let alone as an end in itself.  The 
conclusion of the nihilistic drama demarcates nihilism in its most acute sense, as life is deemed 
completely devoid of value.  This is why Nietzsche suggests that the death of idealism, “which 
no longer has any sanction after it has tried to escape into some beyond, leads to nihilism.”436  
Now, “everything lacks meaning,” and “the untenability of one interpretation of the world [i.e. 
idealism], upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished, awakens the suspicion 
that all interpretations of the world are false.”437  In turn, contempt and resentment toward life 
emerge thanks to this sense of futility (this is, again, reminiscent of Schopenhauer). With this, 
the drama has unfolded.  In the beginning, the slave is faced with the confusing and chaotic 
abyss that defines his or her existence and the suffering implicit in it.  Feeling helpless, the slave 
fabricates ideals by which he or she attempts to justify his or her existence.  Inevitably, the 
process backfires, and the slave ultimately questions his or her own idealism.  As a result, the 
slave then rejects these ideals and negates all values. 
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As I suggested, Nietzsche stresses that, as science becomes more influential in our 
everyday lives, the true nature of the slave’s illusions will inevitably be revealed for what they 
really are, and, as his derision for his contemporaries suggests, he thinks this has already 
happened to some extent.  Indeed, Nietzsche predicts that the eventual demise of idealism will 
come as greater emphasis is placed on science and logic, and that a great noontide of 
consciousness will eventually arise.  Additionally, he believes that this will serve as a significant 
apex in human history, thanks to which his philosophy will attract a larger audience of potential 
free spirits.  Ironically, the self-destruction of idealism is inherent in its own structure, most 
notably in the ideals of science and truth.  Nietzsche believes that science itself entails idealism 
insofar as its adherents possess “the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, 
can penetrate the deepest abysses of being.”438  As a result, science “speeds irresistibly toward its 
limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence of logic, suffers shipwreck,”439 and finally 
“logic coils up…and bites its own tail.”440  Ultimately, the truth about reality—that there are no 
underlying objective truths, as existence is chaos and flux—is revealed, and there is a reaction 
against the futile nature of all forms of idealism. 
What occurs at this stage of the drama—that is, when idealism naturally self-destructs—
is very similar to Nietzsche’s own prescription: the revaluation of all values, which serves as “the 
axe that will chop at the root of humanity’s ‘metaphysical need’.”441  Nietzsche’s revaluation of 
all values occurs when all predominant values are destroyed, or transcended, and new positive 
and life-affirming ones are constructed to replace them. Unfortunately, unless those involved in 
the second act of the nihilistic drama “see the light”—that is, unless they execute something like 
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Nietzsche’s own revaluation of all values—and begin to value the earth (the antithesis of 
nihilism), the axe they wield will not sever the root of the problem (the deprecation of earthly 
life) and their efforts will actually generate a condition far worse than the one from which they 
began.  Nietzsche himself is just as leery about this stage of the nihilistic drama because it 
generally leads to the third and final act, and he certainly does not consider the transition from 
negative nihilism to reactive nihilism to be a healthy one.  How, then, are Nietzsche’s “patients” 
to avoid this exact same fate?   
Optimally, Nietzsche’s prescription—the revaluation of all values—is supposed to 
destroy all predominant values (i.e. nihilistic ones), and then construct new, life-affirming values 
to replace them, whereas the normal course of the disease will result in the absence of all values.  
But might this idolization of—and aspiration for—life-affirmation be nothing more than a 
hopeful ideal?  Does Nietzsche offer any additional instructions to help his patients avoid the 
typical nihilistic fate resulting from the second stage of the nihilistic drama?  Kaufmann 
expresses his doubts, writing that “the result is less a solution of the initial problem than a 
realization of its limitations.”442  If Nietzsche cannot ensure that this dissolution of idealism does 
not yield reactive nihilism, then what was previously a minor infection could become far worse.  
Kaufmann puts the point rather well: “Now it may be asked: if Nietzsche thus criticizes and 
helps to destroy prevalent values, does he not hasten the advent of nihilism…does he not help to 
bring about that catastrophic vacuum which he is prophesying?”443  Expressing similar concerns, 
Copleston wonders whether there is “in him and his philosophy the embodiment of the very 
nihilism for which he professed to supply a remedy.”444 
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To his credit, Nietzsche was not blind to the difficult nature of treating nihilism.  
Nietzsche recognized that, for many, lacking an ideal means lacking a sense of direction, and this 
can certainly be problematic.  This is why he refers to idealism as entailing “life preserving 
errors”445 and as “a means for preservation,”446 and it explains the concern underlying his 
famous admonition, “God is dead!”  This is an expression he utters at various points in his 
works, including The Gay Science447 and Thus Spoke Zarathustra,448 and it is reflected in the 
following well-known passage from The Gay Science: 
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.  “Whither is 
God?” he cried; “I will tell you.  We have killed him—you and I.  All of us are his 
murderers.  But how did we do this?  How could we drink up the sea?  Who gave 
us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?  What were we doing when we 
unchained this earth from its sun?  Whither is it moving now?  Whither are we 
moving?  Away from all suns?  Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions?  Is there still any up or down?  Are we not 
straying as through an infinite nothing?  Do we not feel the breath of empty 
space?449 
 
The proclamation “God is dead!” is often misinterpreted because readers fail to take notice of 
what Nietzsche is referring to when making it—namely, the problems that would likely plague 
an atheistic society, which the madman hints at here.  Again, these are problems that Nietzsche 
himself was very aware of and extremely concerned about.  Indeed, while Nietzsche was 
certainly a non-believer and a persistent critic of religion, he anticipated a great void that would 
be left behind in the wake of God’s death (i.e. the cessation of belief in God).  Although religious 
individuals value life on Earth for insufficient and invalid reasons, at least they still value life to 
some extent (insofar as it is necessary for the afterlife).  Ultimately, Nietzsche is afraid that, with 
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God’s death, life will lose any value it once had for these believers.  Interestingly, many hastily 
write Nietzsche off as a nihilist because they assume that, by eradicating all prior ideals and 
announcing that God is dead, Nietzsche implicitly denounces all value.  However, as many 
scholars, such as Copleston, are quick to point out, “he does not mean to imply that all respect 
for values should be abandoned and all self-restraint thrown overboard.”450  Again, in 
Nietzsche’s opinion, we ought to ideally renounce all forms of nihilism, and emphasize life 
itself.  However, how, if at all, Nietzsche can avoid crushing all values—given the death of God 
and of idealism in general—must be duly considered. 
While Nietzsche’s concept of the “overman” has been the subject of much debate in 
Nietzsche scholarship, it seems to me that the concept might be of use when trying to elucidate 
how Nietzsche hopes to promote a healthy revaluation of all values while avoiding the similar 
devaluation of values inherent in the transition from negative nihilism to reactive nihilism.  In 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra tells a herd of men at the marketplace the following:  
I teach you the overman.  Man is something that shall be overcome.  What have 
you done to overcome him?…The overman is the meaning of the earth…I 
beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those 
who speak to you of otherworldly hopes!  Poison-mixers are they, whether they 
know it or not.  Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves, of 
whom the earth is weary: so let them go.451 
 
We see here that the overman signifies, in essence, Nietzsche’s master type; the overman rejects 
the idealism plaguing the slave mentality and, instead, remains faithful to the earth, embracing 
Nietzsche’s naturalism and nothing more.  Indeed, the overman is able to resist the usual 
temptations associated with his or her existential anxieties, such as indulging in illusions of 
ultimate purposes and objective standards.  Consequently, the overman designates “a type that 
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has the highest constitutional excellence, in contrast to ‘modern’ people, to ‘good’ men, to 
Christians and other nihilists.”452  Wicks, reflecting specifically on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
suggests the following with respect to Nietzsche’s notion of the overman: 
Nietzsche also filled the work with nature metaphors, almost in the spirit of pre-
Socratic naturalist philosophy, which invoke animals, earth, air, fire, water, 
celestial bodies, plants, all in the service of describing the spiritual development 
of Zarathustra, a solitary, reflective, exceedingly strong-willed, sage-like, 
laughing and dancing voice of heroic self-mastery who, accompanied by a proud, 
sharp-eyed eagle and a wise snake, envisions a mode of psychologically healthier 
being beyond the common human condition. Nietzsche refers to this higher mode 
of being as “superhuman” (übermenschlich), and associates the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence — a doctrine for only the healthiest who can love life in its entirety — 
with this spiritual standpoint, in relation to which all-too-often downhearted, all-
too-commonly-human attitudes stand as a mere bridge to be crossed and 
overcome.453 
 
In a sense, the overman overcomes what it means to be a human being, insofar as Nietzsche 
suggests in The Gay Science that a human being has “one additional need—the need for the ever 
new appearance of such teachers and teachings of a ‘purpose’.”454   
Indeed, whereas Nietzsche describes a human being as “a fantastic animal” who “has to 
believe, to know, from time to time why he exists,”455 his overman must cease to ask the question 
“Why?” altogether, as this is what then spawns the problematic purposes and standards inherent 
in idealism.  Only in this case does one cease to falsely judge the earth and truly value and 
represent earthly life as it is—as unstructured and at each moment becoming something entirely 
different.  Ultimately, the overman no longer feels the need to judge life at all, and, in the 
process, Nietzsche thinks he or she ascribes to life its greatest value.  Hence, Nietzsche’s 
overman accepts and embraces earthly life exactly as it is, and, in doing so, exemplifies 
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Nietzsche’s formula for human greatness: “amor fati: that you do not want anything to be 
different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity.  Not just to tolerate necessity…but to 
love it.”456, 457  Nietzsche himself confesses, “I do not have the slightest wish for anything to be 
different from how it is.”458  Thus, Nietzsche’s overman provides us with a recipe for avoiding 
reactive nihilism while rejecting all instantiations of idealism, including the religious: namely, by 
ignoring existential anxiety and the question “Why?”, as well as the “answers” provided by 
various forms of idealism.  Naturally, it seems prudent to examine the practicality of this cure.  
Assuming his patient has already relinquished his diseased values, can Nietzsche convince his 
patient to stop asking “Why?” altogether?  Can he preclude the possibility that his patient will 
relapse into a reactive, nihilistic stupor?  How realistic are the prospects of becoming an 
overman? 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Interestingly, Nietzsche suggests that the honest pursuit of truth is frequently at odds with 
the pursuit of happiness, and that, in turn, the tension between these two pursuits underlies the 
prevalence of faith and other examples of deception that he associates with religion (and with 
idealism in general).  In this vein, he writes the following in a letter to his sister Elisabeth in 
1865: 
Every true faith is indeed infallible; it performs what the believing person hopes 
to find in it, but it does not offer the least support for the establishing of an 
objective truth.  Here the ways of men divide.  If you want to achieve peace of 
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mind and happiness, then have faith; if you want to be a disciple of truth, then 
search.459 
 
James echoes Nietzsche’s sentiments about the power and allure of happiness when it comes to 
considerations of truth, writing that “with such relations between religion and happiness, it is 
perhaps not surprising that men come to regard the happiness which a religious belief affords as 
a proof of its truth.  If a creed makes a man feel happy, he almost inevitably adopts it.”460  
Ultimately, Nietzsche makes it clear that he thinks the pursuit of truth is not an easy or 
pleasurable path, and, as we have seen, he thinks it is a path seldom travelled as a result.  Hence, 
“it requires greatness of soul: the service of truth is the hardest service.”461  In fact, in Beyond 
Good and Evil Nietzsche writes, “it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who 
would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be 
measured according to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it more 
clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, 
falsified.”462  Presumably writing for those who are capable of traversing the more difficult path, 
Nietzsche asserts in the preface to The Anti-Christ that “this book belongs to the very few,”463 
and he warns his readers that “when it comes to spiritual matters, you need to be honest to the 
point of hardness just to be able to tolerate my seriousness, my passion.”464  Finally, the 
juxtaposition of religion with science also reflects the divergent paths of happiness and truth.  On 
the one hand, in the case of religion, the emphasis is thought to be on happiness and comfort, 
while, on the other hand, in the case of science, truth is thought to be the highest priority. 
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Since Nietzsche suggests that a sincere concern for truth can come at the expense of 
happiness, the deception he associates with slaves should not come as much of a surprise.  
Nietzsche himself identifies the psychological impetus for such dishonesty: since they cannot 
accept life on earth as it really is, they must cope by inventing lies and falsehoods that allay the 
discomfort associated with this reality.  That is, without these deceptions their lives would be 
filled with misery and dread.  Oddly enough, then, the slave’s self-deception turns out to be a 
kind of necessity, in which case it would also seem natural.  After all, on Nietzsche’s own 
account, the slave cannot survive without such deceptions (they are “life preserving errors” and 
“a means for preservation”), and he acknowledges that there is a reason human beings adopt 
such convictions, suggesting that “it is the profound, suspicious fear of an incurable pessimism 
that forces whole millennia to bury their teeth in and cling to a religious interpretation of 
existence.”465  Hence, engaging in idealism is by no means a superfluous endeavor, but is, 
instead, seemingly necessary for their health—some human beings need religion and idealism in 
order to avoid despair and, thus, survive! 
As a result, I cannot help but question the practicality of Nietzsche’s cure.  While 
Nietzsche claims that “we ourselves, we free spirits, already constitute a ‘revaluation of all 
values’, a living declaration of war on and victory over all old concepts of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’,”466 
I’m skeptical that Nietzsche’s overman is practically feasible for the vast majority of human 
beings.  As I suggested a moment ago, becoming an overman seems to require us to overcome 
what it means to be human in the first place—to cease asking “Why?” and to ignore our 
existential anxieties.  A psychologist like Nietzsche ought to acknowledge and respect, first and 
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foremost, what it means to actually be human, and thus recognize, among other things, the very 
trait that distinguishes human beings from all other modes of existence: spirit, or self-reflective 
being (self-consciousness).  What’s more, the health a psychologist is concerned with entails the 
health of this spirit or self-reflective nature (i.e. mental health).  For better or worse, it is our 
nature not to be content with simply existing, given our consciousness of our existence.  Hence, 
given the self-conscious existence human beings inherit, asking “Why?” seems inevitable.  So 
too, indulging in idealism in order to satiate this existential reflection seems like a natural 
response, since existential anxieties can otherwise yield despair.  The upshot is that being human 
is dangerous and extremely uncomfortable, and, as a result, a human being “needs a vision, a 
goal, a sense of direction.”467  In my estimation, Nietzsche failed to grasp the extent to which the 
need to ask “Why?” and to satiate the existential anxiety associated with our self-reflective 
nature are defining characteristics of what it means to be human; hence, they cannot be so easily 
ignored.  Unfortunately, Nietzsche conceptualizes health under the assumption that such 
necessary byproducts of our self-reflective nature can be ignored.  In fact, for Nietzsche, it seems 
that good health comes to mean precisely this: overcoming a human being’s natural inclination to 
question existence (and to then subsequently indulge in idealism).  However, since this does not 
seem very realistic, it looks as though Nietzsche’s notion of health is misleading and 
problematic. 
Furthermore, mental health (or lack thereof) can have significant effects on physical well-
being (as e.g. suicide and stress), and when it comes to human beings mental health is vital for 
flourishing.  Mental health is, in turn, directly related to one’s sense of security and well-being 
with respect to the existential anxieties arising from self-consciousness.  In my view, Nietzsche 
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fails to appreciate and acknowledge the mental stability religions (and other instances of 
idealism) can help facilitate.  While Nietzsche frequently suggests that idealism is negatively 
correlated with health, it would seem that idealism, if anything, positively impacts one’s health.  
After all, the idealist is, in a sense, less troubled by the question “Why?”, or even ceases to ask it 
altogether, since he or she allows him- or herself to indulge in answers.  At the very least, one 
must wonder whether those like Nietzsche, who actively downplay the significance of a human 
being’s existential reflections, are able to foster the kind of peace of mind that religions, and 
other instances of idealism, seem to offer.  I argue that, by proposing his revaluation of all 
values, what Nietzsche actually does is jeopardize the mental stability of slaves, because their 
existential reflections and anxieties are brought back into focus.  They must face the chaos once 
more, only to ask the question “Why?” all over again, as this is what they are naturally inclined 
to do.  Yet, Nietzsche supposes this regression to be healthy, because he minimizes the 
importance of alleviating and satisfying the existential needs that religions and other instances of 
idealism provide.  In sum, I contend that Nietzsche’s brand of thoroughgoing naturalism would 
prove unsatisfactory for the vast majority of people—namely, those Nietzsche would label as 
“slaves.”  For this reason, I must conclude that Nietzsche’s prescription for a revaluation of all 
values and for a submission to his brand of naturalism is simply not a promising or realistic 
option for most people; regardless of whether Nietzsche is right to suggest that they are too weak 
for it, the fact remains that “slaves,” by definition, find the master mentality, and the 
thoroughgoing naturalism upon which it rests, unsatisfactory, and they simply will not—or 
cannot—settle for it. 
Moreover, when it comes to the issue of health, and, perhaps even more importantly, to 
Nietzsche’s advice for how to go about adopting a healthy, life-affirming attitude, we should not 
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forget to consider Nietzsche’s own health.  I have already alluded to Nietzsche’s pervasive 
physical ailments in Footnote 378, and there is good reason to believe that his mental health was 
suspect throughout much of his life as well.  In addition to the ten-year period of insanity at the 
end of his life, Nietzsche documents bouts of melancholy and existential crises throughout his 
life.  Consider, for example, the following samples: 
“There were dark moments meanwhile, whole days and nights when I did not 
know any longer how to go on living and when a black despair attacked me, 
worse than I have ever known before.”468 
 
“I am a half-madman who suffers in the head and whom long solitude has 
confused completely.” 469 
 
“I no longer see why I should live for another six months—everything is boring, 
painful.”470 
 
“A few times I also thought of the opposite: driving my solitude and renunciation 
to its ultimate point and— ”471 
 
“The barrel of a revolver is for me now a source of relatively pleasant 
thoughts.”472 
 
“I confess, I am even more pleased about my non-readers, people who have never 
heard either my name or the word ‘philosophy’.”473 
 
While most would admit to having their own personal problems, and to having experienced great 
melancholy on occasion, Nietzsche was clearly unable to master the art of life-affirmation, and 
he can hardly be considered a model for healthy living, or a person worth approaching for any 
kind of related advice.  In fairness, perhaps he was merely trying to embody an ideal that he 
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believed to be the best one, without ever thinking or maintaining that he had, in fact, fully 
realized it. 
In conclusion, I concur with many of Nietzsche’s views regarding the illusory nature of 
various forms of idealism, including, most notably, many of those instantiated in religion.  
However, I question the sagacity of the prescriptive implications arising from his take on the 
relationship between religion (and idealism in general) and health, as well as his celebrated 
espousal of the revaluation of all values.  Thus, I am ultimately inclined to agree with Kaufmann, 
who argues that “Nietzsche attains greatness through his diagnoses rather than through his 
prescriptions.”474  Despite what Nietzsche suggests, religion does not seem to be inherently 
counterproductive to the well-being of individuals.  In the next chapter, I explore the thesis 
advanced by James that religion is, in fact, vitally useful to individuals insofar as it delivers a 
kind of existential satisfaction that is otherwise unattainable. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
William James and The Varieties of Religious Experience 
 
I. Introduction 
William James is a central figure in many contemporary discussions of the philosophy of 
religion, and for good reason: one of his many notable works, The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (hereafter “Varieties”), provides us with one of the most thorough investigations of 
religious phenomena ever conducted.  Transcriptions of 20 lectures James presented in 
Edinburgh, Scotland in 1901 and 1902 comprise Varieties; he was tasked with presenting the 
material for these lectures thanks to an honorary appointment at the University of Edinburgh.  
James, who is just as much a psychologist as he is a philosopher, offers a penetrating analysis of 
the psychological nature of religious beliefs in particular, expounding on what he takes to be the 
many effects, both good and bad, of such beliefs for the individuals who subscribe to them.  
Indeed, James is a psychologist by training, a fact which he alludes to in the very beginning of 
Varieties, where he suggests that this discipline yields the one vantage point from which he feels 
he can make fruitful contributions to the topic at hand, asserting, among other things, that 
“psychology is the only branch of learning in which I am particularly versed.”475 
As we shall see, of the three thinkers discussed in this dissertation, James offers by far the 
most sympathetic perspective of religion’s utility.  Interestingly, he himself was not especially 
religious—as Wayne Proudfoot points out, James’s “background provided him with an interest 
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in religion without affiliation with any particular religious community.  His was very much a 
Protestant culture, but he came to the study of religion with neither commitment to nor 
cultivation in any doctrinal tradition.”476  While not particularly religious, James is able to 
appreciate what he takes to be the genuine spiritual and existential value religion holds for 
others.  Perhaps it is for these reasons that James is able to present a generally well-reasoned, 
even-handed perspective of the utility of religion. 
The utility of religion is certainly of interest to James, as his emphasis on the practical 
effects of religion is palpable throughout Varieties, where he offers a robust and fair account of 
the significant effects, both good and bad, religion has in everyday life.  Of course, such an 
emphasis on the practical effects of religion should not come as a surprise to those familiar with 
James, as it would seem to be an obvious byproduct of the pragmatism he is known for 
championing.  James has become almost universally associated with pragmatism, and he 
explicitly adopts it as his own methodology for approaching religion in Varieties.  In his lecture 
on philosophy,477 James outlines the inadequacies of the philosophy of religion, which 
emphasizes rational demonstration of religious belief, suggesting it ought to be transformed into 
what he calls “science of religion.”  Rather than rational demonstrations of religious beliefs, this 
science of religion concerns itself with the practical consequences of religious beliefs.  In 
establishing his own pragmatic approach to religion, James also appeals to the philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce, regarded by most as the father of pragmatism.478 
In addition to his general espousal of pragmatism, key distinctions introduced by James 
highlight his emphasis on the utility of religion.  For example, his distinction between existential 
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judgments and propositions of value illustrates his emphasis on the utility of religion.  He 
couches this distinction in the form of two questions: “What are the religious propensities?” and 
“What is their philosophic significance?”479  He stresses that keeping these questions clear and 
distinct is vital to his own project, and that he is chiefly concerned with the latter.  The first 
question has to do with facts about religion’s origins and history, and the latter pertains to its 
usefulness or value to us.  James asks, “how can such an existential account of facts of mental 
history decide in one way or another upon their spiritual significance?”480  He points out that 
many positive results can emerge from a belief with a questionable or suspect origin, and he 
concludes: “you see that the existential facts by themselves are insufficient for determining the 
value.”481  To be sure, the difference between the source or origin of a religious belief and its 
value for the individual subscribing to it is a common theme throughout Varieties.  James also 
suggests that it shouldn’t matter whether a religious individual’s belief is ultimately inspired by a 
natural and organic cause or a supernatural one—all that ought to matter are the effects of such 
belief.  “When we think certain states of mind superior to others,” he asks us to consider, “is it 
ever because of what we know concerning their organic antecedents?”482  James answers with an 
emphatic “No!” and claims, instead, that we believe they are superior for one of two reasons: 
either “we take an immediate delight in them; or else it is because we believe them to bring us 
good consequential fruits for life.”483  James’s emphasis on the utility of religion, as opposed to 
its underlying cause, is encapsulated by the “empirical criterion” he defends: “by their fruits ye 
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shall know them, not by their roots.”484  Clearly, given the nature of his analysis and his own 
points of emphasis, James’s reflections are germane to my assessment of the utility of religion.   
Much of Varieties, especially the first half of the book, consists of James describing the 
phenomenon of religion and detailing its multifarious types; for the most part, extended 
discussions about religion’s utility don’t appear until the second half of the book, and, even then, 
extensive description and case studies are interspersed.  Indeed, in Varieties, James spends 
significant time explicating what he means to indicate by “religion,” as well as describing the 
varieties of religious experience arising out of such a conception.  What’s more, I think that due 
consideration of James’s description of what he takes to be religious phenomena is vitally 
important when analyzing what he says regarding religion’s utility.  As we shall see later, this is 
no small matter—I will suggest that different conceptions of religion constitute a confounding 
variable for any survey of what thinkers such as Mill, Nietzsche, and James suggest regarding 
religion’s utility, and that they specifically underlie some of the apparent differences between 
James’s and Nietzsche’s perspectives regarding religion’s utility.  In view of this, I begin the 
chapter with a discussion of James’s descriptive account of religion (Part II) before then 
proceeding to an analysis of what he says regarding religion’s utility (Part III), and I conclude by 
offering some general reflections on Varieties (Part IV).  I now turn to Part II, where I outline 
what James means by “religion,” demarcate what specific aspects of religion he proposes to 
analyze in Varieties, and detail his primary and well-known categorizations of religious 
experience. 
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II. The Varieties of Religious Experience  
A. James’s Definition of “Religion” and the Scope of His Inquiry 
James is well aware of the difficulty associated with trying to offer a definition of 
religion, and he only settles on his own definition after acknowledging and emphasizing the 
difficulty of the exercise.  Accordingly, he writes, “most books on the philosophy of religion try 
to begin with a precise definition of what its essence consists of,” yet “the word ‘religion’ cannot 
stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name.”485  Having said this, he 
continues, “yet this need not prevent me from taking my own narrow view of what religion shall 
consist in for the purpose of these lectures…This, in fact, is what I must do.”486  And so, in his 
empirical, pragmatic, and psychological approach to religious experience, James defines religion 
as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”487  He then 
elaborates on this basic definition, refining it for his purposes throughout much of the first half of 
Varieties. 
He acknowledges that “controversy comes up over the word ‘divine’,”488 and he seeks to 
further clarify what he means by the term as a result.  Not surprisingly, this discussion quickly 
turns to the notion of “God” as traditionally conceived (i.e. as a being possessing supernatural 
qualities), and whether belief in such a God is a necessary ingredient in religion.  James suggests 
that belief in God is not a necessary component of religious experience.  Indeed, on his account, 
Buddhism and Transcendentalism both qualify as religions, despite the fact that neither of them 
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entails belief in God.  Because “the sort of appeal that Emersonian optimism, on the one hand, 
and Buddhistic pessimism, on the other, make to the individual and the sort of response which he 
makes to them in his life are in fact indistinguishable from, and in many respects identical with, 
the best Christian appeal and response,”489 James argues that we have good reason to call them 
“religious.”  After characterizing Transcendentalism and quoting Emerson, James writes, “it 
would be too absurd to say that the inner experiences that underlie such expressions of faith as 
this and impel the writer to their utterance are quite unworthy to be called religious 
experiences.”490  Ultimately, he concludes that, from his “experiential point of view,” he must 
“call these godless or quasi-godless creeds ‘religions’” and “interpret the term ‘divine’ very 
broadly, as denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.”491  I should 
note that, although he includes belief systems some might not be so inclined to call religious, 
James is not alone in thinking of religion so broadly.  Recall, for instance, my earlier discussion 
of J.S. Mill’s similar conception of religion.492 
There are some important implications associated with James’s broad view of religion 
that I think warrant attention here.  Proudfoot raises some valid concerns about James’s broad 
conception of religion, suggesting that, “as is, it allows us to call a madman’s delusion of having 
kissed the Virgin Mary his religion.”493  Proudfoot further speculates that one whose “relation to 
the divine is one of skepticism” might, on James’s definition, also be construed as religious.494  
Moreover, while many—and perhaps most—would associate religion with belief in a 
supernatural God, James clearly does not limit himself to cases where this belief is present.  
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Therefore, he does not require what is, at least for many who contemplate the nature of religion, 
an essential ingredient of it.  However, while there may be a general tendency to associate 
religion with belief in a supernatural God, James points out that many nonetheless do associate 
atheistic belief systems, such as those mentioned above, with religion.  He suggests that “there 
are systems of thought which the world usually calls religious, and yet which do not positively 
assume a God.  Buddhism is in this case.”495  Ultimately, since James does not confine himself to 
an analysis of phenomena where belief in a supernatural God is present, we ought to be on guard 
against conflating what he says regarding religion’s utility with assessments of religion’s utility 
incorporating narrower and exclusively-supernatural conceptions of God (e.g. Nietzsche’s)—to 
do so would obviously be a mistake.  In Section B of Part III, the significance of James’s 
conception of religion is amplified by my juxtaposition of his notion of religion with 
Nietzsche’s.   
Naturally, one of the chief byproducts of James’s broad conception of religion is that the 
term comes to denote a wide range of experiences.  Indeed, the diverse nature of religious 
experience is a central theme throughout Varieties, as James clearly makes it a point to 
emphasize this aspect of religion.  When beginning to define religion, for example, he says, “let 
us rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one essence, but many 
characters which may alternately be equally important in religion.”496  Later, he suggests: 
The whole outcome of these lectures will, I imagine, be the emphasizing to your 
mind of the enormous diversities which the spiritual lives of different men 
exhibit. Their wants, their susceptibilities, and their capacities all vary and must 
be classed under different heads. The result is that we have really different types 
of religious experience.497 
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 In fact, despite the extraordinary breadth of James’s own survey of religious experience in 
Varieties, this wide-ranging nature of religion compels him to stress that “the field of religion 
being as wide as this, it is manifestly impossible that I should pretend to cover it.”498  As a result, 
James readily admits that he cannot possibly hope to offer an adequate analysis of all aspects of 
religion, and the extremely diverse nature of the subject requires him to focus on a more clearly 
defined portion of it. 
To this end, James tries to better define the scope of his own inquiry by articulating what 
he does not intend to discuss—i.e. to “say what aspects of the subject we leave out.”499  It is at 
this point that James offers his well-known distinction between individual religious experiences 
and organized religion.  Specifically, he speaks of “one great partition which divides the 
religious field,” where “on the one side of it lies institutional, on the other personal religion.”500  
He associates theology and ecclesiasticism with institutional religion, and reserves the 
designation of personal religion for the original and personal religious experiences of 
individuals, which have less to do with outside influences, such as the traditions of a church.  He 
describes institutional religion as a kind of externally-oriented experience, suggesting that, “were 
we to limit our view to it, we should have to define religion as an external art, the art of winning 
the favor of gods.”501  Personal religion, on the other hand, entails the opposite and reflects a 
kind of internally-oriented experience; here, it is “the inner dispositions of man himself which 
form the centre of interest.”502 
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Having distinguished individual religion from institutional religion, James then narrows 
the scope of his inquiry by opting to focus solely on individual religion.  “I propose to ignore,” 
he says, “the institutional branch entirely…to confine myself as far as I can to personal religion 
pure and simple.”503  In a similar vein, he asserts, “the immediate personal experiences will 
amply fill our time, and we shall hardly consider theology or ecclesiasticism at all.”504  What’s 
more, when evaluating the fruits of “saintliness,” which he takes to refer to “the ripe fruits of 
religion in a character”505 (and which I will return to in Section A of Part III), James reminds his 
readers that, “in critically judging of the value of religious phenomena, it is very important to 
insist on the distinction between religion as an individual personal function, and religion as an 
institutional, corporate, or tribal product” and that “the religious experience which we are 
studying is that which lives itself out within the private breast.”506  Note that this emphasis on 
individual religious experiences is in his basic definition of religion, according to which he 
chooses to focus on “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude.” 
Aside from needing to narrow the scope of his inquiry in order to make his task more 
manageable, James makes it clear that he has additional reasons for leaving out the institutional 
elements of religion from his purview.  For one, he argues that many of the ill effects commonly 
associated with religion are the result of its institutional elements, and he suggests that these 
negative effects can make it difficult for some people to glean the advantages associated with 
more private religious experiences.  On this point he reflects that “when we hear the word 
‘religion’ nowadays, we think inevitably of some ‘church’ or other; and to some persons the 
word ‘church’ suggests so much hypocrisy and tyranny and meanness and tenacity of 
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superstition that in a wholesale undiscerning way they glory in saying that they are ‘down’ on 
religion altogether.”507  In emphasizing the personal aspects of religion, James hopes to avoid 
this kind of rash and unwarranted dismissal of religion.  Furthermore, James believes 
institutional religion offers a watered-down version of religious experience, whereas private 
religion is more authentic and informative.  Along these lines, he suggests that an examination of 
individual religious experiences will prove more revelatory and enriching to those investigating 
the nature of religion than an examination of its institutional elements.  Accordingly, he writes, 
“it would profit us little to study this second-hand religious life [i.e. the products of institutional 
religion].  We must make search rather for the original experiences which were the pattern-
setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct.”508   
Proudfoot points out that “Varieties has been criticized for its individualism, and for 
James’s lack of attention to ritual, doctrine, and the social and institutional contexts of religious 
experiences.  Each of these is a function of the deliberately ahistorical character of his 
inquiry.”509  Granting that he must limit himself to certain aspects of religion, given his wide-
reaching definition of it, I, too, want to mention some reservations I have regarding James’s 
exclusion of the institutional elements of religion.  To begin with, one commonly finds that the 
way in which a religious individual comes to be religious (i.e. the impetus for his or her 
individual religious experience) is, for better or worse, significantly affected by institutional and 
social elements of religion.  After all, many—if not most—adults who consider themselves 
religious were raised going to church services regularly, participated in the social and other 
events affiliated with a church, and would acknowledge that their perspectives on a number of 
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important issues were shaped by the various church doctrines they were taught at these services 
and events.  Daniel Dennett echoes my point here, suggesting that one “could hardly deny that 
those social and cultural factors hugely affect the content and structure of the individual’s 
experience.”510  If this is the case, it would seem that one cannot hope to adequately address 
individual religion without also touching upon the social and institutional elements that so often 
inspire it.  Proudfoot echoes this point, asking “how are we able to properly identify and describe 
an experience [of an individual] that is reported in a particular text without attention to the 
specific language and historical and social context of the text and of the event to which it 
testifies?”511  Suffice it to say that partitioning the social and the private elements of religion 
from one another, as James proposes to do, is not an easy matter. 
Also, by excluding the institutional element of religion from his investigation, James 
seems to be ignoring what many take to be an essential ingredient of religion.  After all, when we 
hear the word “religion,” many of us automatically conjure up images of churches and church 
doctrines (not to mention temples, synagogues, mosques, shrines, holy sites, etc.), just as James 
himself suggests.  Thus, just as there are those who think of religion as entailing belief in a 
supernatural God, many are naturally inclined to include institutional elements in any discussion 
of religion.  For them, what it means to be religious is implicitly tied to these institutions.  
Therefore, in proposing “to ignore the institutional branch entirely,” I would argue James is, in a 
sense, proposing to ignore what many of us take to be a very integral part of religion.  One could 
then suggest that, in explicitly choosing to ignore the institutional component of religions, what 
James has to say no longer seems to reflect religion, per se, but something more akin to the 
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private, spiritual experience of individuals.  We ought, once again, to bear these considerations in 
mind when considering what James says about the utility of religion.  Also, both sides of the 
religious partition affect human beings in significant ways, and, contrary to James, I am not 
limiting myself to a discussion of individual religion.  One can’t deny (nor does James try to) 
that religious institutions introduced throughout history have had significant and long-lasting 
effects on the welfare of human beings, and, where utility of religion is the concern, it seems 
prudent to consider such effects.  I will offer a more extended discussion of this point in Section 
A of Part III. 
 
B. James’s Characterization and Categorization of Religious 
Experience 
Having offered his general definition of religion early on in Varieties and established that 
he seeks to concern himself only with individual religion, James continues to flesh out what he 
means by religious experience throughout the remainder of the lectures.  In doing so, he 
expounds on two chief characteristics of religious experience: 1) belief in the reality of the 
unseen (i.e. the godlike) and 2) a significant adjustment to that reality.  Accordingly, when 
describing “religion in the broadest and most general terms possible,” James says it amounts to 
“belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting 
ourselves thereto.  This belief and this adjustment are the religious attitude in the soul.”512  He 
elaborates on each of these hallmarks of religion, beginning with the “belief in an object which 
we cannot see.”513  When it comes to religion’s essential belief in the reality of the unseen, James 
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starts by observing that such belief comes in many forms and by way of many objects of belief.  
On this point, he is quick to mention that these objects of belief result from abstract ideas, not 
from any kind of physical experience or sensation.  These objects of belief vary in terms of their 
abstractness, according to James, but the entire spectrum of religious objects of belief, including 
those that are more “concrete,” stem from the realm of ideas, not from physical sensation or 
observation.  Hence, as James observes, even in “the more concrete objects of most men’s 
religion, the deities whom they worship, are known to them only in idea.”514  Additionally, 
James claims that “the absence of definite sensible images is positively insisted on by the 
mystical authorities in all religions.”515 
What’s more, despite having not originated in the corporeal realm of our everyday 
experience, these objects of religious worship still inspire significant changes within it, and even 
in the case of more abstract objects of worship, such as “God’s holiness” and “God’s justice,” the 
effect of such belief on the physical world can be just as potent; in this respect, “religion is full of 
abstract objects which prove to have an equal power.”516  In his explication of this point, James 
offers an extended discussion of Immanuel Kant, whom he thinks shares his perspective 
regarding the ability of objects of belief arising from “pure ideas” to inspire practical effects in 
the physical world; he concludes this discussion by observing: 
Theoretically speaking they [i.e. words and phrases like “God,” “the design of 
creation,” and “the soul”] are words devoid of any significance.  Yet strangely 
enough they have a definite meaning for our practice.  We can act as if there were 
a God; feel as if we were free; consider Nature as if she were full of special 
designs; lay plans as if we were immortal; and we find then that these words do 
make a genuine difference in our moral life…So we have the strange 
phenomenon, as Kant assures us, of a mind believing with all its strength in the 
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real presence of a set of things of no one of which it can form any notion 
whatsoever.517 
 
We see, then, that religious belief in the reality of the unseen is thought to elicit significant 
changes in both the physical and psychological realms of experience.  To be sure, while they 
may arise from “pure ideas,” such religious objects of belief are nevertheless an essential part of 
reality for those who believe in them.  Hence, “beings they are,” James observes, “beings as real 
in the realm which they inhabit as the changing things of sense are in the realm of space.”518, 519  
In fact, James claims, “they are as convincing to those who have them as any direct sensible 
experiences can be, and they are, as a rule, much more convincing than results established by 
mere logic ever are.”520 
Interestingly, James suggests that belief in the reality of the unseen is usually not a 
byproduct of any kind of intellectual analysis, but, rather, tends to stem from something more 
akin to sensation or feeling.  On this point, he claims: 
We may now lay it down as certain that in the distinctively religious sphere of 
experience, many persons (how many we cannot tell) possess the objects of their 
belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect accepts as true, 
but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended…The 
feeling of reality may be something more like a sensation than an intellectual 
operation properly so-called.521 
 
Hence, the source for religious belief in the reality of the unseen is not something we hear, smell, 
taste, touch, or see, yet James suggests it is more akin to these kinds of sensations than it is to 
any kind of analytical thought process.  According to James, “it is as if there were in the human 
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consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may 
call ‘something there,’ more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 
‘senses’ by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed.”522  
James goes so far as to say that this sense of the unseen is sometimes felt to be even stronger 
than ordinary sensation,523 and he concludes that, in this regard, “we are dealing with a well-
marked natural kind of fact.”524   
James juxtaposes mysticism with rationalism during his examination of the relationship 
between the feelings and intellectual processes (or lack thereof) underlying religious belief in the 
reality of the unseen.  On James’s account, mysticism reveals a more private kind of truth and is 
rooted in inarticulate feelings and sensations, while rationalism advocates a version of truth that 
can be fully articulated and verified via intellectual analysis; he puts the point as follows: “the 
opinion opposed to mysticism in philosophy is sometimes spoken of as rationalism. Rationalism 
insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds.”525  He then 
defends the merits of mysticism from the frequent intrusions of rationalism, suggesting that, 
when it comes to many phenomena of life, and not just religious ones, feelings actually precede 
and rule over logic and reason.526  As a result, he concludes that “if you have intuitions at all, 
they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism 
inhabits,” and he suggests that “this inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just 
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as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when it argues against it.”527  Ultimately, 
James believes, religious belief, like many other elements of life, will only “make sense” to an 
individual if it is already rooted in a deeper-seated feeling or sensation, which can be known only 
by the individual.  Hence, he suggests, “the truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, 
articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already 
been impressed in favor of the same conclusion.”528  For those who do have this kind of religious 
feeling, logic and reason usually pose little threat to the religious beliefs that arise from it.  On 
this point, he observes, “if you do have them [i.e. religious sensations], and have them at all 
strongly, the probability is that you cannot help regarding them as genuine perceptions of truth, 
as revelations of a kind of reality which no adverse argument, however unanswerable by you in 
words, can expel from your belief.”529  In sum, when it comes to religious beliefs, as well as 
many other kinds of beliefs, “instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the 
presence of a living God after the fashion shown by my quotations, your critical arguments, be 
they never so superior, will vainly set themselves to change his faith.”530 
In addition to belief in the reality of an unseen power, James claims religion entails a 
significant adjustment to this reality.  In this sense, it engenders a significant existential reaction, 
thanks to which religion delivers existential relief to believers.  As James says, “religion, 
whatever it is, is a man’s total reaction upon life.”531  James characterizes this element of the 
religious experience as “that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting 
presence,” and he claims “this sense of the world’s presence” makes us react “about life at 
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large.”532  Moreover, this existential reaction is something the religious individual takes very 
seriously.  Hence, James claims that, “for common men ‘religion,’ whatever more special 
meanings it may have, signifies always a serious state of mind.”533  Further characterizing this 
sentiment imbedded in religion, he suggests, “if any one phrase could gather its universal 
message, that phrase would be, ‘All is not vanity in this Universe, whatever the appearances may 
suggest.’”534  Similarly, he states, “the divine shall mean for us only such a primal reality as the 
individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a 
jest.”535 
James’s fairly well-known distinction between once-born and twice-born religious types 
is rooted in this essential adjustment to the higher, unseen power.  The division of these two 
types ultimately stems from their different perspectives of “evil,” which is to be taken here in 
both a moral and a natural sense (i.e. in addition to moral wrongs, it incorporates natural pain and 
suffering associated with earthly life).  Generally speaking, if the evil aspects of life are not 
considered to be a major concern to the religious individual, he or she is deemed “once-born.”  
The basic idea is that such an individual receives the good religion is thought to deliver 
immediately, without any deliberations on evil and prolonged preoccupation with pain and 
suffering.  The once-born type still undergoes a kind of existential transformation as a result of 
his or her religious beliefs, after which he or she sees existence in a new, reinvigorating light, but 
it is not necessary to venture beyond the bounds of this earthly world to solicit such relief.  If, on 
the other hand, the religious individual suffers significantly first, going through trials and 
tribulations before receiving deliverance via religion, he or she is said to be “twice-born.”  On 
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James’s account, the twice-born cannot find salvation within the confines of earthly life, and so 
they must travel beyond it, into the supernatural realm, in order to alleviate their fixation on the 
ills of life.  In the case of the once-born type, the existential reaction central to religious 
experience is of a more rudimentary kind, while for the twice-born type it is of a more complex 
nature and involves overcoming a significant “existential crisis.”  In turn, these two religious 
types are born out of two kinds of natural dispositions toward evil: the healthy-minded and the 
morbid-minded.  Describing these two kinds of attitudes and how they influence religious 
development, James says: 
The sanguine and healthy-minded live habitually on the sunny side of their 
misery-line, the depressed and melancholy live beyond it, in darkness and 
apprehension. There are men who seem to have started in life with a bottle or two 
of champagne inscribed to their credit; whilst others seem to have been born close 
to the pain-threshold, which the slightest irritants fatally send them over…Does it 
not appear as if one who lived more habitually on one side of the pain-threshold 
might need a different sort of religion from one who habitually lived on the 
other?536 
 
Interestingly, James maintains that the twice-born type offers a more developed or genuine kind 
of experience, which I will say more about shortly.  First, however, I shall offer a bit more detail 
regarding each of these important religious types. 
Thanks to his or her religious belief, the once-born type recognizes the good inherent in 
earthly life and is happy with his or her natural conditions therein.  Therefore, the pain and 
suffering implicit in natural existence do not constitute any considerable difficulty for the once-
born type, and any concerns about evil are short-lived.  In fact, this type often proactively seeks 
to minimize such concerns, and an aversion to evil is a central tenet of religious belief for this 
type.  While James thinks there is something lacking in the once-born type, he does appreciate 
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some benefits of this particular type, most notably the healthy-mindedness and optimism it is 
founded on.  He asks, “what can be more base and unworthy than the pining, puling, mumping 
mood, no matter by what outward ills it may have been engendered?”537  The once-born type 
presents us with the opposite kind of reaction, namely, one of unreserved optimism, which helps 
individuals overcome any evil lying in their way.  Ultimately, thanks to a religious 
transformation, the once-born type is awakened to a greater sense of meaning born out of natural, 
earthly life. 
As a result of the once-born type’s refusal to entertain depressing thoughts about evil, it is 
said to be rooted in a “healthy-minded” attitude, reflecting “those who, when unhappiness is 
offered or proposed to them, positively refuse to feel it, as if it were something mean and 
wrong.”538  Along these lines, while summarizing his account of the healthy-minded, James says, 
“we saw how this temperament may become the basis for a peculiar type of religion, a religion in 
which good, even the good of this world's life, is regarded as the essential thing for a rational 
being to attend to.”539  James also alludes to the popularity of this kind of attitude toward evil, 
suggesting “it is probable that there never has been a century in which the deliberate refusal to 
think ill of life has not been idealized by a sufficient number of persons to form sects, open or 
secret, who claimed all natural things to be permitted.”540 
James further develops his notion of the healthy-minded type by discussing two sub-types 
within it: the simple and the complex.  The simple healthy-minded type acknowledges death, 
suffering, and evil in the world, but easily reconciles these ills with the good in life; it offers a 
simple, involuntary way of feeling happy about things, which James associates with some of the 
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Greeks and Romans.541  The complex healthy-minded type, on the other hand, consciously tries 
to refuse to acknowledge death and suffering at all; for this type, a concerted effort is made to 
view everything as good, thanks to which evil is not recognized at all.  James characterizes this 
more complex type as more systemic and voluntary, and cites Walt Whitman,542 Baruch 
Spinoza,543 the Mind-cure movement544 (what nowadays might be referred to as the “positive 
thinking” school of thought), and naturalism545 as prime examples of it.  James describes the 
difference between the simple involuntary type and the more complex voluntary type in the 
following: 
If, then, we give the name of healthy-mindedness to the tendency which looks on 
all things and sees that they are good, we find that we must distinguish between a 
more involuntary and a more voluntary or systematic way of being healthy-
minded. In its involuntary variety, healthy-mindedness is a way of feeling happy 
about things immediately. In its systematical variety, it is an abstract way of 
conceiving things as good…Systematic healthy-mindedness, conceiving good as 
the essential and universal aspect of being, deliberately excludes evil from its 
field of vision.546, 547 
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be inwardly dissatisfied with what seemed to them the harshness and irrationality of the orthodox Christian scheme” 
(James, Varieties, 89). 
546 James, Varieties, 86. 
547 James offers a similar description of this kind of attitude that reminds me of something a cognitive psychologist 
might say regarding “evil” things: “refuse to admit their badness; despise their power; ignore their presence; turn 
your attention the other way; and so far as you yourself are concerned at any rate, though the facts may still exist, 
their evil character exists no longer. Since you make them evil or good by your own thoughts about them, it is the 
ruling of your thoughts which proves to be your principal concern” (James, Varieties, 87). 
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Interestingly, in pointing out the virtues of this cheery disposition, James makes a point very 
similar to the one Nietzsche made regarding pity.548  He suggests that dwelling on the evil in the 
world, which manifests itself in the form of fear and anxiety, “but fastens and perpetuates the 
trouble which occasioned it, and increases the total evil of the situation.”549  This is practically 
the mantra of the systemic healthy-minded, once-born religious type, who, as James suggests, 
propose that “evil is a disease; and worry over disease is itself an additional form of disease, 
which only adds to the original complaint.”550 
 As opposed to the once-born, the twice-born are not so easily saved from the evils of the 
natural world, and they must venture beyond this natural world in order to gain their salvation.  
Indeed, the twice-born type struggle mightily with the weight of evil, and, as a result, they do not 
share the healthy-mindedness belonging to the once-born type.  As James says, “in contrast with 
such healthy-minded views as these, if we treat them as a way of deliberately minimizing evil, 
stands a radically opposite view, a way of maximizing evil, if you please so to call it, based on 
the persuasion that the evil aspects of our life are of its very essence, and that the world's 
meaning most comes home to us when we lay them most to heart.”551  Again, this points to the 
fundamental difference between the two types: the once-born type espouses evasion of evil, 
while the twice-born type deems it an essential element of our experience.  According to James, 
from the perspective of the twice-born type, to dismiss evil is to ignore an unavoidable and ever-
palpable feature of existence.  Contrasting the existential reaction of the twice-born type with 
that of the once-born type, James suggests that, in the case of the twice-born type, “the process is 
one of redemption, not of mere reversion to natural health, and the sufferer, when saved, is saved 
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by what seems to him a second birth, a deeper kind of conscious being than he could enjoy 
before.”552  In fact, for the twice-born, “natural good is not simply insufficient in amount and 
transient, there lurks a falsity in its very being.”553  From the perspective of the twice-born, 
“there are two lives, the natural and the spiritual, and we must lose the one before we can 
participate in the other.”554 
Contrary to the healthy-mined type, James suggests that those who cannot so easily 
dismiss the evils of the world inherit a kind of “morbid-mindedness,” exhibiting, as he says, a 
“more morbid way of looking at the situation.”555  The idea here is that, for the morbid-minded, 
the pain and suffering inherent in life are accentuated, and, as Proudfoot points out, someone 
who is morbid-minded and religious “is constantly reminded of her sinfulness and estrangement 
from God.”556  Those who are morbid-minded may be able to experience occasional bouts of 
positive energy and happiness, but such occasions are inevitably short-lived, for the reality of 
doom and despair still lurks behind everything for them.  In commenting on examples he has 
given of morbid-mindedness (one of which is based on his own personal experience), James 
suggests, “one of them gives us the vanity of mortal things; another the sense of sin; and the 
remaining one describes the fear of the universe; -- and in one or other of these three ways it 
always is that man's original optimism and self-satisfaction get leveled with the dust.”557 
As he did with the healthy-minded type, James discusses sub-types of the morbid-minded 
type, observing that “just as we saw that in healthy-mindedness there are shallower and 
profounder levels…so also are there different levels of the morbid mind, and the one is much 
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more formidable than the other.”558  Accordingly, he details two basic kinds of morbid-
mindedness: mild and extreme.  He associates “anhedonia” with the mild sub-type, which he 
defines as “mere passive joylessness and dreariness, discouragement, dejection, lack of taste and 
zest and spring.”559  He describes the mild morbid-minded type as having a general “sense of 
incapacity for joyous feeling.”560  “A much worse form of the morbid-minded type,” James 
claims, “is positive and active anguish, a sort of psychical neuralgia wholly unknown to healthy 
life,”561 which can offer “a pitch of unhappiness so great that the goods of nature may be entirely 
forgotten.”562  This extreme morbid-minded type exhibits a sense of loathing, and “for this 
extremity of pessimism to be reached, something more is needed than observation of life and 
reflection upon death. The individual must in his own person become the prey of a pathological 
melancholy.”563 
James makes it quite clear that cases of melancholy on the very extreme end of the 
spectrum, without any sense of hope whatsoever, do not constitute religion.  In fact, he says, 
“melancholy, according to our ordinary use of language, forfeits all title to be called religious,” 
and he suggests that “religion is equally hostile to heavy grumbling and complaint.”564  
Ultimately, two possibilities emerge for those destined to this kind of extreme morbid-
mindedness: prolonged melancholy or religious salvation.  James cites Arthur Schopenhauer and 
Friedrich Nietzsche as examples of individuals who exude this kind of extreme melancholy, 
deeming them too pessimistic and downtrodden to legitimately represent religious types.  
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According to James, people like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche “lack the purgatorial note which 
religious sadness gives forth.”565  Thus, James argues, the cantankerous temper associated with 
some extremer versions of the morbid-minded type is not of the religious type and these 
counterfeit forms must be duly distinguished from more genuine forms of religion.  Reflecting 
on an example cited, James says:  
You see how the querulous temper of his misery keeps his mind from taking a 
religious direction. Querulousness of mind tends in fact rather towards irreligion; 
and it has played, so far as I know, no part whatever in the construction of 
religious systems…Religious melancholy must be cast in a more melting mood.566   
 
Alternatively, James cites Leo Tolstoy as a legitimate example of the twice-born religious type.  
Tolstoy endures an existential crisis and qualifies, on James’s account, as morbid-minded.  “In 
Tolstoy's case,” he observes, “the sense that life had any meaning whatever was for a time 
wholly withdrawn.  The result was a transformation in the whole expression of reality.”567  
However, all is not lost for Tolstoy, and he is not destined to prolonged bouts of extreme 
melancholy, thanks to a religious transformation.  According to James, this is typical of the 
twice-born type: as a result of an existential crisis, “an urgent wondering and questioning is set 
up, a poring theoretic activity, and in the desperate effort to get into right relations with the 
matter, the sufferer is often led to what becomes for him a satisfying religious solution.”568  In 
sum, through their discovery of the higher, unseen power and their subsequent adjustment 
thereto, the twice-born are able to overcome what might have otherwise become a crippling and 
debilitating awareness of the evils inherent in life. 
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Clearly, there are significant differences between James’s once-born and twice-born 
religious types.  Not surprisingly, James describes a fundamental tension between the two 
mentalities that results from their incongruent views of evil.  Accordingly, he observes:  
We can see how great an antagonism may naturally arise between the healthy-
minded way of viewing life and the way that takes all this experience of evil as 
something essential.  To this latter way, the morbid-minded way, as we might call 
it, healthy-mindedness pure and simple seems unspeakably blind and shallow. To 
the healthy-minded way, on the other hand, the way of the sick soul seems 
unmanly and diseased.569 
 
Nor should it be surprising that, “in their extreme forms, of pure naturalism and pure 
salvationism, the two types are violently contrasted.”570  What is surprising, in my opinion, is 
that James expresses a much more favorable impression of the twice-born type, insofar as he 
suggests it offers a more penetrating and genuine kind of perspective.  The twice-born type is 
thought to be more genuine in that it acknowledges reality as it really is.  According to James, 
since evil is undeniably real and the once-born type doesn’t fully acknowledge this, as the twice-
born type does, the once-born type’s minimization of evil constitutes a kind of shortcoming, the 
cost of which, as Proudfoot points out, “is not to take seriously, and even to deny, an important 
part of experience, that not everything is good.”571  In highlighting the disingenuous nature of the 
once-born type’s unbridled optimism and failure to adequately deal with the reality of evil, 
James claims “it is impossible to carry on this discipline in the subjective sphere without 
zealously emphasizing the brighter and minimizing the darker aspects of the objective sphere of 
things at the same time.”572  By contrast, in acknowledging and dealing with evil, the twice-born 
type is thought to represent a broader spectrum of human experience.  Hence, James ultimately 
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suggests “it seems to me that we are bound to say that morbid-mindedness ranges over the wider 
scale of experience, and that its survey is the one that overlaps.”573  Thus, James characterizes 
once-born religious individuals as being simple-minded, if not dishonest, in this regard, failing to 
adequately acknowledge or appreciate the stark reality of evil in earthly life.  The twice-born, on 
the other hand, are said to have greater awareness of the true nature of reality.  Ultimately, as 
Proudfoot suggests, “to James this position is much more realistic than that of the healthy-
minded type.  It is not predicated on the denial of evil and thus on self-deception.”574 
Not surprisingly, James offers an explanation of the religious adjustment to the higher, 
unseen power in psychological terms.  On his account, a human being is equipped with a mind, 
which he defines as “a system of ideas, each with the excitement it arouses, and with tendencies 
impulsive and inhibitive, which mutually check or reinforce one another.”575  When the ideas and 
propensities within an individual strongly conflict, internal discord and unhappiness are the 
result.  Consequently, as James says, “unhappiness is apt to characterize the period of order-
making and struggle.”576  Those suffering from this kind of discord either continue on in this 
maladapted way, or they undergo a process James calls “unification,” which resolves the internal 
discord by unifying the disparate psychological tendencies responsible for the internal strife.  
Once tormented by conflicting emotions and drives, an individual spared by unification no 
longer experiences their wrath. 
“Conversion” is the term James uses to describe this process of unification in cases of 
religious (both once- and twice-born) experience.  James conceptualizes conversion as follows: 
To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to 
gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or 
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sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and 
unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in 
consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.577 
 
Moreover, according to James, “to say that a man is ‘converted’ means, in these terms, that 
religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that 
religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy.”578  While conversion comes in many 
forms, the result is always the same: “sanctification.”  According to James, sanctification signals 
the newfound sense of ease that replaces the internal discord formerly present within the 
converted individual. He describes the process of sanctification in the following passage: 
What is attained is often an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively 
heroic level, in which impossible things have become possible, and new energies 
and endurances are shown. The personality is changed, the man is born anew, 
whether or not his psychological idiosyncrasies are what give the particular shape 
to his metamorphosis. "Sanctification" is the technical name of this result.579 
 
According to James, sanctification yields several significant effects: 1) a sense of higher control, 
2) the loss of worry, 3) a sense of enlightenment, 4) a change in attitude toward life, and, most 
notably, 5) an “ecstasy of happiness.”580  These effects of sanctification will be addressed in 
more detail in Section A of Part III, where I address what James has to say regarding the fruits of 
“saintliness.” 
James also notes that the process of conversion remains a mystery (e.g. why some 
individuals are converted while others are not), and he observes that “some persons, for instance, 
never are, and possibly never under any circumstances could be, converted.  Religious ideas 
cannot become the centre of their spiritual energy.”581  What’s more, some begin with religion, 
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only to abandon it later (although James thinks that this is rare), while others only find religion 
much later in life; no doubt, as James notes, “even late in life some thaw.”582  While admittedly 
uncertain of its roots, James thinks that the subconscious likely plays a significant role in the 
process of conversion.  Indeed, the subconscious is a theme frequently invoked by James 
throughout Varieties, and he makes it clear that manifestations of religious life “frequently 
connect themselves with the subconscious part of our existence.”583 
According to James, there are two general methods of conversion: the voluntary type 
(which is thought to be consciously triggered) and the involuntary type (which is thought to be 
subconsciously triggered).584  In the case of the voluntary type, a conscious and concerted effort 
is made to resolve the internal stress, which eventually happens in due time.  In the case of the 
involuntary type, on the other hand, virtually the opposite takes place: rather than try to fix 
things, the subject of the conversion “surrenders,” and the conversion is triggered suddenly by 
subconscious influences, not by any conscious effort on the part of the subject.  James claims 
that the voluntary type “are as a rule less interesting than those of the self-surrender [i.e. 
involuntary] type, in which the subconscious effects are more abundant and often startling.”585  
Interestingly, James suggests that self-surrender, which is the trademark of the involuntary type, 
is actually involved in both types.  While the voluntary type consciously strives to reach a 
resolution, James claims some degree of self-surrender is ultimately needed to “get them over the 
hump.”  Thus, he concludes: 
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The difference between the two types is after all not radical. Even in the most 
voluntarily built-up sort of regeneration there are passages of partial self-
surrender interposed; and in the great majority of all cases…it seems that the very 
last step must be left to other forces and performed without the help of its [i.e. the 
individual’s own will] activity.  In other words, self-surrender becomes then 
indispensable.586 
 
The upshot is that, in all instances, conversion ultimately entails the assistance of what the 
converted believes to be the higher, unseen power.  Consequently, “you see why self-surrender 
has been and always must be regarded as the vital turning-point of the religious life,”587 and why 
“it always seems, after the surrender of the personal will, as if an extraneous higher power had 
flooded in and taken possession.”588 
In addition to a fundamental belief in the reality of an unseen, higher power and an 
adjustment to this power, James references three additional features commonly associated with 
religion: sacrifice, confession and prayer.589  While James believes that sacrifice and confession 
are indeed common features of religious experience, he suggests that prayer is an especially vital 
feature of religious phenomena.  According to James, in its “widest sense,” prayer signals “every 
kind of inward communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine.”590  As such, it 
“is the very soul and essence of religion,” as “the religious phenomenon, studied as an inner fact, 
and apart from ecclesiastical or theological complications, has shown itself to consist 
everywhere, and at all its stages, in the consciousness which individuals have of an intercourse 
between themselves and higher powers with which they feel themselves to be related.”591  Hence, 
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prayer reflects the religious individual’s essential belief in the reality of the unseen and is a 
manifestation of the individual’s reaction or adjustment to it. 
Now, before proceeding to an examination of what James specifically says regarding the 
utility of religion, I want to first summarize his more general description of it, which I have 
outlined in this part of the chapter.  I can think of no better way to do this than to quote James 
himself, who offers his own summary in his final lecture.  Religion, he says, involves the 
following beliefs and psychological characteristics: 
1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws 
its chief significance; 2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher 
universe is our true end; 3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof 
-- be that spirit "God" or "law" -- is a process wherein work is really done, and 
spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within 
the phenomenal world. Religion includes also the following psychological 
characteristics: -- 4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the 
form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.  5. An 
assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a 
preponderance of loving affections.592 
 
III. The Utility of Religion 
A. James’s Case for the Utility of Religion 
In addition to offering an extensive description of religious phenomena, James is 
expressly concerned with gauging the usefulness of religion.  The fourteenth and fifteenth 
lectures in Varieties, for example, are specifically devoted to an analysis of the value of 
saintliness (which, for James, signifies the fruits of religion); accordingly, he prefaces these 
lectures by saying:  
We have now passed in review the more important of the phenomena which are 
regarded as fruits of genuine religion and characteristics of men who are devout. 
Today we have to change our attitude from that of description to that of 
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appreciation; we have to ask whether the fruits in question can help us to judge 
the absolute value of what religion adds to human life.593 
 
As we see here, James is clearly interested in ascertaining the utility of religion.  To his credit, he 
is also cautious when proposing to assess the fruits of religion, and he meticulously outlines his 
own methodology before proceeding.  In doing so, he develops his “empirical method,” which he 
carefully distinguishes from theological approaches to religion, saying: 
What I then propose to do is, briefly stated, to test saintliness by common sense, 
to use human standards to help us decide how far the religious life commends 
itself as an ideal kind of human activity. If it commends itself, then any 
theological beliefs that may inspire it, in so far forth will stand accredited. If not, 
then they will be discredited, and all without reference to anything but human 
working principles. It is but the elimination of the humanly unfit, and the survival 
of the humanly fittest, applied to religious beliefs.594 
 
James also makes it a point to stress that we are all unique characters, and that those who 
are religious require—and benefit from—different elements of religion.  Indeed, he suggests, we 
must raise the question, “are different functions in the organism of humanity allotted to different 
types of man, so that some may really be the better for a religion of consolation and reassurance, 
whilst others are better for one of terror and reproof?”595  In turn, he argues that it is becoming 
clearer with time that this is, in fact, befitting of religious experience.  Interestingly, one 
consequence of this is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to try to judge the fruits of religion in 
any kind of objective and impartial manner.  As James says, “if it be so, how can any possible 
judge or critic help being biased in favor of the religion by which his own needs are best met?  
He aspires to impartiality; but he is too close to the struggle.”596  To be sure, this is something 
anyone interested in studying the usefulness of religion ought to be cognizant of, and James 
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should be commended for highlighting this difficulty associated with assessing the prospects of 
religion’s utility. 
I want to stress that, as was the case with his descriptive account of religious phenomena, 
James is chiefly interested in the utility of individual religion.  Having said this, James does 
make some suggestions regarding the utility of institutional religion that I think deserve mention 
before proceeding to his more extensive analysis of individual religion.  Most notably, he points 
out that, unlike instances of individual religion, corporate ambitions become prominent and 
problematic in cases of institutional religion.  James notes that, in their institutional form, 
religions “become ecclesiastical institutions with corporate ambitions of their own. The spirit of 
politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally 
innocent thing.”597  Hence, according to James, as religion is institutionalized it becomes less 
genuine and more corrupted by societal and corporate influences.  By contrast, individual 
religion is not thought to be tainted by such external influences.  For this reason, James thinks it 
also provides a better indication of the legitimate fruits of religion, given that it entails a purer 
and unadulterated form of belief.  Subsequently, James suggests that many of the harms typically 
associated with religion do not properly belong to it, but, instead, result from the corrupting 
influences associated with institutional religion.  Accordingly, he observes that “the basenesses 
so commonly charged to religion's account are thus, almost all of them, not chargeable at all to 
religion proper, but rather to religion's wicked practical partner, the spirit of corporate 
dominion,”598 and that “for many of the historic aberrations which have been laid to her charge, 
religion as such, then, is not to blame.”599  In sum, James implores us not to lose sight of this 
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critical distinction between individual and institutional religion when assessing the utility of 
religion, saying, “I beseech you never to confound the phenomena of mere tribal or corporate 
psychology which it [i.e. institutional religion] presents with those manifestations of the purely 
interior life which are the exclusive object of our study.”600 
I believe James’s reflections on the effects of institutional religion are mostly accurate, 
and I am willing to grant that the more deleterious qualities of religion likely stem from its 
institutionalization.  However, while James is concerned exclusively with individual religion, 
which is, no doubt, a significant qualification, this dissertation is not limited in such a manner.  
Therefore, the consequences—both good and bad—associated with institutional religion must be 
incorporated into the present analysis of religion’s utility.  Recall my discussion of a similar 
point in Chapter 1, where I mentioned that Mill emphasizes that the negative consequences 
associated with some forms of religion (e.g. violence) “do not belong to religion in itself, but to 
particular forms of it, and afford no argument against the usefulness of any religions except those 
by which such enormities are encouraged.”601  As I suggested there, the fact that some forms of 
religion may be devoid of the negative effects associated with other forms does not give us 
license to ignore the negative effects associated with those other forms, just as it would not be 
appropriate to exclude the benefits of some forms of religion simply because other forms fail to 
produce them.  What’s more, as I suggested in Section A of Part II, institutional religion likely 
plays a significant role in most religious experience—as I have argued, it’s hard to imagine an 
individual having a religious experience devoid of its influence.  In which case, there’s reason to 
worry that the perceived harms James associates with institutional religion are prevalent as well.  
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Some philosophers, like Sam Harris, suggest that these harms are significant, too.  Harris argues, 
for example, that extreme divisiveness and violence are inherent in any faithful observance of the 
world’s most popular creeds, such as Islam and Christianity.602  All of this goes to show why I 
emphasize that the present analysis incorporates all varieties of religious experience, without any 
kind of qualification or exclusion. 
 In the process of evaluating the utility of religion, James develops his notion of 
“saintliness.”  “The collective name for the ripe fruits of religion in a character,” James suggests, 
“is Saintliness.”603  According to James, saintliness exhibits four key features, which, in turn, are 
said to yield four natural consequences.  Those four key features are: 1) a sense of a higher, ideal 
purpose or power, 2) a willing submission to this higher purpose or power, given its benevolent 
nature, 3) a newfound kind of joy and freedom that results from divorcing oneself from private 
and individual concerns, and 4) a more loving and harmonious demeanor toward others.604  More 
specifically, James describes the sensation of a higher, ideal purpose or power as “a feeling of 
being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests; and a conviction, not merely 
intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power.”605  Again, James makes 
it clear that this process need not involve a supernatural God, saying that “in Christian saintliness 
this power is always personified as God; but abstract moral ideals, civic or patriotic utopias, or 
inner versions of holiness or right may also be felt as the true lords and enlargers of our life, in 
ways which I described in the lecture on the Reality of the Unseen.”606  Interestingly, James even 
seems to speak to Mill’s “Religion of Humanity,” which I discussed in Chapter 1.607   
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Additionally, four natural consequences are said to arise from the four features of 
saintliness, and these are: 1) asceticism, 2) strength of soul, 3) purity, and 4) charity.  In the 
religious, according to James, we see minimization of worldly pleasures (i.e. asceticism), as 
communion with the higher, ideal reality exposes the insignificance of such pleasures.  The souls 
of the religious are also said to be strengthened as a result, which James describes as follows: 
The sense of enlargement of life may be so uplifting that personal motives and 
inhibitions, commonly omnipotent, become too insignificant for notice, and new 
reaches of patience and fortitude open out. Fears and anxieties go, and blissful 
equanimity takes their place. Come heaven, come hell, it makes no difference 
now!608 
 
At the same time, religious experience yields a newfound sense of internal purity and resolution 
of psychological discord that stems from the process of conversion, which I outlined in Section B 
of Part II.  Finally, the religious are said to be amicable and good-natured.  In James’s view, 
there is no doubt that these consequences can be beneficial, and he asserts that “the best fruits of 
religious experience are the best things that history has to show.”609  Indeed, according to James, 
“the highest flights of charity, devotion, trust, patience, bravery to which the wings of human 
nature have spread themselves have been flown for religious ideals.”610  However, he thinks that 
the consequences of saintliness can prove to be problematic when found in excess.  I will say 
more about this problem of excess in a moment, but first I want to say more about the specific 
ways in which James thinks these consequences of saintliness can be beneficial. 
On James’s account, it would seem that the most obvious benefit of religion is the 
significant existential or psychological relief it provides to the individual.  To put the point in the 
simplest terms possible, religion makes us happy.  In describing the general process of 
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unification within the will of an individual (which, again, James calls “conversion” in religious 
instances), whereby a kind of psychological harmony is attained, James says, “however it come, 
it brings a characteristic sort of relief; and never such extreme relief as when it is cast into the 
religious mould. Happiness! happiness!”611  According to James, the sense of God (i.e. of a 
higher, unseen power), coupled with God’s benevolent nature, affords the religious individual a 
sense of ease otherwise unattainable.  “Easily, permanently, and successfully,” James claims, “it 
often transforms the most intolerable misery into the profoundest and most enduring 
happiness.”612   James grants that the existential ease associated with religion takes various 
forms, suggesting that “the temper of the tranquil-mindedness differs, of course, according as the 
person is of a constitutionally sombre or of a constitutionally cheerful cast of mind. In the 
sombre it partakes more of resignation and submission; in the cheerful it is a joyous consent.”613  
In either case, religion is thought to provide “a new zest which adds itself like a gift to life,”614 
and “the transition from tenseness, self-responsibility, and worry, to equanimity, receptivity, and 
peace, is the most wonderful of all those shiftings of inner equilibrium.”615  It is important to 
note that the happiness James attaches to religion is not merely momentary relief from whatever 
ails us in our daily lives; rather, religion is said to engender a more enthusiastic and lasting 
endorsement of life.  On this point, James observes, “the more commonplace happinesses which 
we get are ‘reliefs,’ occasioned by our momentary escapes from evils either experienced or 
threatened.  But in its most characteristic embodiments, religious happiness is no mere feeling of 
escape.”616 
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Not only does James suggest that religion makes people happy and thereby improves 
their psychological wellbeing, he alleges that the kind of existential or psychological relief it 
produces is one-of-a-kind.  After pointing out that “the essence of religious experiences, the 
thing by which we finally must judge them, must be that element or quality in them which we 
can meet nowhere else,”617 he ultimately argues that the kind of positive impulse he associates 
with religion comprises this quality.  He elaborates on the unique nature of religious happiness in 
the following illuminating passage: 
There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in which the 
will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to 
close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God…Fear is 
not held in abeyance as it is by mere morality, it is positively expunged and 
washed away…it adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically 
deducible from anything else.618 
 
James insists that this difference in attitude toward life is significant, claiming that “it makes a 
tremendous emotional and practical difference to one whether one accept the universe in the drab 
discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity, or with the passionate happiness of Christian 
saints.”619 
In this vein, James extensively discusses the relationship between morality and religion in 
an effort to elucidate what it is that he thinks is uniquely beneficial about religion, suggesting at 
the outset that religion “will prove to contain some elements which morality pure and simple 
does not contain.”620  While “at bottom the whole concern of both morality and religion is with 
the manner of our acceptance of the universe,”621 what stands out about religion, he argues, is 
that it entails a significantly more optimistic and cheerful attitude toward life than morality.  “For 
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religion,” he says, “in its strong and fully developed manifestations, the service of the highest 
never is felt as a yoke.”622  As a result, he concludes: 
If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it seems to me that we ought to take 
it as meaning this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of 
espousal, in regions where morality strictly so called can at best but bow its head 
and acquiesce…this sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting is what we 
find nowhere but in religion.623 
 
In making his case, James compares Marcus Aurelius, whom he associates with the moral 
character, with a medieval German Christian writer and, after quoting excerpts from each, he 
observes “how much more active and positive the impulse of the Christian writer to accept his 
place in the universe is!  Marcus Aurelius agrees to the scheme—the German theologian agrees 
with it.”624  In a later lecture, James articulates another important difference between morality 
and religion: he suggests that morality demands a kind of active mental strenuousness from its 
adherents, whereas religion is said to yield a kind of passive mental relaxation.  Along these 
lines, the teachings associated with many religions, such as the mind-cure movement, is thought 
to be at odds with moral teachings.  On this point, he writes: 
Official moralists advise us never to relax our strenuousness…But the persons I 
speak of find that all this conscious effort leads to nothing but failure and vexation 
in their hand…the way to success…is by an anti-moralistic method, by the 
"surrender" of which I spoke in my second lecture. Passivity, not activity; 
relaxation, not intentness, should be now the rule.625 
 
In other words, moralists tell us to always be thinking about what we ought to do, but, for the 
religious, all is in God’s hands.  As I indicated in my earlier discussion of conversion, religion 
entails surrender to the higher power.  This, in turn, yields an appreciable sense of freedom and 
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joy, on James’s account, since the religious no longer feel bogged down by worries regarding the 
difficulties of their everyday lives.  Both morality and religion are thought to be concerned with 
happiness, but “even more in the religious life than in the moral life, happiness and unhappiness 
seem to be the poles round which the interest revolves.”626  Hence, in distinguishing religion 
from morality, James suggests that what is unique about religion is its decidedly optimistic 
outlook on life and the more pronounced sense of happiness it produces.  Furthermore, he is 
quick to point out that religion’s unique ability to engender a higher kind of happiness should 
weigh significantly in its favor when considering its utility, as indicated by the following: 
We are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe…in those states of mind 
which fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to as an imposition of 
necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint.  In 
the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused: 
even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may increase.  
Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary; and if it be 
the only agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human 
faculty stands vindicated beyond dispute.  It becomes an essential organ of our 
life, performing a function which no other portion of our nature can so 
successfully fulfill.627 
 
 Another benefit of religion is the charitable nature it engenders.  James raises concerns 
about the tendencies of the religious to be overly charitable (more on this in a moment), but he 
clearly lauds the tenderness and charity he associates with them and expresses his misgivings 
about the opposite mentality of hardness and suspicion found in some non-religious characters 
(e.g. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche).  According to James, in the case of the saint, “the ordinary 
motives to antipathy, which usually set such close bounds to tenderness among human beings, 
are inhibited. The saint loves his enemies, and treats loathsome beggars as his brothers.”628  
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James thinks that this is especially noteworthy insofar as it seems to run counter to our natural 
instincts,629 and for this reason he thinks it constitutes a kind of paradox.  Moreover, he speaks to 
the ability of the religious individual’s charitable nature to enact positive change in others: 
“treating those whom they met, in spite of the past, in spite of all appearances, as worthy, they 
have stimulated them to be worthy, miraculously transformed them by their radiant example and 
by the challenge of their expectation.”630  What’s more, he purports “we never can be sure in 
advance of any man that his salvation by the way of love is hopeless.”631  James thinks that the 
charitable backbone of religion underlies other important aspects of society as well, suggesting 
that “this belief in the essential sacredness of every one expresses itself to-day in all sorts of 
humane customs and reformatory institutions, and in a growing aversion to the death penalty and 
to brutality in punishment.”632  Ultimately, the charitable and loving nature of religion is said to 
be, at its core, regenerative: “force destroys enemies; and the best that can be said of prudence is 
that it keeps what we already have in safety. But non-resistance, when successful, turns enemies 
into friends; and charity regenerates its objects.”633 
Perhaps most interestingly, James discusses a benefit of religion stemming from its 
inherent asceticism.  Asceticism, on James’s account, entails a kind of disentanglement from the 
shallow interests of everyday worldly affairs.  As he says, “the man who lives in his religious 
centre of personal energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, differs from his previous 
carnal self in perfectly definite ways.”634  Hence, the suggestion is that saints reveal that there is 
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more to life than is typically suggested in our everyday lives, and James claims “this practical 
proof that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is the saint's magic gift to mankind.”635  
One outgrowth of asceticism is an embracing of poverty, which James maintains is “felt at all 
times and under all creeds as one adornment of a saintly life.”636  He marvels at this element of 
religion, since, once again, it runs so contrary to our natural inclinations.637 
He argues that this divorce from worldly affairs and material pursuits can be seen as a 
virtue of religion, because, if for no other reason, “lives based on having are less free than lives 
based either on doing or on being, and in the interest of action people subject to spiritual 
excitement throw away possessions as so many clogs.”638  James emphasizes that money-minded 
individuals face a litany of worries that don’t apply to individuals who can free themselves from 
the clutches of materialism.  On this point, he observes, “there are thousands of conjunctures in 
which a wealth-bound man must be a slave, whilst a man for whom poverty has no terrors 
becomes a freeman.”639  Indeed, James is Socrates-like in his disdain for the materialism that 
tends to run rampant in any typical human society.640  Religious asceticism serves as a kind of 
antidote for this undesired element of human nature.  “When one sees,” he observes, “the way in 
which wealth-getting enters as an ideal into the very bone and marrow of our generation, one 
wonders whether a revival of the belief that poverty is a worthy religious vocation may not be 
‘the transformation of military courage,’ and the spiritual reform which our time stands most in 
                                                             
635 James, Varieties, 312. 
636 James, Varieties, 277. 
637 More specifically, James calls this affinity for poverty a paradox (James, Varieties, 277) and a “seemingly 
unnatural opinion” (James, Varieties, 279). 
638 James, Varieties, 281. 
639 James, Varieties, 320. 
640 In Plato’s Republic, Socrates suggests that when an individual pursues material wealth he or she is feeding an 
unnecessary desire (as opposed to a necessary desire, such as wanting food, sleep, etc.), which is implicitly harmful 
to the individual.  In pursuing such unnecessary desires, Socrates believes we feed the baser element of our soul (i.e. 
desire) at the expense of the higher one (i.e. reason).  On Socrates’s account, internal discord and, ultimately, 
unhappiness are the inevitable consequences of this unhealthy practice. 
175 
 
need of.”641  In fact, James even claims that “it is certain that the prevalent fear of poverty among 
the educated classes is the worst moral disease from which our civilization suffers.”642   
Moreover, James argues that living a life of poverty can help satisfy another basic need: 
namely, a need to overcome challenge and adversity.  According to James, we all need some 
basic tension in our life, some degree of strenuousness, to add some “color” to it.  James suggests 
that war is an example of something that ordinarily fulfills this need.  Unfortunately, war comes 
with obvious terrible consequences, and James asserts that “what we now need to discover in the 
social realm is the moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak to men as 
universally as war does, and yet will be as compatible with their spiritual selves as war has 
proved itself to be incompatible.”643  “May not voluntarily accepted poverty,” James asks, “be 
‘the strenuous life,’ without the need of crushing weaker peoples?”644  
As I mentioned earlier, James believes that prayer constitutes the very essence of 
religion, insofar as it manifests the religious individual’s belief in a higher power, as well as his 
or her adjustment to this higher power.  According to James, prayer indicates belief on the part of 
the individual praying that there is someone or something there to hear the prayer and, further, 
that the endeavor is not a futile one (i.e. praying will, in fact, bring about change).  Along these 
lines, he suggests the following: 
Religion, in the vital sense in which these lectures study it, must stand or fall by 
the persuasion that effects of some sort genuinely do occur. Through prayer, 
religion insists, things which cannot be realized in any other manner come about: 
energy which but for prayer would be bound is by prayer set free and operates in 
some part, be it objective or subjective, of the world of facts.645 
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To be sure, the efficacy of prayer has been debated for centuries, and James himself has much to 
say regarding the practical effects of prayer.  He suggests that, while prayer certainly proves 
ineffective in some cases, it does yield positive results in other cases, and he specifically 
addresses two cases to support his view: prayer for better weather and prayer for the recovery of 
sick people.  He claims that, in the case of praying for better health, prayer really does effect 
change for the better, while in the case of weather it does not.  Accordingly, he asserts, “as 
regards prayers for the sick, if any medical fact can be considered to stand firm, it is that in 
certain environments prayer may contribute to recovery, and should be encouraged as a 
therapeutic measure;” however, “the case of the weather is different.”646  In his view, a lot 
ultimately rides on the effectiveness of prayer, as indicated by the following: 
If it be not effective; if it be not a give and take relation; if nothing be really 
transacted while it lasts; if the world is in no whit different for its having taken 
place; then prayer, taken in this wide meaning of a sense that something is 
transacting, is of course a feeling of what is illusory, and religion must on the 
whole be classed, not simply as containing elements of delusion -- these 
undoubtedly everywhere exist -- but as being rooted in delusion altogether, just as 
materialists and atheists have always said it was.647 
 
James points out that prayer can be said to effect change in one of two ways: in the 
objective natural world and in the subjective realm of the praying individual’s private 
experience.  Accordingly, he suggests, “it may well prove that the sphere of influence in prayer 
is subjective exclusively, and that what is immediately changed is only the mind of the praying 
person.”648  In view of this, James claims that, if nothing else, prayer certainly does yield 
palpable consequences for the individual who prays.  Hence, “the outward face of nature need 
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not alter, but the expressions of meaning in it alter,”649 and “when we see all things in God, and 
refer all things to him, we read in common matters superior expressions of meaning.”650  
Ultimately, regardless of whether change in the more public and objective sphere of life is 
effected, “existence as a whole appears transfigured”651 to the praying individual.  He 
characterizes the specific ways in which prayer affects the private experience of the praying 
individual, suggesting, for example, that “when one's affections keep in touch with the divinity 
of the world's authorship, fear and egotism fall away,” and that “we meet a new world when we 
meet the old world in the spirit which this kind of prayer infuses.”652  In the end, James suggests, 
the impact prayer has on the subjective experience validates the notion that something is, in fact, 
“transacted” during prayer.  “So long as this operativeness is admitted to be real,” he contends, 
“it makes no essential difference whether its immediate effects be subjective or objective. The 
fundamental religious point is that in prayer, spiritual energy, which otherwise would slumber, 
does become active, and spiritual work of some kind is effected really.”653 
In addition to the benefits associated with religious belief in general, James speaks to a 
benefit exclusive to the once-born religious type.  More specifically, the minimization of evil, 
which is a defining feature of the once-born type, feeds a natural desire that James claims is 
latent in all of us.  This is evident in the following passage, which I first alluded to in Chapter 2: 
The systematic cultivation of healthy-mindedness as a religious attitude is 
therefore consonant with important currents in human nature, and is anything but 
absurd. In fact, we all do cultivate it more or less...We divert our attention from 
disease and death as much as we can; and the slaughter-houses and indecencies 
without end on which our life is founded are huddled out of sight and never 
mentioned, so that the world we recognize officially in literature and in society is 
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a poetic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and better than the world that really 
is.654 
 
While James clearly suggests that the once-born types offer a less genuine kind of experience, he 
still readily acknowledges the usefulness of marginalizing one’s sense of evil.  By contrast, “if 
we admit that evil is an essential part of our being and the key to the interpretation of our life, we 
load ourselves down with a difficulty that has always proved burdensome in philosophies of 
religion.”655, 656  Indeed, the utility of this marginalization of evil explains the spread and 
longevity of the once-born type.  Accordingly, James observes that “the adequacy of their 
message to the mental needs of a large fraction of mankind is what gave force to those earlier 
gospels. Exactly the same adequacy holds in the case of the mind-cure message, foolish as it may 
sound upon its surface.”657  Ultimately, since it is, by its very nature, positive and uplifting, 
James claims that “no one can fail of the regenerative influence of optimistic thinking, 
pertinaciously pursued.”658 
Clearly, James believes there is much to be said in religion’s favor when it comes to an 
analysis of its utility.  However, he also addresses religion’s disadvantages, too.  For the most 
part, James roots these disadvantages in extravagance.  He acknowledges that all the 
consequences associated with saintliness can be carried to excess, suggesting that “we find that 
error by excess is exemplified by every saintly virtue.”659  Hence, “the fruits of religion, in other 
words, are, like all human products, liable to corruption by excess.”660  As always, James offers a 
number of examples for each kind of religious excess.  For instance, a religious individual may 
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become so consumed by his or her desire for a life of purity that he or she completely withdraws 
from ordinary daily life altogether, “one form of contact with the outer life being dropped after 
another, to save the purity of inner tone.”661  “When the craving for moral consistency and purity 
is developed to this degree,” James explains, “the subject may well find the outer world too full 
of shocks to dwell in, and can unify his life and keep his soul unspotted only by withdrawing 
from it.”662  Similarly, extreme asceticism proves problematic, as the individual indulging in it 
can engage in self-torture and other unhealthy forms of self-denial.  Likewise, “fanaticism” 
denotes excessive devotion, a kind of “loyalty carried to a convulsive extreme.”663  
Unfortunately, a “consequence of this condition of mind is jealousy for the deity's honor” and 
“the slightest affront or neglect must be resented, the deity's enemies must be put to shame.”664  
Ultimately, “crusades have been preached and massacres instigated for no other reason than to 
remove a fancied slight upon the God.”665  Finally, James explores the effects of excessive 
religious tenderness and charity, which is reflected by injunctions such as “resist not evil” and 
“love your enemies” from the Sermon on the Mount.  Once again, James is quick to note that 
such advice would seem to be at odds with our natural impulses, and, in an effort to gauge the 
effects of excessive religious charity, James makes a distinction between the world as it actually 
is and an ideal world.  While “saintly conduct would be the most perfect conduct conceivable in 
an environment where all were saints already [i.e. in an ideal world]…in an environment where 
few are saints, and many the exact reverse of saints, it must be ill adapted.”666  Thus, James 
concludes, “in the world that actually is, the virtues of sympathy, charity, and non-resistance may 
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be, and often have been, manifested in excess.”667  Hence, the primary concern in cases of excess 
religious charity is that the saint can be taken advantage of in the world as it actually is.   As 
James suggests, “the saint may simply give the universe into the hands of the enemy by his 
trustfulness. He may by non-resistance cut off his own survival.”668  Yet, even in his statement of 
its disadvantages, James remains sympathetic to religion, as is evidenced in the case of excessive 
charity.  After all, even in excess, he suggests that there is an admirable quality to saintly 
tenderness, as it can still be “a genuinely creative social force…The saints are authors, auctores, 
increasers, of goodness.”669  Hence, James reckons, “the saint may waste his tenderness and be 
the dupe and victim of his charitable fever, but the general function of his charity in social 
evolution is vital and essential.”670 
Interestingly, James argues that religious excess is correlated with lower intelligence.  On 
this point, he suggests, “what gives the impression of extravagance proves usually on 
examination to be a relative deficiency of intellect. Spiritual excitement takes pathological forms 
whenever other interests are too few and the intellect too narrow.”671  In much the same way, he 
asserts that one’s conception of God plays a factor in religious excess.  Accordingly, a god most 
closely identified with honor and justice yields a greater likelihood of excess than a god more 
associated with love and humility.  In this vein, James observes: “Fanaticism must then be 
inscribed on the wrong side of religion's account, so long as the religious person's intellect is on 
the stage which the despotic kind of God satisfies. But as soon as the God is represented as less 
intent on his own honor and glory, it ceases to be a danger.”672  According to James, we have 
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seen a general historical refinement of the concept of god, thanks to which crass and problematic 
attributes of God naturally become less popular over time.  For instance, once a staple of 
religious deities, the notion of a God who assigns eternal punishments and rewards and who 
provides salvation to some but not to others has grown less popular over time.  As James 
suggests, “any God who, on the one hand, can care to keep a pedantically minute account of 
individual shortcomings, and on the other can feel such partialities, and load particular creatures 
with such insipid marks of favor, is too small-minded a God for our credence.”673  The upshot is 
that, in instances of religious excess, inferior intellects immune to this general trend of religious 
refinement continue to endorse older visions of god, in which case they often fail to produce the 
usual fruits of religious belief outlined earlier.  In fact, James claims, “we feel that saintliness of 
character may yield almost absolutely worthless fruits if it be associated with such inferior 
intellectual sympathies.”674 
Once again, James seems to fear that the more problematic elements of religious belief 
associated with its less intelligent forms will cloud the judgment of one seeking to gauge 
religion’s overall utility and unduly affect any subsequent assessment of it as a result.  Just as he 
makes it clear that we ought to divorce the ills associated with institutional elements of religion 
from religion proper, he urges us to do the same with respect to less intelligent forms of religious 
belief.  Accordingly, he suggests, “we must not confound the essentials of saintliness, which are 
those general passions of which I have spoken, with its accidents, which are the special 
determinations of these passions at any historical moment.”675  While I think James is justified in 
distinguishing the essential byproducts of religion from those that are more “accidental,” I think 
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it would be a mistake to eliminate the latter from our survey of religion’s utility altogether, for 
these accidents still arise as a result of religion and would not have emerged otherwise.  
Accidental or not, these less magnanimous forms of belief still manifest bona fide effects of 
religion.  So long as less intelligent people continue to populate the Earth and espouse religious 
views, we shall have to deal with such unwanted consequences. 
In a similar fashion, James reflects on the relationship between religion and pathology 
and expresses concern that religion may be discounted due to the relationship between them.  He 
certainly believes that they can coincide, suggesting early on in Varieties that, “as a matter of 
fact a religious life, exclusively pursued, does tend to make the person exceptional and 
eccentric.”676  Further, he adds, “religious geniuses have often shown symptoms of nervous 
instability” and they are “creatures of exalted emotional sensibility.”677  For this reason, he is 
worried some might dismiss religion on account of the fact that it can often stem from 
pathological origins, which is why he makes it a point to distinguish between the existential facts 
associated with religion and its spiritual value (see Part I).  Religion may, at times, be rooted in 
pathology, but James does not think that this gives us license to do away with it.  “Judge the 
religious life by its results exclusively,” he writes, "and I shall assume that the bugaboo of 
morbid origin will scandalize your piety no more.”678  Hence, on his account, that religion and 
pathology may cross paths is no mark against religion.  What’s more, James implies that there is 
likely a greater sense of significance associated with an individual’s experience when they do 
cross paths, and he claims that religious experience rooted in pathology makes it more likely that 
an individual “will make his mark and affect his age, than if his temperament were less 
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neurotic.”679  However, he does clearly maintain that there is a point at which the pathological 
ceases to be religious. Consider, for instance, extreme melancholy, which is a form of pathology 
thanks to which the person afflicted by it cannot see any good in existence.  As I indicated in 
Section B of Part II, James is careful to distinguish extreme melancholics from the twice-born 
religious type, whom they tend to closely resemble; he does this by asserting that the religious 
are unequivocally optimistic in the long run and are always able to appreciate the good in life, 
though this might take some time in the case of the twice-born type. 
 
B. James’s Case for the Utility of Supernatural Religion 
Speaking of the twice-born type of religious experience, James believes it offers a benefit 
not found in cases of the once-born type of religious experience.  Namely, it offers hope, by way 
of its supernatural goods, to those who are greatly troubled by evil and who would otherwise 
have no hope.  In Section B of Part II, I pointed out that James suggests that the once-born type 
is disingenuous insofar as it fails to adequately acknowledge the reality of evil.  I think Proudfoot 
is right when he suggests that “this reminder of the reality of suffering is an important theme that 
runs through James’s writings on morality and religion.”680  This emphasis is indeed evident in 
many of James’s reflections throughout Varieties.  Pain and suffering are inevitable, and death 
threatens us in our every waking moment.  Evil is everywhere, and it’s ultimately inescapable, 
despite any concerted efforts to convince ourselves otherwise.  These are typical points of 
emphasis one comes across when examining Varieties.  As a result, James speaks as if there is 
reason to fear that, at any given time, the once-born type may, themselves, sense the hollow 
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nature of their own belief, which fails to adequately acknowledge the reality of evil, thanks to 
which “the healthy-minded consciousness is left with an irremediable sense of 
precariousness.”681  In some cases, the once-born mentality may prove successful, but its efficacy 
is never guaranteed, even in these successful cases—tragedy or serious reflection can undermine 
it at any time.  “Within the sphere of its successful operation there is nothing to be said against it 
as a religious solution,” James suggests, “but it breaks down impotently as soon as melancholy 
comes.”682  Consider, also, that the reality of evil can become so overwhelming for some that it 
spoils the prospects of even fleeting moments of happiness.  On this point, James observes, 
“make the human being's sensitiveness a little greater, carry him a little farther over the misery-
threshold, and the good quality of the successful moments themselves when they occur is spoiled 
and vitiated.”683  Therefore, for many—and perhaps even most—individuals, a much stronger 
remedy is in order than the once-born type, working within the confines of this natural, earthly 
life, is able to provide; as James suggests, “our troubles lie indeed too deep for that cure.”684  The 
supernatural re-birth of the twice-born type offers hope in the form of supernatural promises: one 
need not despair over the inevitable loss of all natural goods any longer if even better goods 
await in a world or existence beyond this one.  In the end, even supposing that the mentality of 
the once-born type does work for some, there are others who cannot so easily deal with the 
reality of evil, and the bottom line is that there are many people for whom the mentality of the 
once-born type simply will not suffice.  For such people, religion of the twice-born type offers 
the only form of hope available to them—without it, they simply could not deal with the reality 
of evil. 
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James’s more favorable impression of the twice-born type is rooted in his own skepticism 
regarding the prospects of a purely-natural worldview, and, if it weren’t for the inadequacy of 
natural goods to elicit a reliable and authentic kind of happiness, the twice-born type would cease 
to appear so advantageous.  According to James, no matter what joys we may be fortunate 
enough to experience during our natural lives, almost all of us are ultimately destined to feel a 
sense of failure and general unease.  “Take the happiest man,” he says, “the one most envied by 
the world, and in nine cases out of ten his inmost consciousness is one of failure.”685  
Furthermore, on James’s account, death lurks behind our every experience, and it is thought to be 
necessarily at tension with any profit we gain from our natural lives.  Unfortunately, as he puts it, 
“everything is the great spectre of universal death, the all-encompassing blackness.”686  
Additionally, the better your life is, the more bittersweet the situation becomes—the more, in a 
way, you stand to lose.  On this point, he claims, “the merrier the skating, the warmer and more 
sparkling the sun by day, and the ruddier the bonfires at night, the more poignant the sadness 
with which one must take in the meaning of the total situation.”687  For James, such 
considerations necessarily spawn a sort of sadness, an existential melancholy, and he thinks that, 
if we are being honest with ourselves about our situation here on Earth, we cannot help but feel 
pangs of sadness knowing that everything will inevitably be taken away.  The upshot is that, at 
least for the reflecting person, James does not seem to believe it is possible to be genuinely 
happy without the prospects of some good lying beyond the natural world, which is why he 
thinks that the once-born type manifests a kind of shortcoming.  Accordingly, he avows 
                                                             
685 James, Varieties, 127. 
686 James, Varieties, 128. 
687 James, Varieties, 130. 
186 
 
“healthy-mindedness pure and simple, with its sentimental optimism, can hardly be regarded by 
any thinking man as a serious solution.”688 
In this vein, he discusses the historical failures of the once-born type.  He considers the 
ancient Greeks, who are often associated with naturalistic optimism, and suggests that they 
ultimately succumb to pessimism and sadness upon due reflection.  Hence, although “the early 
Greeks are continually held up to us in literary works as models of the healthy-minded 
joyousness which the religion of nature may engender,” we see that “even in Homer the 
reflective passages are cheerless, and the moment the Greeks grew systematically pensive and 
thought of ultimates, they became unmitigated pessimists.”689, 690  For James, then, serious and 
candid consideration of the reality of our natural life on Earth necessarily engenders a kind of 
skepticism regarding the prospects of a purely-natural worldview.  Confined to the natural goods 
of this earthly world, James argues purely naturalistic outlooks can only end in sadness.  “Old 
age,” he suggests, “has the last word: the purely naturalistic look at life, however enthusiastically 
it may begin, is sure to end in sadness.”691  In fact, “this sadness lies at the heart of every merely 
positivistic, agnostic, or naturalistic scheme of philosophy.”692  Thus, at least with respect to the 
prospects of a purely-natural kind of happiness, James must be deemed a skeptic. 
While I grant that the mentality of the once-born type may prove insufficient for some, I 
must say that I think James is too dismissive of the once-born type.  Is it really impossible, as 
James seems to suggest, to acknowledge the pains associated with earthly life (e.g. our 
unavoidable death), and yet still find genuine happiness within the confines of this life, 
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embracing a purely-natural view of existence?  I am inclined to think not.  I think it is possible 
for the once-born type to have a kind of genuine appreciation for all that our existence entails, 
including the evil that the twice-born type are said to accentuate, and to nonetheless resolutely 
choose to ignore and minimize this evil as much as possible.  Why must death be thought of as 
eliciting a kind of necessary tension with our earthly lives, as James thinks it must?693  Perhaps, 
instead, it actually amplifies the meaning and significance of our natural lives.  One could 
reasonably argue that the prospects of an unavoidable death enhance the sense of import we 
associate with the life we are fortunate enough to live during our finite existence.  After all, don’t 
we gain a greater appreciation of life after we reflect on death?  Moreover, our finite existence 
likely impels more immediate and invested action, ripe with a greater sense of urgency.  On the 
other hand, the alternative, immortality, could arguably spawn apathy and general malaise.694  
Why worry about anything now when the rest of eternity awaits us?  
Moreover, while it seems unfortunate that death brings an end to our earthly goods, there 
is something to be said for the possibility of goods associated with death.  Indeed, it very well 
might be the case that death brings about its own kind of goods.  At the very least, death will 
bring an end to earthly pain and suffering, which the twice-born type is so apt to dwell on.  
Recall my extended discussion of the possible goods associated with death in Section C of Part 
III in Chapter 1.  Among other things, I pointed out how Mill suggests that immortality, and not 
a finite existence, might actually be the more dreadful of the two alternatives.  Should death 
bring this kind of good, and if, as Socrates claims, we have no reason to fear it, then it does not, 
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in fact, seem that rational reflection on our inevitable demise need elicit the kind of despair 
James associates with it.  All of this goes to show that James’s suggestion that due reflection on 
death, and the termination of our earthly goods that it signals, necessarily yields existential 
despair and dissatisfaction with purely-natural worldviews is a bit suspect.  It seems quite 
possible to reflect extensively on existence and yet consistently embrace the healthy-mindedness 
endorsed by the once-born type.  Hence, contrary to James, I do not believe that serious 
reflection regarding life on Earth necessarily generates dissatisfaction with a purely-natural 
worldview. 
I think it is interesting that James characterizes Nietzsche, who obviously holds a much 
more favorable view of purely-natural worldviews, as pessimistic, when Nietzsche explicitly 
advocates the merits of life-affirmation and despises the kind of down-trodden mentality James 
attaches to him.  James describes the mood of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as “peevishness 
running away with the bit between its teeth,” and he suggests that “the sallies of the two German 
authors remind one, half the time, of the sick shriekings of two dying rats.”695  Nietzsche 
certainly could be deemed pessimistic insofar as he accentuates the shortcomings of most human 
beings (i.e. his contention that most do not acknowledge reality as it actually is because they 
cannot cope with it) and is excessively critical of them for these shortcomings, but he clearly is 
not pessimistic with respect to his attitude toward our natural life on Earth.  Moreover, in a 
certain and carefully-qualified sense, James ought to be considered more pessimistic than 
Nietzsche, given what he says in Varieties.  Specifically, he is more pessimistic about the 
prospects of thoroughgoing naturalism.696 
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I must say that I find the relationship between Nietzsche and James fascinating, as there 
are many significant similarities in terms of their values and the conceptualizations underlying 
their analyses of religion, and yet they reach starkly different conclusions regarding its utility.  
For example, both emphasize psychological health throughout their examinations of religion, and 
both emphasize the relationship between religion and health in general.  As has been evident 
throughout this chapter, James, like Nietzsche, frequently alludes to the relationship between 
religion and the pain and suffering associated with human existence.  As Reinhold Niebuhr 
suggests, “James surveys the effect of religious faith upon the health and wholesomeness of the 
individual, upon the capacity or incapacity to withstand the strains of life.”697  To be sure, both 
emphasize the relationship between religion and health, but Nietzsche and James offer very 
different opinions regarding the impact of religion on health.  While Nietzsche suggests that 
religions like Christianity only engender misery by dwelling on pain and suffering (see Part IV 
of Chapter 2), James claims that they have quite the opposite effect, instead transfiguring such 
misery into optimism.  In fact, as we have seen, James believes religion sometimes offers the 
only solution for those who would otherwise be bogged down by such pain and suffering.  In 
sum, James suggests that endowing individuals with the ability to take on the strains of life is one 
of the chief virtues of religion, while Nietzsche gives his readers the impression that religion 
engenders weak and “diseased” individuals who cannot—and do not—accept the realities of 
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their earthly lives, including the dangers and the suffering implicit in them.  Although they each 
value the same things, namely, positive and life-affirming attitudes, effects, and individuals, 
James and Nietzsche completely disagree about whether religion can bring them about.   
Ultimately, James asserts that religion is fundamentally and essentially positive and 
regenerative in nature.  On James’s account, if an individual does not possess the easy optimism 
of the once-born type or overcome a kind of existential crisis (which is, itself, a kind of 
optimistic outcome), he or she cannot properly be called religious in the first place.  Similarly, as 
we have seen, one who continues to labor in extreme melancholy and pessimism cannot properly 
be called religious.  Instead, religious experience, in both its once-born and twice-born forms, 
signals a positive and uplifting movement within the soul (in the case of twice-born religious 
individuals, a longer gestation period may be required, but the relief comes nonetheless).  For 
James, conversion, by definition, signals a positive transformation of the soul, thanks to which 
internal discord is eliminated.  Hence, religion engenders psychological health, insofar as it helps 
individuals conquer the reality of pain and suffering and helps them rid themselves of any mental 
dis-ease arising from this reality. 
This characterization of religion is clearly at odds with Nietzsche’s, as Nietzsche suggests 
that religion is, instead, nihilistic (i.e. it negates life and is pessimistic) and unhealthy.  Indeed, 
Nietzsche would likely classify most religious individuals as pessimistic and unhealthy, since he 
thinks that the supernatural illusions and other forms of idealism religious individuals espouse 
are inherently unhealthy psychological practices that betray a deep-seated pessimism regarding 
life.  Recall that, on Nietzsche’s account, rather than instill optimism in the course of life, the 
religious instead say “no” to it, and he believes that the resentment laden (presumably 
unbeknownst to them) in their other-worldly (or “unseen,” as James would say) ideals and other 
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nihilistic tendencies substantiates their pessimistic undertones and psychological dis-ease.  
Therefore, rather than offer relief for mental dis-ease, Nietzsche suggests that religion constitutes 
a kind of mental disease. 
This divergence in opinion regarding the utility of religion is also evidenced in their 
contradictory evaluations of religious faith.  As I discussed in Part IV of Chapter 2, Nietzsche 
argues that religious faith is a sign of weakness and dis-ease, but James often speaks of the 
merits of faith; not only that, he does so in a manner that bears a strange resemblance to 
Nietzsche’s own locution.  Accordingly, he describes religious faith as “a force that re-infuses 
the positive willingness to live, even in full presence of the evil perceptions that erewhile made 
life seem unbearable.”698  In this vein, Niebuhr points out that “James glories in the affirmative 
attitude of Luther’s ‘Commentary on Galatians’ because the sense of forgiveness and release 
from the burden of guilt is essentially affirmative and healthy-minded.”699  Once again, we see 
that James suggests that religion is optimistic and life-affirming.  While the twice-born may have 
originally been saddled with pessimism and the power of evil, and though they may never 
completely lose sight of that evil, their second birth still ultimately signals a more optimistic 
outlook and an increase in the degree to which they are healthy-minded.  Hence, given James’s 
conception of religion, its significant utility for the individual is, in an important respect, a 
defining characteristic.   
Indeed, James suggests that as soon as a particular form of religion ceases to be useful, 
and to generate the positive, uplifting features he associates with it, it is abandoned and replaced 
by one that is more valuable.  Accordingly, he claims, through a discussion of the evolution of 
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the deities believed in, that there is a kind of natural selection at play when it comes to which of 
these deities, as well as religions more generally, die off and which become more permanent 
fixtures in the history of humankind.  The upshot is that, on his account, this natural selection is 
essentially an account of utility.  Thus, James suggests that the gods worshipped by various 
peoples throughout history are chosen because of “the value of the fruits…[they] seemed to them 
to yield.  So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless…the deity grew discredited.”700  
Hence, on his account, there is a kind of built-in testament to the utility of any extant religion.  
“The gods we stand by,” James continues, “are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose 
demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one another.”701  Once 
again, this goes to show that James views religion as inherently useful, and one finds this to be a 
recurring theme in Varieties. 
Interestingly, James’s twice-born type seems akin to Nietzsche’s “slave” and his once-
born type seems similar to Nietzsche’s “master.”  Like Nietzsche’s master, James’s once-born 
type does not venture beyond the bounds of natural, earthly life, and both are thought to espouse 
optimism without doing so.  Similarly, James’s twice-born type, like Nietzsche’s slave, dwells 
on the pain and suffering implicit in earthly life, and must venture beyond the natural world to 
find happiness.  Ironically, just as James lauds the twice-born type for acknowledging an aspect 
of reality the once-born type does not (i.e. evil), Nietzsche speaks highly of masters for doing the 
very same thing.  Recall that Nietzsche roots the slave’s self-deception in his or her 
preoccupation with the pain and suffering (i.e. the evil) of earthly life.  This is precisely what 
James thinks indicates a heightened sense of awareness in the twice-born type!  On Nietzsche’s 
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account, the slave is consequently compelled to seek a supernatural remedy because he or she is 
unable to cope with earthly life as it actually is, and it is this supernatural move that reflects the 
slave’s deception and inadequate view of reality.  For James, on the other hand, this process of 
moving beyond the natural world, which we find in his twice-born type and Nietzsche’s slave, 
actually reflects a greater awareness of reality that is found wanting in his once-born type and 
Nietzsche’s master.  According to James, the once-born type and Nietzsche’s master may be able 
to confine themselves to a purely naturalistic outlook on life, but, in doing so, they implicitly 
deceive themselves about the reality of evil.  As we’ve seen, on his account, due reflection on 
reality renders such a purely-natural outlook insufficient and unwanted. 
One thing that I think likely contributes significantly to their divergent views regarding 
the effects of religion on health is that they are working with completely different conceptions of 
“religion.”  As a result, while ostensibly they may appear to be discussing the fruits of the same 
phenomenon, they are actually, as they say, “comparing apples and oranges.”   I say this because 
Nietzsche clearly has the world’s most popular supernatural religions, especially, as we have 
seen, Christianity, chiefly—if not solely—in mind when advancing his criticisms, while James 
works with a much broader conception of religion (as I detailed in Section A of Part II).  If he 
were to employ James’s notion of religion, Nietzsche would view it more favorably, since it 
would arguably include his own naturalistic, life-affirming reaction to life, as well as similar 
manifestations of the master mentality he would not ordinarily associate with religion.  Indeed, I 
would argue that Nietzsche’s idealization of earthly life more closely resembles James’s once-
born type than James admits.  As I have suggested, I do not think Nietzsche is properly labeled a 
pessimist in a way that would exclude him from the kind of optimism associated with James’s 
once-born type, contrary to what James claims.  In my view, Nietzsche holds life-affirmation up 
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as a kind of higher ideal in a way that is on a par with many of the examples of the once-born 
type that James offers. 
Similarly, I think that one’s estimation of religion’s optimism will hang on what he or she 
associates with the term.  If one means what Nietzsche seems to have meant, namely, being able 
to embrace his thoroughgoing naturalism (which signals his idea of authentic “life affirmation”), 
then it’s easy to agree with him and say that religion is not so optimistic, since it tends to move 
beyond the bounds of his naturalism into the realm of the unseen.  If, however, one means 
something more along the lines of what James seems to have meant by the concept, where it 
reflects being able to find peace within one’s existence and to avoid existential despair, then it’s 
easy to see why James describes religion as optimistic.  I think that their view of health, in turn, 
hinges on their divergent views of what signals an optimistic or positive character.  For 
Nietzsche, the healthy individual is one who bravely tackles life without recourse to supernatural 
notions, while, for James, the healthy individual is simply one who is able to avoid internal 
discord and existential crisis.  In view of this significant difference in their denotation of such 
key concepts, it should come as no surprise that Nietzsche and James seem to arrive at such 
different conclusions regarding the value of religion. 
I take issue with James’s general conception of religion, insofar as he defines it in a 
manner that renders it necessarily optimistic (much like I took issue with Nietzsche for rendering 
religion in such a universally-negative light).  I think he is right to suggest that religious 
experience tends to be uplifting and positive, but I’m not so sure this holds true in all cases.  
Surely there are individuals we would be inclined to call “religious” who are not as content and 
optimistic about life as James implies they must be in order to be deemed religious.  Take, for 
example, someone who believes wholeheartedly in the prospects of heaven, but who deplores the 
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daily toils associated with earthly life.  Surely there are individuals for whom God is at the center 
of their affairs and yet earthly existence is still seen as a kind of ever-present ill that must be 
dealt with.  Such an individual wants nothing more than to get on with what really matters: the 
good life that awaits him or her in heaven.  In the meantime, he or she reluctantly puts up with 
the plights of his or her natural existence, wanting nothing more than for this worldly existence 
to be over.  To be sure, this is not a pretty picture and it seems a bit dubious to call such a life a 
life of optimism, but should we refrain from calling such an individual religious solely on 
account of the fact?  If the individual continues to be bogged down by the pain and suffering 
implicit in earthly life, James clearly is reluctant to call them religious, given his essentially-
positive rendition of religion.  Yet, it seems to me that, insofar as the individual still goes to 
church, says his or her prayers daily, and puts God before all else in his or her life, the majority 
of us would still think of such an individual as religious.  In a fair assessment of religion, I think 
we ought to include those who are not ultimately so optimistic when they otherwise seem to us to 
be religious, and, for this reason, I worry about James’s basic conception of religion.  Indeed, I 
wonder just how many of the individuals we are naturally inclined to call “religious” are as 
hopeful and optimistic as James suggests they must be. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, I believe that James offers a very illuminating analysis of the utility of individual 
religion, and, despite some of the problems I’ve alluded to throughout this chapter, I think he 
offers an invaluable contribution to the study of religion’s utility.  By and large, he makes a good 
case for several of the benefits he associates with religion.  Nevertheless, in the preceding 
analysis, I have alluded to several problems with his account of religion’s utility.  I have argued, 
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for example, that a proper analysis of religion’s utility must remain open to the less desirable 
elements of religion that James himself purposefully ignores or downplays.  Hence, the 
institutional components of religion, which I have suggested pervade most religious experience 
and have palpable consequences (which James does not deny), must not be ignored.  I have also 
voiced concerns about the feasibility of James’s distinction between individual and institutional 
religion.  His notion of “individual religion” requires the existence of “pattern-setters,” but I 
suggested that there is good reason to wonder whether such pattern-setters actually exist.  
Furthermore, less intelligent forms of individual religion, which spawn more detrimental 
consequences thanks to their excesses, should not be minimized, which James seems inclined to 
do.  Similarly, I have expressed concerns regarding his exclusively-optimistic interpretation of 
religion—in point of fact, some who we would naturally call religious do not seem so optimistic 
(granted many do).  Additionally, I have mentioned my concerns regarding his broad conception 
of religion throughout the chapter, which echoes much of what I said regarding Mill’s similar 
conception in Chapter 1. 
Finally, I have contended that James is too dismissive of the prospects of pure naturalism.  
This is probably what I find most problematic regarding James’s analysis.  I am not convinced 
that the kind of existential relief he says can only be found by way of religion (especially the 
twice-born type) cannot, in fact, be found elsewhere.  Clearly, to say that religion engenders 
happiness is one thing and to say that it yields a higher kind of happiness that can be found 
nowhere else is quite another.  The latter is a much stronger claim, and, subsequently, it is much 
tougher to defend than the former claim.  In my view, while James is careful in trying to 
distinguish a certain pitch of optimism belonging solely to religion, separating it from morality 
and naturalism, he does not adequately demonstrate that the religious are, in fact, capable of a 
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unique or higher kind of happiness.  I think he is right when he suggests that religion can 
engender greater happiness than morality, but I do not think he makes a good case against 
naturalism.  James is clearly skeptical of the prospects of pure naturalism when it comes to 
making people happy and satisfying their self-reflective nature, but, contrary to what he suggests, 
I do believe naturalism can work for some and that it is not destined to sadness and despair.  Nor 
is it shallow, as James contends, and I believe it can—and does—suffice for some, proving 
capable of generating a kind of happiness rivaling the relief he associates with supernatural 
religion.  Hence, in much the same way Nietzsche undervalues twice-born religious experience, 
James undervalues once-born religious experience.  As we saw in Section B of Part III in 
Chapter 1, Mill certainly has his doubts about James’s position, too.702  He claims, for example, 
that, “history, so far as we know it, bears out the opinion, that mankind can perfectly well do 
without the belief in a heaven.”703  While James contends that the Greeks “knew no joys 
comparable in quality of preciousness to those which we shall erelong see that Brahmans, 
Buddhists, Christians, Mohammedans, twice-born people whose religion is non-naturalistic, get 
from their several creeds of mysticism and renunciation,”704 Mill counters that “we neither find 
that the Greeks enjoyed life less, nor feared death more, than other people.”705  On this point, I 
ultimately agree with Mill.  As I suggested, if it turns out that the supernatural goods religion 
promises are not necessary for the kind of optimism and existential relief James suggests religion 
solely engenders, then the case for religion’s utility surely loses some of its force. 
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However, I believe James does an admirable job of demonstrating how religion does 
yield significant existential relief to some who would otherwise remain hopeless in the face of 
evil.  Indeed, Varieties is, in a sense, one long testament to this particular fruit of religion.  James 
believes, as do I, that Nietzsche’s naturalism will prove insufficient and generally unsatisfactory 
for many—perhaps even most—people.  As I argued in Chapter 2, I think that Nietzsche fails to 
properly estimate the value of twice-born religious experience (i.e. the supernatural religions 
associated with his slave), insofar as he categorically condemns it and, thus, fails to appreciate 
that, as his own philosophy suggests, some require such experience in order to be healthy.  
Without it, some would be unable to cope with the pain and suffering inherent in earthly life, just 
as he himself suggests.  This is a point that James clearly recognizes, as I hope to have shown 
throughout this chapter, and, as a result, he offers a much more sympathetic perspective of 
religion than Nietzsche does in this regard, which I think is warranted.  Religion may not 
produce a unique kind of happiness, as James contends it does, but it surely can engender 
happiness; and, for some individuals, it may prove to be a requirement for happiness.  If nothing 
else, Varieties offers a thorough defense of these points, and religion ought to be credited 
accordingly as a result.  I now turn to the Conclusion of this dissertation, where I form some 
conclusions regarding the utility of religion that I think are warranted based on the foregoing 
textual analyses. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, Mill, Nietzsche, and James have much to say about the utility of 
religion, and attempting to formulate conclusions based on their extensive—and often 
conflicting—reflections is not a very straightforward task.  Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of 
the undertaking, I am convinced that some conclusions regarding the utility of religion can be 
defended.  In the following, I briefly summarize my primary observations from each chapter and 
establish what I think we may generally conclude from these observations.  I end by articulating 
the need for a more sustained study of the utility of religion, à la James’s call for a “science of 
religion,” and by offering suggestions regarding how to best facilitate this study in the future. 
Let me begin by saying that I think James makes a good point in suggesting that we 
ought to try to develop a “science of religion” in an effort to analyze religion in a more useful 
way.  I agree with much of his criticism of the philosophy of religion and his conclusion that it is 
generally unable to adequately assess the value of religion.  As Proudfoot suggests, “a ‘science 
of religions’ can tell us which faiths have worked best, in a way that no rationalist analysis can.  
In Varieties James proposes that philosophy of religion be replaced by such a science of 
religions, and he hopes that the book will make a contribution to it.”706  Moreover, I think the 
impetus for much of the animosity toward religion is likely the dubious philosophical and 
dogmatic intellectual arguments offered on its behalf, which James focuses on and, in my 
opinion, rightly derides in his lecture on philosophy.707  In my judgment, some are so put off by 
the lack of a sound intellectual basis for such religious belief (which is further compounded by 
                                                             
706 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Introduction and Notes by Wayne Proudfoot (New York: 
Barnes & Noble Classics, 2004), xvii. 
707 I.e. Lecture XVIII in Varieties. 
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the insistence on the part of some theologians and philosophers that there is one) that they fail to 
recognize that it might nevertheless prove useful despite any intellectual shortcomings.  Thus, I 
certainly appreciate James’s desire to emphasize the effects of religion on our everyday lives, as 
his science of religion is intended to do, rather than to toil in the intellectual discussions 
comprising the philosophy of religion. 
In Chapter 1, we saw how Mill distinguishes between religion’s social utility and its 
individual utility.  I think this is a useful distinction with which to start an analysis of the utility 
of religion, as it reflects what are arguably the two most common claims offered in support of 
religion’s usefulness: 1) religion is morally useful and 2) religion makes individuals happy.  
Interestingly, we saw how differently Mill viewed the utility of religion from the perspective of 
society as opposed to the perspective of individuals.  As I suggested, I believe Mill makes a very 
strong case against the thesis that religion is morally useful.  I agree with his assertion that 
religion often receives credit for teaching and enforcing morality when, in fact, deeper 
underlying forces are likely responsible for these effects, and I think he makes a strong case for 
why religion can even be morally problematic.  Additionally, I discussed research on the 
relationship between religion and morality which, at best, fails to substantiate any positive 
correlation between religion and morality.  I do not mean to suggest that religion is altogether 
incapable of inspiring moral behavior, but I do believe, as Mill argued, that most people probably 
vastly overstate the moral utility of religion.  In my view, Mill is justified in trying to divorce 
religion from the good moral consequences so often associated with it, and I believe he is 
generally successful in his attempt to undermine arguments in favor of religion’s social utility.  
However, we also saw how Mill was not so inclined to dismiss arguments in favor of the 
individual utility of religion.  Indeed, he conceded that religion produces existential relief for 
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individuals (i.e. religion makes some individuals happy), but he questioned whether supernatural 
religion is necessary and/or optimal for this kind of relief.  In turn, he suggested that supernatural 
religion is neither necessary nor optimal for such relief, and, in the process, he elaborated on 
other viable alternatives, such as patriotism and his own Religion of Humanity.  While I think 
that his alternatives might prove to be generally effective, I expressed concerns about their 
adequacy in all cases.  That is, I granted that Mill’s alternatives can suffice for some, but I 
suggested that there might be others for whom a supernatural remedy is still required.  
Ultimately, I concluded Chapter 1 by agreeing with Mill that the case for religion’s social utility 
is unconvincing, and, in subsequent chapters, I turned to a more detailed analysis of the case for 
its individual utility, which seemed much more promising. 
In Chapter 2, I presented Nietzsche’s case against religion’s individual utility.  On his 
account, religion is problematic for individuals because it entails self-deception and is unhealthy.  
Nietzsche, a thoroughgoing naturalist, decries religion on the basis of its anti-natural and 
supernatural tendencies, which appeal to something beyond the natural world and, thus, entail 
deception.  In lieu of religious values, which he believes propagate weakness and disease, 
Nietzsche maintains that individuals ought to instead uphold more natural and life-affirming 
values, which are said to spawn a more vigorous and healthy mentality.  While I agreed that 
religion is commonly associated with deception, I expressed my doubts regarding Nietzsche’s 
contention that it is implicitly unhealthy.  I cited, among other things, his own reflections on the 
slave mentality, which seem to suggest that supernatural religion is a natural consequence of the 
human condition.   In other words, some—and perhaps many—may require supernatural religion 
in order to cope with earthly life, in which case it would seem to be a necessary component in 
their prescription for a healthy life.  Thus, I concluded Chapter 2 by arguing that Nietzsche’s 
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conception of health is inadequate and that, as a result, his categorical misgivings about the 
utility of religion for individuals are unfounded.  Having granted that it may entail deception, I 
remained unconvinced that religion is necessarily unhealthy for individuals, and, in turning to 
Chapter 3, I began to wonder whether the opposite might, in fact, be the case.  Perhaps, as James 
maintains, religion is, instead, necessarily healthy and regenerative. 
In Chapter 3, I presented James’s case for religion’s individual utility, which is 
predicated on his notion that religion is, by definition, a healthy and optimistic phenomenon.  On 
his account, although it is complicated and multifaceted, religion is always essentially positive 
and regenerative, thanks to the process of conversion implicit in it, which reflects the elimination 
of psychological discord within an individual.  James expounds on the many benefits he 
associates with individual religion, and he downplays the harms he links to it.  According to 
James, some people are plagued by an overwhelming fixation on the evils of earthly life that can 
only be alleviated by religion, and others who may not require religion in order to be happy are 
still happier as a result of their religion.  He suggests that the harms associated with religion can 
usually be traced back to the excesses of overindulgent and inferior intellects, and that, as 
humanity continues to become more refined, these excesses will become less prevalent and 
problematic.  Ultimately, I argued that James makes a very good case for religion’s individual 
utility, but I expressed my concerns that he is nevertheless overstating his case against the 
prospects of purely-natural worldviews.  While I agreed that he demonstrated the usefulness of 
supernatural religion for some individuals, I suggested he nevertheless underestimates the 
prospects for happiness without it.  Recall that James submits that a serious and reflective 
individual cannot help but experience sadness when thinking about the evils inherent in earthly 
life, and that long-lasting happiness and existential peace require him or her to appeal to 
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something beyond the natural world.  I suggested that James’s view seems to reflect his own 
unduly skeptical view of purely-natural worldviews, and I argued that, while making 
supernatural appeals might be necessary for existential relief in some cases, it still nevertheless 
seems possible in other cases to secure a similar kind of relief without making such appeals.  
Hence, Nietzsche’s naturalism may not prove to be satisfactory for the majority of people (as I 
argued in Chapter 2 and as James suggests), but I do believe it is, in fact, satisfactory in some 
cases (as I argued in Chapter 3 and contrary to what James suggests).  I also expressed concerns 
about James’s notion that religion is always positive and regenerative in nature, since there seem 
to be individuals that we are inclined to classify as “religious” who do not fit his optimistic 
description. 
In this dissertation, I have aimed to catalogue some of the harms and benefits properly 
ascribed to religion.  I hope to have established that, although religion yields little moral utility 
and even seems to be morally problematic, it proves useful for some individuals insofar as it 
provides significant existential relief.  Now, contrary to what James suggests and in accordance 
with what Mill and Nietzsche assert, I maintain that some people are nevertheless capable of 
experiencing similar existential relief and happiness by purely natural means.  Still, I believe 
James is right to emphasize that there are those who seem to require supernatural religion in 
order to experience such relief.  In this case, supernatural religion is vitally useful for the mental 
wellbeing of these individuals, which I think Mill (to a lesser extent) and Nietzsche (to a greater 
extent) fail to adequately appreciate.  Ultimately, I am not sure that we will ever have an answer 
to the question “why?” (i.e. why is there something and not nothing?).  Until we do, I believe 
that religion will continue to exert a significant positive influence on the lives of some (perhaps 
most) people, which surely merits consideration in an analysis of the utility of religion. 
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However, while there may be, as I have argued, individuals who profit from religion in 
this manner, the harms associated with religion must still be considered.  Specifically, I am 
worried that religion may be morally problematic (as Mill suggested) and I am concerned about 
some of the deception and intellectual difficulties linked to religion, which Mill and Nietzsche 
referred to.  Hence, granting that religion produces positive effects for many individuals, 
potential harms associated with religion must still be factored into an assessment of its overall 
utility, and I believe that weighing these benefits and harms against each other is the primary 
task awaiting those who wish to contribute to James’s science of religion in the future.  If, for 
example, it were established that religion is actually negatively correlated with morality, then 
that consideration would need to be duly weighed against the individual utility of religion. 
With this in mind, consider, for a moment, the “religion-causes-violence” thesis that was 
mentioned many times throughout the dissertation.  Although I am not fully committed to the 
notion that religion is positively correlated with violence, I have expressed concerns that it may 
be.  To be sure, there are those who assert religion does propagate violence; for instance, I have 
referenced Sam Harris, who claims religion is inherently divisive.  While examining the merits 
of Harris’s arguments for this position lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, I do believe his 
initial worry is warranted.  Hence, although I think the relationship between religion and 
violence is anything but clear, I do believe it is worthwhile to investigate the relationship further 
in order try to shed light on the matter, contrary to what William T. Cavanaugh suggests in his 
article “Does Religion Cause Violence: Behind the Common Question Lies a Morass of Unclear 
Thinking.”708  Cavanaugh challenges the notion that religions like “Christianity, Islam, and other 
                                                             
708 William T. Cavanaugh, “Does Religion Cause Violence: Behind the Common Question Lies a Morass of Unclear 
Thinking,” Harvard Divinity School: Harvard Divinity Bulletin, vol. 35, no. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 2007), 
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faiths are more inclined toward violence than ideologies and institutions that are identified as 
‘secular’,”709 and he suggests that the problem with those advancing the religion-causes-violence 
argument is their “inability to find a convincing way to separate religious violence from secular 
violence.”710 
Briefly, Cavanaugh contends that it is difficult—if not impossible—to disentangle 
religion from other social processes and institutions, and he suggests that “religion was not 
considered something separable from such political institutions until the modern era.”711  As a 
result, substantiating that religion, in particular, is the root of violence becomes problematic.  He 
also alludes to the disparate conceptions of religion, which he argues makes it all the more 
difficult to establish a meaningful link between religion and violence.  To be sure, I think much 
of what Cavanaugh says is fair and well-reasoned.  He raises some excellent points that must be 
addressed by anyone advocating the position that religion causes violence.  And, as we have 
seen, religion is indeed a notoriously vague concept, which makes it more difficult for religion-
causes-violence theorists to substantiate their arguments.  Cavanaugh is also right to suggest that 
it is hard to isolate religion from the other social factors with which it seems so intertwined, like 
politics, culture, and education.  Cavanaugh’s concerns are even more global and worrisome than 
they initially seem, as his analysis calls into question the very prospects of analyzing the utility 
of religion at all, since the upshot of his argument is that we cannot clearly distinguish what 
religion even is or adequately separate it from other potential causal factors.  As he puts the 
point: “what does or does not count as religion is based on subjective and indefensible 
assumptions.”712  In this case, Cavanaugh’s concerns also threaten the very foundation of 
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James’s science of religion.  After all, how can we propose to measure the effects of religion on 
our daily lives if we cannot establish what religion even is? 
Throughout this dissertation, I have echoed some of Cavanaugh’s concerns and referred 
to many conceptual difficulties associated with defining “religion.”  In Chapter 1, for instance, I 
noted that Mill defines “religion” in a very general manner but then proceeds to focus on 
something much more specific (i.e. supernatural religion) in his actual analysis of the utility of 
religion.  Moreover, I expressed concerns about defining religion in such a broad manner to 
begin with, as both Mill and James do.  Specifically, such a broad definition of religion would 
seem to incorporate belief systems that some are hesitant to associate with religion, including 
many ostensibly secular commitments, such as patriotism.  Cavanaugh reflects on this point, 
writing, “a survey of religious studies literature finds totems, witchcraft, the rights of man, 
Marxism, liberalism, Japanese tea ceremonies, nationalism, sports, free market ideology, and a 
host of other institutions and practices treated under the rubric ‘religion’.”713  As opposed to Mill 
and James, Nietzsche works with a more specific conception of religion, focusing primarily on 
supernatural religions like Christianity.  As I have argued, these conceptual differences surely 
influence these thinkers’ assessments of religion’s utility.  If Nietzsche was working with 
James’s broad conception of religion (which I have suggested even includes Nietzsche’s own 
fervent naturalism), then surely he would have reached more favorable conclusions regarding 
religion’s utility.  In view of these conceptual difficulties and Cavanaugh’s concerns, I think it is 
imperative that anyone contributing to the discussion of religion’s utility stipulate what definition 
of “religion” they intend to work with (which, to their credit, both Mill and James do).  However, 
Cavanaugh suggests that issues persist even if one tries to offer clear definitions: 
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If one tries to limit the definition of religion to belief in God or gods, then certain 
belief systems that are usually called “religions” are eliminated, such as 
Theravada Buddhism and Confucianism.  If the definition is expanded to include 
such belief systems, then all sorts of practices, including many that are usually 
labeled ‘secular,’ fall under the definition of religion.714 
 
Nevertheless, despite such concerns, I believe it is important to keep in mind that the 
term “religion” is not vacuous.  If it were, it would be difficult to ascertain how Cavanaugh can 
be so sure that there is, in fact, something that is intertwined with the other institutions he 
mentions (i.e. what is it that he claims cannot be isolated from these other institutions?).  I agree 
that trying to validate any thesis related to religion is a difficult endeavor because considerable 
legwork is involved, but I disagree with Cavanaugh’s conclusion, which I believe is too strong.  
Yes, the distinction between religious and secular institutions may be “mystifying” and, at times, 
“misleading” if the legwork is not properly done, but that does not mean that it is altogether 
“unhelpful.”715  Cavanaugh is essentially suggesting that the case for religion causing violence 
can’t be made because the term “religion” is vague.  It would seem, then, that for this same 
reason he would have a problem with anyone invoking the term “religion” in any discussion.  
Shall we not permit ourselves to use the term at all?  Antagonism toward the concept of 
“religion” itself certainly seems to be the upshot of his analysis, but I want to be sure to avoid a 
slippery slope fallacy here.  If Cavanaugh’s position is to be interpreted less extremely, then 
further explanation is required regarding the point at which the term “religion” ceases to be 
problematic for the reasons he articulates.  In other words, how can the issue he raises ever be 
eradicated in any discussion?  If Cavanaugh wishes to avoid association with the extreme 
position that renders the term “religion” incapable of ever serving a useful purpose, then I think 
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he owes us some explanation as to how (or when) it can be used without meeting the same 
pitfalls that plague it within discussions regarding the religion-causes-violence thesis. 
Whether it is ultimately Cavanaugh’s stance or not, I believe such an extreme position is 
certainly unreasonable.  It is impossible to avoid vagueness altogether; there is almost always a 
way to phrase our thoughts more precisely (after all, even the term “vague” is vague).  Clearly, 
we cannot—and should not—avoid speaking when vagueness is inevitable, or else we would 
arguably never speak.  Just as clearly, we can see that, even in instances where vagueness is 
unavoidable, we can still convey what we mean and gain something from doing so.  Hence, 
speaking in such circumstances is still useful, contrary to what Cavanaugh implies.  Consider, for 
example, the following scenario.  Lost while on vacation, I ask where a historic stadium is 
located and a stranger replies, “a long way away from here, buddy.”  What the stranger said is 
vague, and it certainly draws my ire (as I wish he’d be more specific), but it is nonetheless 
useful, since I had been under the impression that I was very close to the stadium.  So too, just 
because “religion” is a vague term doesn’t mean that it can’t nonetheless be employed in a useful 
manner.716  I believe we can speak of religion in a meaningful and useful manner, provided we 
set the necessary foundation and carefully distinguish, as best we can, what exactly we propose 
to signify by our employment of the term.  Thus, the key to a fruitful discussion of the 
relationship between religion and violence, or of anything pertaining to religion, is to, once 
again, clarify as much as possible at the outset what we mean when we use the critical terms 
involved.  Others may disagree with what we have decided to include or exclude by defining the 
terms in the manner we do, but we can still establish fruitful findings regarding the phenomenon 
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of religion as we have chosen to consider it.  All of this goes to show that using the empirical 
method championed by James in an effort to continue exploring the effects of religion is not a 
futile endeavor, as Cavanaugh seems to believe; rather, I believe it is a task well worth the 
attention of future scholarship.  It is, as I have indicated, also pursuant to James’s science of 
religion, toward which I ultimately hope this dissertation constitutes a worthy contribution. 
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APPENDIX: 
Comprehensive Outline of Dissertation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Subject: Philosophy of Religion 
2. Issue: Utility (As Opposed to Truth) of Religion 
3. Significance of Issue: Religion Is Especially Important because It Is So Widespread 
4. The Truth of Religion Receives More Attention than the Utility of Religion 
5. The Utility of Religion Is an Important and Underappreciated Issue 
6. Historical Context and Scholarship 
7. Introduction of Primary Philosophical Texts 
8. Overview of Dissertation and Thesis 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: J.S. Mill and Utility of Religion 
 
I. Introduction  
1. General Introduction 
2. Utility of Religion Is Concerned with the Utility of Religion, Not with Its Truth 
3. The Relationship between the Truth of Religion and the Utility of Religion and Mill’s 
Warning against Unbridled Skepticism 
4. Mill Defines “Religion” in a Very General Manner, but He Focuses on “Supernatural 
Religions” in Much of the Essay 
5. Outline of Chapter 
 
II. Religion and Morality  
A. The Moral Case for the Social Utility of Religion 
6. The Thesis: Religion Is Morally Advantageous 
7. A Stronger Version of the Argument: Religion Is Necessary for Morality 
8. A Weaker Version of the Argument: Religion Is Otherwise Morally Beneficial 
9. Two Themes Underlying Arguments in Support of the Thesis: 1) Religion As an Enforcer 
of Morality 
10. 2) Religion As a Teacher of Morality 
11. The Historical Argument for Religion’s Usefulness 
12. Mill Rejects the Thesis, and He Also Suggests that Religion Is Morally Problematic 
 
B. Mill’s Case against the Thesis that Religion Is Morally Advantageous 
13. The Relationship between Religion and Morality Is Generally Overstated 
14. Morality Is Primarily Steered by Other Powers, Not by Religion  
15. The Power of Authority 
16. The Power of Education 
17. The Power of Public Opinion 
18. Religion Is Not an Effective Enforcer of Morality 
19. Problems with Supernatural Consequences 
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20. Religion Is Not an Effective Teacher of Morality 
21. There Are Inconsistent Moral Recommendations across Religious Traditions 
22. There Are Inconsistent Moral Recommendations within Religious Traditions 
23. Mill Grants Historical Benefit of Religion, Which Seems Suspect 
24. The Benefit Has Been Gained, and Religion Is No Longer Needed 
 
C. Mill’s Case for Why Religion Is Morally Problematic 
25. Mill Not Only Discounts the Thesis that Religion Is Morally Advantageous, He Suggests 
Ways in Which It Is Morally Inhibitory (E.g. Its Holy Nature Restricts Moral Progress) 
26. The Selfish Nature of “Moral” Behavior Motivated by Supernatural Consequences 
27. Lou Matz’s Concern Regarding Mill, a Utilitarian, Making This Point 
28. Holy Wars and the Idea that Religion Causes Violence 
29. Mill Argues that Nefarious Forms of Religion Are Becoming Less Prevalent 
30. Immoral Examples (E.g. Emulating a Creator that Creates a Hell) 
31. Søren Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith 
32. The Problem of Faith 
 
D. Empirical Research 
33. Empirical Evidence Supports Mill 
34. Marc Hauser’s and Peter Singer’s Research: Religious and Non-religious Make Same 
Moral Decisions 
35. Russell Middleton’s and Snell Putney’s Research: Two Kinds of Moral Standards 
(Ascetic and Social) 
36. Middleton and Putney Continued: Non-religious Are Just as Likely (Even More So) to 
Act in Accord with Their Moral Beliefs and Standards as the Religious Are 
37. Gregory S. Paul’s Quantitative Cross-national Analysis 
38. Paul Continued: More Religious Populations Experience Higher Frequency of Social 
Problems 
39. Research Indicating a Positive Correlation between Religion and Moral Beliefs and 
Standards 
40. Research Indicating a Positive Correlation between Religion and Moral Behavior 
 
III. Religion and Personal Happiness 
A. The Case for Supernatural Religions As a Source of Personal Happiness 
41. Introduction 
42. The Origin and Evolution of Religion 
43. Two Reasons Why Religion Is So Long-lasting: 1) It Satisfies Existential Curiosity (a 
Trait It Shares with Poetry) 
44. 2) It Offers Hope Byway of a Positive Belief in a Compensatory Afterlife (a Trait that 
Distinguishes It from Poetry) 
45. Mill Grants that Religion Yields Personal Satisfaction, but He Wonders Whether It Is 
Necessary and/or Optimal for Such Personal Satisfaction 
 
B. Mill’s Case for Why Supernatural Religions Are Not Necessary for Securing 
Personal Happiness 
212 
 
46. History Has Shown That Humankind Can Prosper without Being Significantly Influenced 
by Belief in Heaven and Hell (E.g. Greeks and Buddhists) 
47. There Are Other Substitutes Available (E.g. Patriotism) 
48. Mill’s “Religion of Humanity” 
49. Sigmund Freud Suggests That Science Can Play This Kind of Role 
 
C. Mill’s Case for Why Supernatural Religions Are Not Optimal for Securing 
Personal Happiness 
50. Religion of Humanity Also Avoids the Pitfalls of Supernatural Religions and Is Therefore 
Preferable 
51. Moral Behavior Associated with Religion of Humanity Is Disinterested (Unlike 
Supernatural Religions) but Still Offers a Reward 
52. Religion of Humanity Avoids the Intellectual Difficulties Associated with Supernatural 
Religions (E.g. the Problem of Faith) 
53. The Problem of Evil 
54. The Problem of Hell 
55. The Problem of Divine Grace 
56. One Advantage of Supernatural Religions: the Hope Associated with the Prospect of an 
Afterlife 
57. This Is Becoming Less of an Advantage, and Eventually It Will Cease to Be One 
58. Death Is Not an Evil or to Be Feared 
59. The Evolution of Mill’s Own Increasingly-optimistic View of the Belief in an Afterlife 
throughout His Lifetime and Writings 
60. Lou Matz’s Criticism of Mill’s Position in Utility of Religion 
61. The Criticism Does Not Seem Justified 
 
IV. Conclusion 
62. Mill’s Arguments against the Thesis that Religion Is Morally Advantageous Are 
Generally Convincing 
63. Mill’s Arguments Regarding Religion and the Happiness of Individuals Are Also 
Generally Convincing 
64. Mill Does Not Consider Religion’s Effect on the Physical Health of Individuals 
65. Dawkins and the “Placebo Effect” 
66. Are Mill’s Alternatives Viable for Everyone?  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: Friedrich Nietzsche and The Anti-Christ 
 
I. Introduction 
1. General Introduction 
2. Introduction to Nietzsche 
3. Arthur Schopenhauer’s Influence on Nietzsche 
4. Introduction to The Anti-Christ 
5. Outline of Chapter 
 
II. Nietzsche’s Naturalism 
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6. Introduction to Nietzsche’s Naturalism 
7. Traditional Conceptions of Morality 
8. Nietzsche’s Amoralism 
9. Nietzsche’s Reductionist Ontology 
10. Nietzsche’s Naturalism and His Reductionist Ontology Conflict with the Notions of 
Objective Truths and Moral Standards 
11. His Amoralism Underlies His Distinction between Master and Slave Moralities 
12. Slave Moralities and the Slave Mentality 
13. “Good and Evil” 
14. Master Moralities and the Master Mentality 
15. “Good and Bad” 
16. Nietzsche’s Problems with Religion Stem from the Slave Mentality and the Rejection of 
His Thoroughgoing Naturalism He Associates with It 
 
III. Religion and Truth 
17. Nietzsche Values Honesty and Believes Religion Entails Dishonesty 
18. Self-deception (and the Slave Mentality) Is Common 
19. Supernatural Beliefs Entail Deception 
20. The Notion of Equality Entails Deception 
21. Religious Faith Entails Deception 
22. Religion Is at Odds with Science, Which Is Associated with an Honest Regard for the 
Truth 
23. Priestly Influence 
24. The History of Christianity 
25. Religion—Especially Christianity—Is Ultimately a “Self-misunderstanding” 
26. Concerns Regarding Nietzsche’s Depiction of the Relationship between Religion and 
Truth 
 
IV. Religion and Health 
27. The Master-Slave Distinction Reflects Psychological Attitudes toward Earthly Life 
28. The Problem of Nihilism  
29. Slaves Say “No” to Earthly Life (I.e. They Are Nihilistic) 
30. Schopenhauer—an Atheist—Is Also Nihilistic 
31. Nihilism Is Unhealthy and Nietzsche Values Health above All Else 
32. Religion Is Associated with Weakness and Mental Disease 
33. Religions Value and Emphasize Self-Sacrifice 
34. Religious Faith Is a Sign of Weakness and Disease 
35. Other-worldly Dispositions Are Unhealthy 
36. Nihilistic Conceptions of God 
37. Religions Value and Emphasize Pity, Which Is the “Practice of Nihilism” 
38. Religions Produce Unnecessary Fear and Guilt and Lower Self-esteem 
39. Christianity Is Depressive and Produces Misery, Which Distinguishes It from Buddhism 
40. The Nihilistic Influence of Priests 
41. Concerns Regarding Nietzsche’s Depiction of the Relationship between Religion and 
Health 
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V. Nietzsche’s Remedy: Revaluation of All Values 
42. Nietzsche Fancies Himself a Psychologist 
43. Nietzsche Clearly Disdains the Slave Mentality and Advocates Life Affirmation 
44. Religion (and Slaves in General) Stymies the Emergence and Flourishing of Masters 
45. Nietzsche’s Contempt for Contemporaries 
46. Science and the Prospects of Masters 
47. The Problem of Idealism 
48. Nietzsche’s Prescription: Honesty and A Revaluation of All Values 
49. The Stages of Nihilism 
50. Science and the Natural and Inevitable Devaluation of Idealism  
51. The Similarity between the Natural Devaluation of Idealism and Nietzsche’s Own 
Revaluation of All Values 
52. How Efficacious Is Nietzsche’s Remedy? 
53. “God Is Dead!” Warns of the Difficulties 
54. Nietzsche’s “Overman” 
55. Are We “Human, All Too Human”? 
 
VI. Conclusion 
56. The Divergent Paths of Truth and Happiness 
57. Slaves Cater to Happiness Rather Than the Truth 
58. The Practicality of Nietzsche’s Overman 
59. The Mental Health Benefits of Religion and Idealism 
60. Nietzsche’s Own Mental Health 
61. I Appreciate Nietzsche’s Naturalism and General Descriptive Philosophy, but I Do Not 
Agree with His Prescription for Health 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: William James and The Varieties of Religious Experience 
 
I. Introduction  
1. Introduction to William James 
2. James Offers a Relatively Sympathetic, Well-reasoned Perspective of the Utility of 
Religion 
3. His General Pragmatism Demonstrates His Interest in the Utility of Religion 
4. His Well-known Distinctions and Empirical Criterion Demonstrate His Interest in the 
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